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Abstract 
 
There is increasing concern for scarcity of natural resources and deterioration of the 
environment due to economic activity. Although theoretically the Hotelling rule not 
only provides an optimal extraction for the resource owner’s profit maximization 
problem but also provides the optimal solution for society as a whole, the rule fails 
to fit the facts and only applies to the idealised world for which it was constructed. In 
particularly, when the resource firm realises it can affect its price depending on 
extraction, shareholders will disagree on the extraction rate. Thus, how to deal with 
the shareholders’ interests and make decisions for resource firms is of central 
importance.  Endogenizing firms’ objectives through shareholder voting via 
majority rule is considered as the solution.  
 
This thesis analyzes the behaviour of resources firms in shareholder voting 
equilibrium when the firms’ decisions are taken through shareholder voting. Firstly, 
theoretical models are formulated for the extraction rate and pollution intensity of 
resources firms respectively. We show that the share ownership owned by the largest 
shareholder is an important determinant of extraction rate and pollution intensity. 
Moreover empirical studies using panel data are conducted to test the hypothesis. We 
find strong evidence supporting our theoretical implications. As for the extraction 
rate in resource firms, the results indicate a significant and negative relation between 
extraction rate and the share owned by the largest shareholder. However, a 
significantly positive relation is found using oil fields level data. As for the pollution 
emissions in firms, we find the firm where the largest shareholder holds a larger 
share will have lower pollution intensity. 
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Chapter 1   
Introduction 
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1.1 Research Motives and Aims  
Non-renewable resources include fossil fuel energy such as petroleum (crude oil), 
natural gas and coal and non-energy minerals such as metal and copper. These 
natural resources usually take millions of years to form naturally by geological 
processes so that they exist in the form of finite stocks. Once these reserves are 
extracted, they cannot be renewed. Eventually non-renewable resources will become 
too costly to harvest and human beings will need to find other resources to substitute. 
In terms of social benefits, an optimal extraction is considered to have the property 
that the stock goes to zero at exactly the same point in time that demand and 
extraction go to zero (Perman, et al., 2003). Moreover, the production and 
consumption of non-renewable fossil energy fuels contribute to global warming, for 
example, in petroleum refining. Therefore, our research is centered on 
non-renewable resources extraction and pollution emissions.  
 
The problem of optimal non-renewable resources extraction is first demonstrated by 
Hotelling (1931). In its simplest form, the Hotelling rule states that the price of a 
non-renewable resource should rise at the real rate of interest, which is a necessary 
condition for an extraction programme to be efficient. However, the rule fails to fit 
the facts and only applies to the idealized world for which it was constructed. 
Moreover, when a firm realizes it can affect its price depending on extraction, the 
shareholders often disagree on the extraction rate the firm should take. The reason is 
that an individual with a share ownership different from the population average tends 
to manipulate prices to alter wages and profits. Therefore, how to deal with the 
shareholders’ interests and make extraction decisions for non-renewable resources is 
of central importance under the incomplete market. 
 
In line with Yalcin and Renström (2003), shareholder voting is a solution to 
reconciling the shareholders’ interests through the mechanism of majority voting, 
and thereby preferences of the shareholders are consistent with the objective of the 
firm. Shareholders vote on candidates taken from the group of shareholders, and the 
majority-elected candidate will implement his or her preferred production decision 
(i.e. the candidate decision-maker is referred as Median Voter). Applying 
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median-voter theorem, shareholder voting equilibrium is defined as the production 
decision which is taken by a candidate decision-maker since the candidate 
decision-maker cannot lose against any other candidate in a binary election. 
Shareholder voting equilibrium is considered as production decision via media voter.  
 
Another related paper by Roemer (1993) assumes that all individuals have the same 
preferences but differ in share endowments and the voters’ optimal level of the 
externality increases as voters’ share ownership of the firm increases. He finds that 
the poorer the median voter is relative to the average, a shift towards share 
egalitarian ownership under a median voter assumption will result in greater 
environmental degradation: as the median voter comes to control more resources, her 
preferred level of pollution rises. On the other hand, when the level of environmental 
degradation is picked by those who pursue profit by sacrificing environmental 
quality, will have the positive impact on environmental quality because 
redistribution lead to a decrease in their income and thereby the desire of the wealthy 
for pollution is weakened. 
 
Intrigued by the failure of Hotelling’s (1931) rule and the papers by Yalcin and 
Renström (2003) and Roemer (1993), this thesis seeks to formulate theoretical 
models demonstrating the role of share ownership distribution or the largest 
shareholder in non-renewable resources extraction and pollution emissions, which 
has not been considered in existing literature. Meanwhile, we attempt to conduct 
empirical analysis examining whether the share of the largest shareholder is a 
determinant of extraction and pollution decisions.  
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1.2 Contributions and Datasets Issues 
The theoretical models, together with the empirical evidence complement the extant 
studies on endogenous firm objectives by showing the effects of shares owned by the 
largest shareholder on firm decisions. Yalcin and Renström (2003) and Roemer 
(1993) deal only with the role of share ownership distribution in production / 
pollution decisions of firms through majority voting theoretically. We apply this 
mechanism to natural resources and environmental economics aiming to investigate 
if share ownership distribution matters for resources firms. At the same time, the 
theoretical models are developed.  
 
The principal contribution of our study is that, contrary to previous literature, which 
focuses on the determinants of non-renewable resources extraction rate either only 
economic factors such as price and lagged production or only cost function with 
geological characteristics such as remaining reserves and pay thickness, there is one 
more critical factor to consider—share ownership distribution.  
 
The second contribution of this thesis is in the theoretical respect: theory models are 
formulated for chapter 3 and chapter 5. Chapter 3 extends the work of Yalcin and 
Renström (2003) into resources firms and oil fields respectively. Chapter 5 
constructs a model concerning the relationship between share ownership distribution 
and pollution of firms which reaches a conclusion counter to that of Roemer (1993).  
 
The third contribution is methodological: updated estimation techniques compared to 
those in relevant literature are used. All our empirical studies are estimated with 
panel data techniques which allow particular attention to be paid to the firm/field 
heterogeneity and the dynamic features of the model. In chapter 3, System 
Generalized Method of Moments estimator (GMM) is used. It not only takes into 
account the endogeneity bias and dynamic effects but also mitigates the bias which a 
small sample may cause. In chapter 4, random effects model is applied to capture the 
unobservable characteristics of oil fields. In chapter 5, different from one related 
paper concerning firm pollution emissions by Berrone et al. (2010), who estimate 
their panel regressions applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), we use Feasible 
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Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) and Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) 
which fit panel data and ensure the results are consistent and efficient.   
 
The focus of our study is restricted to firms engaging in non-renewable resources 
production and exploration in chapter 3 and chapter 4. The foremost problem we 
encountered is about the reliability of data and the sufficiency of the sample. Initially 
we collected data from the annual reports of coal mining firms. But the problem was 
that different firms across different countries adopt different measurement in 
reserves and most could not provide complete information of reserves for each mine 
continuously. Therefore, we turn to oil firms.  
 
In addition to the above contributions, another advantage of our study is the 
uniqueness of the datasets we use. As for chapter 3, due to the difficulty in access to 
oil reserves of firms, we take firm value as an appropriate proxy for it. Moreover, the 
share ownership data, production and price data are collected manually from annual 
reports of firms. As for chapter 4, unlike Pesaran (1990) and Favero (1992), who 
estimate the oil supply of UK Continental Shelf oil fields in aggregated output 
equation, we use the disaggregated data by oil fields. Moreover, all the datasets we 
use in the estimation are gathered manually. As for chapter 5, we improve on 
Berrone (2010) regarding the measurement of pollution emissions in two ways. First, 
we use the updated weighting factor, i.e. the value of Human Toxicity Potential 
(HTP) of Hertwich et al. (2006). Second, rather than using pollution emissions in 
pounds directly, we use pollution intensity through dividing pollution emissions by 
real sales.  
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1.3 The Structure of the Thesis 
In this thesis, we would explore three research questions: 
(1) How does share ownership distribution affect extraction rate of resource 
firms when firm decisions are taken through shareholder voting? 
(2) How does share ownership distribution impact extraction rate of North Sea 
oil fields when resource firms have strategic interactions on the same 
plateau? 
(3) How does share ownership distribution affect pollution intensity among firms 
in a duopoly model with shareholder voting?  
 
The structure of the thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we provide a 
literature review on fundamental concepts of non-renewable resources extraction and 
endogenous firm objectives via median voter. First, we present the initiation of the 
theoretical argument —Hotelling models and the relevant extensions for optimal 
extraction of non-renewable resources for competitive firms and a social planner 
followed by an overview of endogenizing the firm production decisions through 
shareholder voting. Lastly, we survey the paper of Roemer (1993) who demonstrated 
the role of share ownership distribution in pollution emissions.   
 
Chapter 3 is devoted to studying the effect of the shares owned by largest 
shareholder on extraction rate of non-renewable resources across firms. Relevant 
empirical literature is reviewed. Then, a simple open-economy non-renewable 
resource model where individuals differ in share ownership of the resource firm is 
formulated and our hypothesis is developed. Lastly, we test if the share ownership of 
the largest shareholder determines the extraction rate of oil using 20 US oil firms 
over 1993-2007.  
 
Chapter 4 is devoted to studying the effect of share ownership held by the largest 
shareholder on extraction rate in oil fields focusing on the literature about the 
production modeling of oil fields. We perform an econometric estimation and 
examine if the largest shareholder does matter for extraction rate based on 44 oil 
fields of the UK Continental Shelf over 1997-2001.  
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Chapter 5 is devoted to studying the effect of share ownership by the largest 
shareholder on pollution emissions. Existing empirical studies concerning the 
determinants of pollution are summarized. Next, we build a duopoly model which 
can capture strategic interaction among firms showing the possibility that firms 
where the larger shareholder holds a larger share will have lower pollution intensity 
in a shareholder voting equilibrium. Finally, by estimating FGLS and PCSE models, 
we test the hypothesis that the larger the share owned by the largest shareholder, the 
smaller the pollution intensity. The observations are focused on three industries: 
Primary Metal (SIC-code33), Metal Mining (SIC-code10) and Petroleum Refining 
and related Industries (SIC-code 29). 
 
Finally, chapter 6 concludes the thesis with an overview of our theoretical 
proposition and empirical findings, then a discussion of the results and the policy 
implications is provided. Finally, some limitations and future research directions are 
presented.  
 
All the data and empirical estimations generated by Stata can be found on a CD-Rom 
which is enclosed with this thesis. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review of the 
Fundamental Concepts 
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2.1 Introduction 
Concerning scarcity of natural resources and deterioration of the environment due to 
economic activity, resources economists have engaged in accumulating considerable 
knowledge. The problem of optimal non-renewable resource extraction is first 
demonstrated by Hotelling (1931). In its simplest form, the Hotelling rule states that 
the price of a non-renewable resource should rise at the real rate of the interest, 
which is a necessary condition for an extraction programme to be efficient.  
 
However, most extant studies suggest that this economic theory of exhaustible 
resources does not adequately explain producer behaviour. To reconcile the theory 
with the reality, economists have expanded Hotelling’s basic theoretical framework 
by introducing more realistic factors to fit the facts. Exploration activity has been 
modelled by allowing new additions of unlimited reserves (Pindyck, 1978; Pesaran, 
1990). Imperfect competition among producers has been considered (Stiglitz, 1976; 
Salant, 1976; Perman et al., 2003). Moreover, asymmetric information has been 
incorporated in the basic Hotelling model (Gaudet et al., 1995; Osmundsen, 1998). 
Taxation effects have been modelled by introducing the distortions due to 
non-neutral tax policy (Slade, 1984; Perman et al., 2003; Krautkramer, 1990; Favero, 
1992). Technical change is also explored by considering cost-lowering technological 
improvements (Slade, 1982; Cuddington and Moss, 2000; Managi et al., 2005). 
    
Our research is concentrated on non-renewable resources extraction decisions of 
firms in incomplete markets since profit-maximization is no longer a well defined 
objective for firm due to lack of price normalization. Accordingly the shareholders 
often disagree about the objectives the firm should pursue. Majority vote of 
shareholders may be one solution to respect shareholders unanimity, which is free of 
the complications and is a more reasonable mechanism relevant to other mechanisms 
or approaches (Sadanand and Williamson, 1991; Geraats and Haller, 1998). Kelsey 
and Milne (1996) show the existence of a simultaneous equilibrium with competitive 
exchange in markets where consumers and producers are price-takers, but each 
firm’s production decisions are determined by an internal collective criterion. Yalcin 
and Renström (2003) have demonstrated that shareholder voting equilibrium is the 
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production decision which is taken by a candidate decision-maker (the electorate 
being shareholders) because the candidate decision-maker cannot lose against any 
other candidate in a binary election. Roemer (1993) analyzes how the level of 
pollution changes as the distribution of share ownership becomes more egalitarian. 
     
As for non-renewable resources extraction in incomplete markets, prior studies 
demonstrate that how producers extract non-renewable natural resources in 
monopolistic firms differs from a social planner but without considering the role of 
shareholders voting in production decisions for a monopolistic firm. They simply 
analyze whether some producers adhere to the Hotelling rule and reach the 
conclusion that a monopoly-owned non-renewable resource tends to be exhausted at 
a slower rate than is socially optimal (e.g. Stiglitz, 1976; Pindyck, 1978; Perman et 
al, 2003). Moreover, little empirical study is found to explore the factors influencing 
the extraction decisions of the monopolistic producer, particularly for the effect of 
share ownership distribution when decisions are taken through by shareholder 
voting. 
    
Our research fills the gap between two strands of literature. The first strand is about 
non-renewable resource optimal extraction in incomplete markets. The second strand 
is about the firm’s objectives are endogenized through shareholder voting via media 
voter. Our emphasis on petroleum extraction complements the analysis by Yalcin 
and Renström (2003) and links it to the extraction problem of non-renewable 
resources. Meanwhile, it considers the fact that extraction and use of fossil fuels such 
as oil, gas, and coal leads to the excessive accumulation of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere. Motivated by Roemer (1993) who has shown the role of share 
ownership distribution in pollution decisions via the median voter rule, we also 
address its effect on pollution abatement decisions when firm objectives are 
endogenized through shareholder voting.  
    
This chapter only includes the fundamental theory and concepts relevant to our study 
whereas related empirical literature will be provided in chapter 3, 4 and 5 
respectively. The rest of this chapter begins by reviewing the theoretical model of 
optimal extraction of non-renewable resources by a social planner and a competitive 
firm whereby the Hotelling rule (1931) is derived and illustrated. More complicated 
11 
 
extensions of the Hotelling model fitting the reality are surveyed in section 2.2.1 and 
applications of Hotelling theory relevant to extraction of petroleum are presented in 
section 2.2.2. In section 2.3, previous studies on endogenized firm objective through 
shareholder voting are reviewed. In section 2.4, studies related to pollution emissions 
at firm level are summarized.  
 
2.2 Optimal Extraction of Non-renewable Resources 
This part of the literature review considers how non-renewable resources are 
extracted for a social planner and for a firm in perfectly competitive markets 
separately. As for a social planner, social welfare is maximized given the constraints 
of fixed resource stock. As for a decision-maker in a competitive firm, the firm’s 
profit is maximized which is subject to fixed initial stock for all firms collectively. 
 
The socially optimal extraction programme involves the choice of resource 
extraction R(t)  over the interval t = 0 to t = T that satisfies the resource stock 
constraint, St and which maximizes social welfare, W
1
.  Mathematically, we have 
  
     Max 
0
W ( ( ))
T
tU R t e dt                                     (2.1)   
     Subject to tRtS
                                          (2.2)  
In order to obtain a formal solution to this optimization problem, tR  must be 
chosen so that the discounted marginal utility is equal at each point in time, that is 
 


  te 
R
U
 constant                                              (2.3) 
 
Moreover, the social utility from consuming a quantity R of the resource may be 
defined as 
R
dRRPRU
0
)()(  in which P(R) denote the inverse demand function 
for the resource, indicating that the resource net price P  is a function of the 
quantity extracted R, P(R) = aRKe . By differentiating total utility with respect to R 
                                                 
1
 For excellent discussion of the underlying welfare framework , see Stern (2007): page 49-59.  
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(the rate of resource extraction and use), we obtain 
U
R(t)
t
tP



 which states that the 
marginal social utility of resource use equals the royalty of the resource tP . Hence, 
the requirement that the discounted marginal utility be constant is equivalent to the 
requirement that the discounted net price is constant as well. That is, 
 
0tan
R
U
PtconsePe tt
t 

                      
Rearranging this condition, we obtain tt ePP

0  which implies that the value of a 
unit of reserves in the ground is the same as its current value above the ground less 
the marginal costs of extracting it.     
Then by differentiating tt ePP

0 , we obtain 

t
t
P
P
, the Hotelling rule. It states 
that the shadow price or royalty tP  of non-renewable resource should rise at a rate 
which is equal to the social utility discount rate  when the social value of the 
resource is to be maximized. That is to say, according to Hotelling’s rule, the value 
of a unit of reserves in the ground (also called in situ resource price) is the same as 
its current value above the ground less the marginal costs of extracting it. Moreover, 
this is a necessary condition for an extraction program to be efficient and does not 
fully characterize the solution to the optimization problem.  
 
In contrast to a social planner, a price-taker makes extraction decision by 
maximizing its firm’s discounted profit instead of a utilitarian social welfare 
subjected to the total initial reserves S  for all firms collectively, which is displayed 
as: 
        Max ,
0
W
T
it
j tP R e dt
                                     
(2.4)         
        subject to ,
0
1
( )
mT
j t
j
R dt S

                                  (2.5)  
The profit-maximizing extraction rate ,j tR is obtained when its discounted marginal 
profit is the same at any time, namely
,
,
j t it it
t
j t
PR
e Pe
R
 

 

constant. The result 
implies that market net price of the resource must grow over time at the market 
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interest rate, namely t
t
P
P
i

 , once again it is the Hotelling efficiency rule which is 
identical to the outcome of the social optimal solution as shown above. Therefore, 
the extraction path in competitive market economies is socially optimal when the 
market interest rate is equal to social discount rate and extraction cost is zero.  
 
Summing up, the Hotelling rule is an efficient condition that must be satisfied by any 
optimal extraction programme regardless of utilitarian social welfare and 
competitive market economies. According to Hotelling (1931), there are five main 
factors determining a non-renewable natural resource price: the marginal cost of 
extraction, the back stop price of the next best substitute, demand and the resource 
reserves and the discount rate.  
 
However, when these variants are unknown, we are not able to determine the price 
path of the natural resource and an optimal extraction rate. In particular, if the 
demand is non-isoelastic, for example, when private and social discount rates
2
 are 
different, market extraction paths may be biased compared with optimal path. 
Moreover, as Mankiw and Reis (2007) specified, information stickiness is present in 
all markets when setting prices, wages, and consumption and especially for smaller 
shareholders who are inattentive, sporadically updating their information sets. It is 
shown that monetary policy and aggregate demand shocks account for most of the 
variance of inflation, output, and hours. 
               
2.2.1 Extensions of the Hotelling model 
The Hotelling rule (1931) is based on very restrictive assumptions such as perfect 
information and costless extraction. Economists attempt to improve its empirical 
validity by adding more realistic assumptions such as exploration activity (Pindyck, 
1978; Pesaran, 1990), imperfect competition (Stiglitz, 1976; Salant, 1976; Perman et 
al., 2003), asymmetric information (Gaudet et al., 1995; Osmundsen, 1998), resource 
taxation (Perman et al., 2003; Krautkramer, 1990; Favero, 1992), and technical 
                                                 
2 In terms of discount rate, see excellent discussion in Stern (2007), page 58-59. 
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change (Slade, 1982; Cuddington and Moss, 2000; Managi et al., 2005). These prior 
studies are briefly reviewed as follows. 
 
2.2.1.1 Exploration  
   
Pindyck (1978) demonstrates that optimal exploratory activity and production are 
simultaneously determined in the context of a continuous-time model under certainty. 
He considers that potential resource reserves are unlimited. A conclusion is reached 
that the price paths will be U-shaped. Because when the initial reserves endowment 
is small, at first production will increase as reserves are developed, and later it will 
decline as both exploratory activity and the discovery rate fall.   
  
By building on the theoretical contributions of Pindyck (1978), Pesaran (1990) has 
developed a multi-period discrete-time econometric model for the analysis of 
exploration and extraction decisions of a price-taking firm operating under 
uncertainty. He proposed the production equation under the Rational Expectation 
Hypothesis (REH for short) and Adaptive Expectations Hypothesis (AEH for short) 
respectively: 
 
ttttttttttt uhzqzppzzqq   113112111101 )()1(   (REH) (2.6) 
ttttttttt vhzqzpzzqq   11311211101 )(
~)1()1( 
 (AEH) (2.7) 
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and tR denotes quarterly proven reserves 
computed from yearly reserves,  is discount factor, tp  
represents real price of oil 
computed as 1.0107*average quarterly spot prices of Brent Crude or Arabian Light 
Crude /average quarterly index of export prices of industrial countries. In addition, 
adaptive expectations of the real oil prices are constructed recursively according 
to 11 )1()(
~)(~   ttt ppp  . 
    
Furthermore, Pesaran (1990) has applied the framework to an empirical analysis of 
oil exploration and extraction on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS). 
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Both equations are estimated by OLS showing that production is positively 
correlated with the lagged production or price. Moreover, under the assumption of 
zero discount rate, they found strong positive price effects on oil supplies only in the 
case of supply equation with adaptively formed price expectations.  
 
2.2.1.2 Imperfect competition  
 
The presence of imperfect competition evidently influences the optimal extraction of 
firms. Although Hotelling analyzes the cases of perfect competition and monopoly, 
his work contain no game-theoretic considerations
3
. In this section, relevant models 
of the non-renewable resources extraction in incomplete markets, including 
monopoly, oligopoly, and a cartel-versus-fringe, are reviewed.    
    
There has been much literature concerning the rate of exploration of a non-renewable 
resource in a monopolistic market. Stiglitz (1976) demonstrated that, under a special 
case of a stationary isoelasticity demand, with zero extraction costs, monopolistic 
and competitive price paths will coincide. In other cases, a monopolist tends to 
extract less than a producer in a competitive market. This means that the monopolist 
will take a longer time than the competitive market to exhaust the same initial 
resource stock suggesting that the monopolist is a more conservation minded than a 
competitive market would be. The same conclusion is reached by Perman et al. 
(2003). The influence of monopoly in price paths is captured by empirical studies. 
For example, Ellis and Halvorsen (2002) investigate the gap between price and 
marginal cost. Through estimating the model for the largest firm in the nickel 
industry, they find that market power accounts for the large share of the gap.  
    
Motivated by the post-1973 oil market and the presence of OPEC as a dominant 
player, Salant (1976) treats the oil market as consisting of a dominant firm (i.e. cartel) 
and a fringe of price-taking firms. The open loop Nash-Cournot equilibrium is 
solved by defining that the competitive fringe takes as given price paths by the 
dominant player and then choose an extraction rate, while the dominant player 
                                                 
3
 As Hotelling (1931) suggested, a more realistic market structure for non-renewable resource is some form of 
oligopolistic competition rather than a monopoly. 
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chooses a price path given the aggregate extraction path of competitive fringe. 
During the decision process, the dominant player and the competitive fringes do not 
consider the effect of their strategies on each other. 
    
An open-loop Nash equilibrium among several oligopolistists is characterized by 
Loury (1986) who considers that these firms have the same marginal cost but 
different initial reserves. Loury shows that aggregate output falls over time, in 
particular those firms with smaller reserves deplete faster than firms with large 
reserves. Lewis and Schmalensee (1980) consider firms that differ in extraction costs. 
They demonstrate that in an open-loop Nash equilibrium the lowest cost deposit may 
not be exhausted first, which is contrary to what is dictated by a social planner. The 
same result is given by Benchekroun et al. (2009, 2010) who assume that there are 
two groups both consisting of identical firms, and firms can differ across groups in 
deposit size and marginal cost. They also find that an increase in the aggregate stock 
of the fringe with higher extraction cost may undermine social welfare.  
   
Focusing on open-loop equilibrium in an extractive duopoly, Gaudet and Long (1994) 
analyze the effect of a marginal transfer from one firm to another and show that a 
transfer that gives rise to more unequal stock distribution will lead to the industry’s 
higher output and profit. This result is a dynamic counterpart of results obtained in 
the static Cournot oligopoly model of Bergstrom and Varian (1985) who consider 
that an increase in the marginal cost of one firm will lead to an equal decrease in the 
marginal cost of its rival.    
    
Some other studies adopt the cartel-versus-fringe approach in which the cartel is 
considered as a Stackelberg leader (Gilbert, 1978; Newbery, 1981; Ulph, 1982; 
Groot, Withagen and de Zeeuw, 1992). In contrast to Salant’s model, the cartel 
determines its extraction path first, and the fringe reacts to that. The cartel takes the 
fringe’s reaction into account in choosing the extraction path. However, a problem 
with the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is not time-consistent. The leader will 
have an incentive to renege on its announced plan and will manipulate the fringe’s 
reaction when there is no binding contract. To avoid the problem of time 
inconsistency, Groot, Withagen and de Zeeuw (2003) propose a model of cartel and 
fringe under the feedback assumption. When the number of fringe firms tends to be 
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infinitely large, the value function for each fringe is linear in its own stock but 
independent of other firms’ stock. They not only find that the open-loop Stakelberg 
solution is time-consistent but also find it coincides with the feedback solution path.  
 
2.2.1.3 Asymmetric information 
    
For non-renewable natural resources exploitation, government as the owner of the 
resource (called the principal) will delegate the extraction of the resource to a firm or 
firms (called the agent). If both the government and the delegated firm can perfectly 
observe the resource price and the extraction costs, the observed extraction path will 
satisfy the Hotelling rule of non-renewable resources optimal extraction. Then the 
royalty schedule must induce the mining firm to deplete the mine in a way that 
marginal net benefits increase at the rate of interest (Gaudet et al., 1995). In practice, 
however, the firm knows more than the owner such as extraction costs and deposit 
size. The literature introduces the asymmetry of information into the Hotelling model 
for non-renewable resources extraction aiming to arrive at a more general 
characterization of the optimal royalty. 
    
Gaudet et al. (1995) consider the effects of asymmetric information on extraction 
costs and analyze optimal non-renewable resource royalty contracts (payment and 
extraction path). They show that the asymmetry of the information constraints the 
government’s effort to recuperate the resource rent via a royalty payment imposed on 
the firms exploiting the resource. In comparison with full information extraction, 
when the resource stock is required to be exhausted in two periods by optimal 
contracts, information asymmetry decreases the production in the first period for all 
types of firms except the most efficient. Moreover, even the output of the lowest cost 
firm is distorted when exhaustion in two periods is not warranted. 
    
Osmundsen (1998) develop a model of optimal regulation in exploiting 
non-renewable natural resources when government faces the problem of asymmetric 
information about reserves. It is shown that optimal contracts in a two-period distort 
both the extent and the pace of extraction. When the choice of terminal period is 
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endogenized, it is optimal to distort the number of extraction periods in response to 
the asymmetry of information.  
    
Turning attention to our study in terms of petroleum extraction, the effects of 
asymmetry of information is a concern as it is likely to be more severe than other 
non-renewable resources. According to Osmundsen (1995, 1998), two explanations 
for this are: (1) large resource rents may induce firms to exaggerate true costs, and (2) 
particularly for the vertically integrated multinational petroleum firms, they have 
more opportunities to camouflage their true costs.  
 
2.2.1.4 Resource taxation 
 
Extractive industries are subject to many forms of taxation and government 
regulations such as severance taxes, royalties, subsidies and price controls. Those 
taxes can be levied at any stage of production (e.g. exploration, refining or 
fabrication). A neutral tax system can be omitted from an economic and econometric 
model. A system can be considered neutral if it does not affect the decisions of 
economic agents. When a non-neutrality tax system is omitted, its instability might 
cause the break-down of a backward looking econometric model (Lucas, 1976). 
 
Many people have studied the effects of taxations on extraction profile under perfect 
competition. Slade (1984) developed a model for assessing the effects of taxation on 
resource extraction for a vertically integrated extractive firm incorporating various 
sorts of taxes and subsidies at different stages of production. After estimation of a 
U.S. copper-mining firm which has only one mine, the solutions are compared with 
those solutions in tax-free situations with respect to the magnitude and time pattern 
of distortions. He shows that taxation affects the extraction path and cumulative ore
4
 
extraction as well as cumulative metal production. Only the first effect can be 
observed. However, in practice, the latter two effects dominate. Moreover, taxies and 
subsidies can change ultimate ore extraction and metal processing intensities in 
opposite ways depending on the stages of production at which the tax is imposed.  
 
                                                 
4 The term ‘Ore’ represents one mineral in the ground. 
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Moreover, Krautkramer (1990) develops a model for examining the effects of 
taxation on resource depletion when ore quality varies within deposits and ore 
quality selection is constrained. He concludes that tax policy is less conserving of the 
resource when ore quality is heterogeneous within deposits. In particular a constant 
severance tax can induce faster depletion, reduce the life of the mine and increase the 
production of metal when extraction is feasible.  
 
Another related paper is by Perman et al. (2003) who analyze the effect of revenue 
tax or subsidy on resource royalties. They show that imposition of revenue tax 
(revenue subsidy) is equivalent to an increase (decrease) in extraction cost. Therefore, 
consistent with Slade (1984), taxies and subsidies can change ultimate ore extraction 
in opposite directions. In contrast to revenue tax, revenue subsidy may lead to lower 
initial gross price and shorten the time to exhaust the stock.  
 
Particularly for fossil fuels taxation, Ulph and Ulph (1994) analyze the optimal time 
path of a carbon tax and show that some factors cause the carbon tax to rise whereas 
others cause it to fall. They also demonstrate the numerical results suggesting that a 
carbon tax is supposed to be upward initially and then downward.  In contrast, 
Sinclair (1994) argues that declining oil taxation is advantageous if falling time-trend 
carbon taxation can lessen future global warming.  
    
Very few econometric models, except Favero (1992), have been done on estimating 
the effects of taxation on non-renewable resources extraction and exploration. 
Favero (1992) has expanded Pesaran (1990) econometric model of petroleum 
exploration and extraction policies for ‘price taking’ suppliers in the UKCS. Favero 
(1992) estimates the oil supply function by taking the UKCS taxation system into 
account. He concludes the post-tax shadow price of oil in the ground becomes 
negative suggesting that the model overstates the impact of taxation on profit. This 
feature is attributed by the inability of the model to capture recent modifications in 
taxation aimed at helping development. He supports suggestions by Pesaran (1990) 
that the result needs a further disaggregation of the investment and production 
decision into exploration development and extraction decisions may be worth 
considering. Inspired by Favero (1992), we investigate the extraction decision of the 
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UKCS by disaggregating the extraction of the UKCS into the extraction of oil fields 
in chapter 4.  
 
2.2.1.5 Technological change 
 
The empirical failure of Hotelling has been credited in part to technical changes. On 
the one hand, new techniques and processes may obtain synthetic substitutes for 
non-renewable resources. On the other, improvement in technology may facilitate 
more efficient exploration and production, thereby potentially offsetting the 
depletion effect on resource prices. 
 
Slade (1982) examines the effect of technological change on the 
exhaustible-resource industry particularly on market prices. The author argues that 
marginal extraction costs fall over time as technology improves thereby market 
prices can fall early on when scarcity rents are small. However, as reserves depletes, 
prices eventually rise and the price paths is U-shaped.  
 
Cuddington and Moss (1998) investigate the determinants of the average exploration 
cost for additional petroleum reserves in the U.S. over 1967-1990. Technological 
change played a major role in allaying what would lead to a sharp rise in the average 
cost of finding additional reserves of natural gas. The impact of technological change 
on finding costs for U.S. crude oil reserves has been more modest in comparison 
with natural gas. A similar conclusion is reached by Managi et al. (2005) who test 
the impact of technological change on offshore oil and gas exploration-discovery and 
of drilling cost in the Gulf of Mexico from 1947 to 1998, both at field level and at 
regional level. They use the number and significance of technological innovations as 
a proxy for technological change. The results show that technological change plays a 
very significant role in increasing reserves and lowering cost over the past 50 years.  
 
Many studies have shown the Hotelling rule has difficulty in explaining the actual 
initial price level (Miller and Upton, 1985; Gately, 1984). Nevertheless, a notable 
exception is found in the work of Lin and Wagner (2007). Using data on the oil 
market from 1970 to 2004, Lin and Wagner incorporate stock effects and the 
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technological progress in the theoretical Hotelling model and show that the oil price 
is consistent with the Hotelling model. Therefore, technological change matters for 
reconciling the Hotelling theory with reality. 
 
2.2.2 Application to petroleum extraction  
The Hotelling model has received considerable development and application in 
petroleum exploration and extraction (Pearce and Turner, 1990; Tietenberg, 2000). 
We concentrate on the petroleum supply studies aiming to address the determinants 
of petroleum production decisions in prior studies.  
 
Mabro et al. (1986) construct a static linear model dealing with oil output in terms of 
seasonal dummies, a time, a time trend, and the nominal price of Brent Crude. Using 
monthly data covering the periods from January 1980 to February 1985, they find 
that seasonal variations have significant impact on U.K. oil production but fail to 
find the evidence of price sensitivity of oil output.  
 
Unlike Mabro et al. (1986), Pesaran (1990) accounts for price and cost expectations 
(in rational expectations hypothesis and adaptive expectations hypothesis 
respectively) and dynamic effects of lagged production. An econometrical model is 
developed based on the work of Pindyck (1978) regarding optimal exploration and 
extraction for oil price-taking firms in which their objective is to maximize the 
expected profits. In the model, he shows that price changes in oil supplies depending 
crucially on the formation of price expectations. Moreover, non-OPEC oil 
production not only depends on price but also depends on expected future 
output-reserve ratios. The latter dependence arises due to the assumption of joint 
determination of extraction and exploration decisions.  
 
After estimating this model with UKCS data over the periods 1978-1986, Pesaran 
(1990) finds strong positive price effects on oil supplies only in the hypothesis of the 
supply equation with adaptive price expectations. However, using Norwegian data 
over 1989-2008, the model in Pesaran (1990) is evaluated by Persson (2011) who 
finds poor results and concludes that it is not valid to use in Norwegian production.  
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Another related study is by Nygreen et al. (1998) who evaluate a model of 
Norwegian petroleum production and transportation which had been used by the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and major Norwegian oil producers for more than 
fifteen years. As for the model, the optimal solutions are derived from maximization 
of total net present value of future cash flows or minimization of deviations from an 
initial target including both economic and engineering constraints (i.e. pipeline and 
production capacity). The authors reach the conclusion that this model has 
influenced historical oil production and planning. Nevertheless, most important 
production decisions are made in line with political factors. 
 
Summing up, extant models provide possible thinking ways of petroleum production 
decisions. Production decisions in practice are not always made simply according to 
the models of optimal production. According to Nygreen et al. (1998), 
accompanying political effects might make the models more reliable and applicable.  
 
2.3 Endogenizing the Production Decisions  
In complete markets, it is reasonable for a firm to maximize profit when the price is 
normalized and there is unanimity among shareholders. However, in incomplete 
markets, in addition to price normalization problem, shareholders often disagree on 
the effect of changes in firm production plans. Therefore, profit-maximization is no 
longer a well-defined objective for the firm in incomplete markets. In this section, 
the literature focuses on the source of shareholders disagreements and the solution to 
aggregate the shareholders interests as well as related theory by Yalcin and Renström 
(2003).      
 
2.3.1 The source of failure of shareholders unanimity  
If markets are incomplete, profit-maximization is no longer a well-defined objective 
for the firm, and shareholders disagreement may occur in equilibrium. This source of 
the disagreement seems natural and realistic. Investors have differing subjective 
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assessment of investments in the absence of markets (DeMarzo, 1993). On the other 
hand, there may be conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders of the 
firm (a so-called principal-agent problem) as well as among shareholders themselves. 
But even if the principal-agent problem is absent, if managers are eager to fulfill the 
wishes of the shareholders, the problem remains that the shareholders themselves 
may disagree over what objectives the firm should pursue (Geraats and Haller, 1998). 
Moreover, Yalcin and Renström (2003) suggest that shareholders often tend to 
disagree about the objectives the firm should pursue, and none of them may favour 
profit maximization. Early work concerning objectives of firms with incomplete 
markets has explored the consequence of specific decision criteria. For instance, 
Geanakoplos et al. (1987) have established that even the most promising 
decentralised decision producer leads to generic inefficient allocations in stock 
market economies.  
   
The failure of shareholder unanimity is a major concern in the literature summarized 
by Haller (1988). Haller (1986) points out that shareholder disagreement results from 
the fact that the firm has got market power and, that its production decision affects 
equilibrium prices. If investors differ in preferences, they prefer different relative 
prices. If they differ in endowments, then the firm's decisions will affect the value of 
these endowments and will have a redistributive effect. Moreover, DeMarzo (1993) 
also investigates the source of this shareholder disagreement and in particular 
characterizes the relationship between the preferences of the shareholders and its 
production objectives.  
    
Finally, under imperfect competition, the problem concerning the suitability and 
appropriateness of profit or net market value maximization has been disputed for a 
long time. As Yalcin and Renström (2003) specified, as for suitability, the lack of 
fairly general equilibrium existence results was a concern. Standard techniques 
turned out to have little impact in many instances, while nonexistence was 
established in some other instances. As for appropriateness, the objective of profit or 
net market value maximization is questionable if firms exercise market power. For 
instance, Geraats and Haller (1998) analyze various cases to show that (actual or 
asymptotic) shareholder unanimity and (actual or asymptotic) net-market-value 
maximization are, by and large, unrelated phenomena. This finding contrasts with 
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the results under replication where asymptotic shareholder unanimity and asymptotic 
net-market-value maximization go hand-in-hand.  
    
The issue of oligopolistic or monopolistic market power and the genuine source of 
shareholder disagreement may be convoluted with another important issue known as 
the “numeraire problem”: how to account properly for profits. Yalcin and Renström 
(2003) point out that in certain models, even the definition of profits is dubious 
because of the price normalization or numeraire, problem. Nevertheless, when firms 
exercise market power and maximize nominal profits, price normalization has real 
effects, as first addressed by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972). Different real outcomes 
would then be obtained under different price normalization rules (see Haller (1986); 
Grodal (1996); in addition, see Bohm (1994); Dierker and Grodal (1996) among 
others, for attempts to address or resolve this issue. According to Yalcin and Thomas 
(2003), a further issue is that when a firm has market power, net market value 
maximization may not be supported by shareholders who often disagree on the 
objectives the firm should undertake. Thus, the need to reconcile or aggregate 
shareholder interests arises. Shareholder voting may be the solution. 
 
2.3.2 The mechanisms of reconciling shareholders disagreements   
There are two ways in which the literature has resolved this problem. One is to 
restrict either the feasible set of potential modifications of production plans or the 
nature of the utility functions to reconcile the disagreements among shareholders; the 
other is to devise alternative mechanisms for the firm’s decision-making such as 
maximization of the expected utility of profit (Sandmo, 1971; Leland, 1972) and 
maximization of a weighted sum of the shareholders’ utilities (Diamond, 1967).  
    
As for the first approach, the conditions necessary for unanimity of shareholders are 
too restrictive and not realistic. For instance, the restricting of individual’s 
preference (Baron, 1979) and the competitive assumptions about how potential 
changes in firm plans will be evaluated (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). As for the 
alternative mechanism approach, prior papers encounter one difficulty that truthful 
revelation by shareholders of their preferences is required. Moreover, the 
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mechanisms are usually very abstract decision-making rules which place large 
computational and informational demands on the shareholders.  
 
In contrast, majority rule is free of these complications and is a more reasonable 
mechanism (Sadanand and Williamson, 1991). As Gerrates and Haller (1998) 
suggest, if the median-voter argument applies, the core elements are very easily 
determined as the most preferred alternatives of the median voter. Kelsey and Milne 
(1996) show the existence of a simultaneous equilibrium with competitive exchange 
in markets where consumers and producers are price-takers, but each firm’s 
production decisions are determined by an internal collective criterion. When the 
firm’s production decisions are taken through shareholder voting, the consistency 
between preferences of the shareholders and the objective of firm is ensured thereby 
the firm objective is endogenized (Yalcin and Renström, 2003).  
 
2.3.2.1 Median voter theory 
 
When a decision is reached by voting or is arrived at by a group all of whose 
members are not in complete accord, the median-voter theorem for voting in 
committees will be adopted, which is proposed by Black (1948) and applied to 
electoral competition and extension to representative democracy by Downs (1957). 
The median voter theorem, is a famous voting model positing that in a majority 
election, if voter policy preferences can be represented as a points along a single 
dimension, if all voters vote deterministically for the politician that commits to a 
policy position closest to their own preference, and if there are only two politicians, 
then if the politicians want to maximize their number of votes they should both 
commit to the policy position preferred by the median voter. 
 
To appreciate the logic of the median voter model, consider a setting where three 
individuals —Anne, Bob and Charlie—are to choose a restaurant for lunch. Anne 
prefers a restaurant where lunch can be had for $5.00, Bob favours a bit better fare at 
a restaurant serving $10.00 lunches, and Charlie wants a gourmet restaurant where 
lunch will cost around $20.00. Bob can be said to be the median voter because 
exactly the same number of individuals prefer a more expensive restaurant than Bob 
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as prefer a less expensive restaurant than Bob, here one each. For convenience 
assume that, given any two options, each member of the lunch group prefers 
restaurants with prices closer to their preferred restaurant to ones that are farther 
from it. Now consider some majority decisions over alternative restaurants: 
 
            OPTIONS   PATTERN OF VOTES   RESULT 
            $10 vs. $20   A: 10   B: 10   C: 20     10 
            $5 vs. $20    A: 5    B: 5    C: 20      5 
            $5 vs. $16    A: 5    B: 5    C: 16      5 
            $10 vs. $5    A: 5    B: 10   C: 10      10 
            Example is from Congleton (2002) 
 
Note that Bob always votes in favour of the outcome that wins the election. Note 
also Bob's preferred $10 restaurant will defeat any other. As specified above, the 
median voter’s ideal point is always a Condorcet winner. Consequently, once the 
median voter’s preferred outcome is reached, it cannot be defeated by another in 
pair-wise majority voting.  
 
Congleton (2002) further identifies two versions of the median voter theorem: a 
weak form which says that the median voter “casts his or her vote for the policy that 
is adopted,” and a strong form, which states that the median voter “always gets her 
most preferred policy.” Moreover, Dasgupta and Maskin (2008) have shown that 
simple majority rule satisfies five standard and attractive axioms —the Pareto 
property, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and 
(generic) decisiveness —over a larger class of preference domains than (essentially) 
any other voting rule.  
 
However, there is a well-known theoretical problem with majority rule that appears 
to reduce the applicability of the median voter model. A median voter does not 
always exist. For example, suppose there are three voters —Anne, Bob and Cathy 
–who must choose among three policy alternatives—I, II, and III. Suppose that Anne 
prefers option III to II to I, while Bob prefers I to III to II and Cathy prefers II to I to 
III. Note that the pattern of votes will be, III > II and II > I, but I > III. Majority rule 
can lead to inconsistent rankings of policy alternatives, and to unstable policy 
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choices. Black (1948) pointed out that single peaked preferences are sufficient to 
guarantee the existence of a median voter in one dimensional issue spaces. But in 
two-dimensional cases, a median voter exists only in cases where voter tastes are 
very symmetrically distributed (Plott, 1969). 
 
 
2.3.2.2 The existence and the nature of shareholder voting     
equilibrium 
 
Geraats and Haller (1998) have made several simplifying assumptions to validate the 
median-voter approach: absence of conflicting interests of management and 
shareholders; focus on a single firm to isolate the most pertinent issues of 
shareholder voting; a one-dimensional production decision; a specific quadratic cost 
function to avoid corner solutions; and a mean-variance setting. They provide the 
two key prerequisites for the median-voter argument: (1) a one-dimensional space of 
alternatives; (2) single-peakedness of individual preferences.  
    
Rather than voting directly on the firm’s production decisions, Yalcin and Renstrom 
(2003) assume that shareholders vote on candidates taken from the group of 
shareholders, and the majority-elected candidate will implement his or her preferred 
production decision (i.e. the candidate decision-maker is referred to as the Median 
Voter). Applying the median-voter theorem, shareholder voting equilibrium is 
defined as the production decision which is taken by a candidate decision-maker 
since the candidate decision-maker cannot lose against any other candidate in a 
binary election.  
     
The existence of voting equilibrium is by no means guaranteed when 
multidimensional (production or other) decisions are taken (Plott, 1967). Whereas 
Sadanand and Williamson (1991) established the existence of equilibrium with 
shareholders voting in production economy with incomplete markets based on the 
mechanism of majority rule. Allocation of the shares of the firms and the initial good 
are determined by trading in the market. Production decisions are made collectively 
by the shareholders using the version of majority rule. DeMarzo (1993) incorporates 
a model of corporate control into a general equilibrium framework for production 
28 
 
economies with incomplete markets. Firms’ objectives are viewed as being subject to 
shareholders’ control via some decision mechanism. As long as the decision 
mechanism is responsive to unanimous preference by shareholders, shareholder 
control is consistent with but stronger than the value maximization.  
 
In a general equilibrium model with certain externalities between production and 
consumption, Kelsey and Milne (1996) show the existence of a simultaneous 
equilibrium with competitive exchange in markets where consumers and producers 
are price-takers, but each firm’s production decisions are determined by an internal 
collective criterion. Again with multidimensional production decisions, a recurrent 
theme in a small literature using the simultaneity model is that ceteris paribus a firm 
maximizes the welfare of one of its final shareholders in equilibrium provided 
equilibrium exists (see Gevers, 1974; Benninga and Muller, 1979; DeMarzo, 1993).  
    
Moreover, DeMarzo (1993) shows that in some instances where a voting equilibrium 
exists, the firm's production plan is optimal for the largest shareholder of the firm 
(for other forms of shareholder participation, see Forsythe and Suchanek (1984) and 
Haller (1991)). In addition, Geraats and Haller (1998) analyze the outcome of a 
single majority voting among shareholders of a single firm with one-dimensional 
production decisions. The asset market is effective by assumption and the safe asset 
is chosen to be the numeraire. As a result of their assumption on a stock market 
economy, a shareholder voting equilibrium (i.e., a median voter outcome in 
before-trade voting) exists and is essentially unique. 
 
2.3.3 The effects of share ownership distribution 
Yalcin and Renström (2003) analyze the behaviour of a monopolistic firm in general 
equilibrium and demonstrate that inequality of share ownership distribution leads to 
underproduction or overproduction relative to the efficient level when production 
decisions are taken through shareholder voting via median voter. 
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As stated in the paper by Yalcin and Renström (2003), shareholders are asked to 
express preferences over l2 (labour for the monopoly sector) to recognize the general 
equilibrium price consequences. The consumer h’s indirect utility can be obtained: 
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From the derivative of  2
h l  with respect to l2, the net effect of the consumer’s 
endowment of shares h2  relative to her endowment of potential work time is 
explicitly implied. A change in consumer h’s share h is 
increasing/constant/decreasing in sector 2(monopoly firms) activity if her share h2  
in the monopoly firm is less/equal/greater than the population average.   
    
The production decision is defined as a shareholder voting equilibrium by Yalcin and 
Renström (2003). Shareholders vote on candidates and the majority-elected 
candidate will make the production decisions. Under the assumption that all 
consumers have the same time endowment, production in the monopoly firm is 
higher/equal/lower output than the Competitive Economic Equilibrium (CEE) if the 
median voter owns a proportion of shares in the monopoly firm that is 
lower/equal/higher than the inverse of the population size. In particular, if consumers 
are identical in their labour endowments and public ownership, then the CEE results. 
    
Another related paper exploring the distribution of share ownership is by Renström 
and Roszbach (1998). They analyze wage setting by a monopoly union, when union 
members own shares in the firm. Union members vote on the wage rate and the firm 
is a price-taker. They conclude that the more right-skewed the distribution of share 
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ownership among union members the higher is the demanded wage rate and the 
higher is unemployment.   
     
On the other hand, Roemer (1993) has shown the role of share distribution in 
pollutant emission level, modeling a situation in which a firm’s production causes a 
negative externality. All individuals have the same preferences but differ in share 
endowments. The firm’s production decisions are taken through shareholder voting. 
He shows that the more right-skewed the distribution of share ownership is, i.e., the 
poorer the median voter is relative to the average, the more production and the more 
of the externality the firm produces. Furthermore, in the political-economic models 
where the voters determine the level of the public bad but shareholdings are 
determined endogenously on a stock market, the optimal level of the public bad is 
indeed increasing in the share of the firm an agent holds at equilibrium, and a 
redistribution of wealth which engenders a more equal distribution of shares of firms 
at equilibrium lowers the equilibrium level of the public bad (Roemer, 1992a, 
1992b).  
 
2.3.4 Trading in shares and the redistribution effect 
 
Most of the literature analyzes a situation where share ownership is exogenous and 
there is no trade in shares. However, individuals may purchase additional shares 
(deviating from the initial distribution) to acquire voting rights and affect the 
decisions in their desired direction. Moreover, by purchasing/selling shares, the 
individuals also affect the equilibrium prices of shares.  
 
Geraats and Haller (1998) divide the shareholders into two classes: naive and 
sophisticated shareholders. As for naive investors, they take the initial shareholdings 
as unalterable. They vote on the current production decision as if this decision was 
inconsequential for the future stock market allocation. Sophisticated investors, by 
definition, are assumed to have resolved this problem. They anticipate correctly the 
impact of the current production decision on their ultimate welfare, a case of perfect 
foresight or “rational expectations.” They find that no sophisticated shareholder 
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supports the production plan that maximizes the net market value of the firm. An 
investor’s preferred production plan depends on his initial or final shareholdings and 
risk aversion. Distributional assumptions regarding initial shareholdings and risk 
aversion parameters prove crucial for the median voter outcome.  
 
Furthermore, before-trade shareholder voting leads to asymptotic net-market-value 
maximization when the median investor is naive and the median share size goes to 
zero so that the wealth from shareholdings outweighs future risk exposure. In the 
case of after-trade voting, investors do not have the opportunity to adjust their share 
holdings after the voting so that they incorporate the cost of production home by the 
final shareholders. As a consequence, naive investors prefer asymptotic market-value 
maximization whereas sophisticated investors may obtain strategic shareholdings to 
influence the voting outcome (Geraats and Haller, 1998). 
 
However, Yalcin and Renström (2003) have further explored that non-strategic 
investors do not recognize their influence on the decision of the monopoly firm when 
trading shares, and then any initial distribution of shares can constitute a shareholder 
voting equilibrium. On the other hand, if investors recognize that when 
purchasing/selling shares of the monopoly firm they change the identity of the 
decisive individual, shareholders always have the incentive to trade their shares until 
the competitive equilibrium is reached. Instead of short-selling constraints, if 
individuals realize their influence on the voting outcome when trading, and if 
individuals are allowed to sell short their shares, then trade occurs until the 
distribution of shares is such that the voting outcome supports the CEE. This result is 
close to the Coase Theorem, in the sense that the economy trades itself to efficiency. 
If individuals are not allowed to sell short their shares then the equilibrium is such 
that all shareholders agree on the production decision, but it typically involves 
underproduction relative to the CEE. They conclude that it is not market power itself 
that causes underproduction, but the inability to perfectly trade the rights (shares) in 
the economy. 
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2.4 Pollution emissions 
The exploitation of non-renewable resources has been linked to pollution problems. 
The most prominent link is the extraction and use of fossil fuels such as oil, gas, and 
coal and the excessive accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (Long, 
2011). For example, petroleum refining generates negative externality which 
contributes to global warming. 
    
Most models of pollution choices assume that firms maximize profits. However, the 
typical justification for profit maximization is the Fisher Separation Theorem (see 
Milne, 1981), which specifies that all shareholders will agree on maximizing the firm 
value only when there are no externalities and the firm is a price-taker and financial 
markets are complete. Furthermore, profits are not well-defined because of the price 
normalization problem (Yalcin and Renstrom, 2003; Kelsey and Milne, 2006).  
 
Hence, in the presence of market distortions, shareholders tend to disagree on the 
objectives the firm should undertake. To respect shareholders’ unanimity, majority 
vote of shareholders is proposed for the solution
5
. The next section surveys the 
theory of Roemer (1993) who explores how the level of pollution changes as the 
distribution of share ownership becomes more egalitarian. 
 
2.4.1 Definitions and Basic specification of Roemer’s model 
A firm in which a small number of people influence its decisions must choose the 
level of various externalities such as the amount of pollutants the firm will emit. 
While these pollutants enter negatively into everyone’s utility function, they also 
enter positively into the profit function of the firm as less pollution control 
equipment means greater profits.  
    
                                                 
5
 According to Coase (1937), only when property rights are well defined and enforceable, when all economic 
agents have full information, when transaction cost is low, there is no need for third party’s intervention to 
correct externalities, because economic agents can bargain to achieve a Pareto optimal resource allocation. 
However, in practice these conditions are rarely satisfied. Therefore, the shareholding by an affected third party 
is considered as a solution to deal with the externality problems. 
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Economic equilibrium at externality level x  is defined by Roemer (1993) as a pair 
of non-negative functions: wage function ),( xw 
 
and total income function ),( xy  . 
Therefore )()(),(),( xsxswxsy   where ),( xsw and ),( xsy are the wage and 
total income respectively of an agent with skill level s . ( )s is the percentage of 
share ownership the agent holds in terms of skills. The firm’s profits is denoted 
)(x . Then the consumer’s indirect utility for the externality is defined as: 
)),,((),( xxsyusxv  . Meanwhile, Roemer (1993) assumed that the marginal utility 
with respect to skill at equilibrium is increasing in the level of the externality, 
namely 0))]()(),(()),,(([ 11  xsxswxxsyu
dx
d
   for all non-negative 
],0[ xx  and all s . 
    
On the one hand, Roemer (1993) proposed that ),( sxv is concave in x  and )(sx  
is single-valued and optimal skill level
*s exists and 0)( sx  if *ss  .
 
)(sx  is a 
strictly increasing function on ]1,[ *s . In addition, he also showed the desired level of 
the externality increases with one’s share of profits for this case the marginal utility 
of income is constant when preferences is quasi-linear ( )(),( xqyxyu  and q is
 
convex); in the meantime, the share distribution increases in s ( 0)(  s ) and the 
marginal production is increasing in externality. 
 
2.4.2 The effect of share ownership on pollutants level  
The egalitarian distribution of shares is defined by the share function 
1
)(
)(
)( 
sf
s
se

 where )(s denotes the percentage of share ownership for 
individuals in the firm and )(sf indicates the fraction of the individual skill level in 
population. To eliminate the inegalitarian distribution circumstances, a 
representation of a process by which the distribution can become more egalitarian at 
time t in [0,1] the distribution of share ownership is given by: 
           )()1()(),( ststts
e                              (2.11) 
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Then the utility for a voter of types owns fraction  of the firm at equilibrium give 
by: 
 
         )),(),((),( xxxswuxv
s                             (2.12)  
where his ideal level of the externality, call it )(sx , is obtained by setting 
0),( xv
dx
d s
. 
Therefore, Roemer (1993) has shown that the voters’ optimal level of the externality 
increases as his share ownership  of firm increases 0
d
dx s
(2.13) even when the 
marginal utility of income decreases rapidly with income.  
    
Finally, three main political scenarios under which the level of externality is chosen 
by the electorate are envisaged. Under median voter politics, under the conditions of 
proposition 2.12 or 2.13, since preferences are single-peaked and the optimal level of 
the public bad for a voter is increasing in s , the unique Condorcet winner is the level 
of the externality that is for
ms , the median of the distribution of skill measured as 
the probability F. When the share of corporate stock held by the median voter is less 
than a per capita share (i.e. 1)( ms  ), according to process (2.11), the median 
voter’s share therefore rises as the distribution becomes more egalitarian over time. 
By proposition (2.13), the median voter’s optimal level of the externality rises.  
    
Under interest group politics, either under a dictatorship or through lobbying by the 
wealthy, or the firm inordinately impacts on political decision on the level of 
externality, or a political party representing the interest of the wealthy wins a 
democratic election, Roemer (1993) pointed out that the interest group will choose 
higher levels of externality than with median voter politics. However, by more 
egalitarian redistribution in (2.11), shares are redistributed and the large shareholders 
become less large; accordingly economic democracy leads to a decrease in the level 
of externality. 
    
Under Determination of externality by shareholders, all shareholders vote on the 
level of externality in the share-democratic firm, and the unique Condorcet winner is 
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the level of externality preferred by the median shareholder. If the median 
shareholder owns a larger-than-per-capita share for the locality, then economic 
democratization will lower his/her share and, by proposition (2.13), the level of 
externality chosen will decrease.  
    
2.5 Conclusions 
On basis of the Hotelling rule for non-renewable resources optimal extraction, extant 
literature has introduced many realistic factors to reconcile the theory with the reality. 
A strand of studies, in particular, extends the Hotelling model in petroleum 
extraction modeling. Nevertheless, oil firms or oil fields fail to make optimal 
production decisions according to the theoretical models. In incomplete markets, 
shareholder voting is considered as a solution to eliminating shareholders’ 
disagreements on production plans and pollution control, thereby firm objectives are 
endogenized. Given this initiation, it would be of crucial research value to provide a 
thorough understanding of the relationship between share ownership distribution and 
production as well as pollution emissions when firm decisions are taken through 
shareholder voting. Besides, the relevant empirical literature is provided in a separate 
chapter. In chapter 3, the tests of the Hotelling rule are surveyed. In chapter 4, oil 
production modeling and the main determinants of extraction of oil fields are 
reviewed. In chapter 5, related studies for pollution emissions of firms are presented. 
Especially for chapter 3 and chapter 5, representative empirical studies are 
summarized in tables. 
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Chapter 3  
Share Ownership Distribution and 
Natural Resources Extraction Rate 
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3.1 Introduction 
The problem of making production decisions in an exchange economy was first 
addressed in the Arrow-Debreu (1954) model, which assumed complete markets and 
the existence as well as the optimality of equilibrium. The precondition for firm 
decision-making is value maximization. It is reasonable as a result of shareholders’ 
unanimity and normalized market price. But in incomplete markets, the main 
difference is that shareholders will generally disagree on the effect of changes in 
firm production plans. Accordingly, profit-maximization is no longer a well defined 
objective for the firm due to the price normalization problem, and shareholders’ 
disagreement may occur in equilibrium as individuals differ in share ownership of 
the resource firm.  
 
In particular, in terms of non-renewable resources, they are viewed as existing in the 
form of fixed stocks of reserves, which once extracted cannot be renewed. Moreover, 
it is known that the production and consumption of non-renewable fossil energy 
fuels are the primary cause of many of the world’s most serious environmental 
problems. Although theoretically the Hotelling rule provides an optimal solution for 
the resource owner and social planner, the rule fails to fit the facts and only applies 
to the idealised world for which it was constructed. When the resource firm realises 
it can affect its price by changing extraction, shareholders will disagree on the 
extraction rate. The reason is that an individual with a share ownership different 
from the population average wishes to manipulate prices and alter wages versus 
profits. Thus, how to deal with the shareholders’ interests and make extraction 
decisions for non-renewable resources is of central importance under the incomplete 
market. 
 
 
Shareholder voting is a resolution to reconcile shareholders’ disagreement or 
aggregate investors’ interests through the mechanism of majority voting, and thereby 
preferences of the shareholders are consistent with the objective of the firm 
(DeMarzo, 1993; Yalcin and Renström, 2003). More importantly, the distribution of 
share ownership plays an important role in firm’s behaviour when decisions are 
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taken through shareholder voting. The reason is that when a firm has market power it 
can alter prices through the redistribution among shareholders according to the 
shareholders’ endowments. Shareholders with different endowments would support 
different production plans. The distribution of endowments would affect the identity 
of the median voter of the firm and thereby affect the firm’s behaviour.  
 
Yalcin and Renström (2003) have carried out one of the few studies analyzing the 
effect of share ownership distribution on production decisions, demonstrating that 
depending on the underlying distribution, rational voting may imply overproduction 
as well as underproduction, relative to the efficient level. Any initial distribution of 
shares is equilibrium, if individuals do not recognize their influence on voting when 
trading shares. However, when they do, and there are no short-selling constraints, the 
only equilibrium is the efficient one. When short-selling constraints are introduced, it 
is more likely to result in underproduction in the monopoly firm.  
 
In the realm of natural resources economics, no previous study examines the effect 
of share ownership distribution on extraction of natural resources either theoretically 
or empirically. In theoretical part, we formulate a simple open-economy 
non-renewable resource extraction model in which individuals differ in share 
ownership of the resource firm. The resource extraction decision is assumed to be 
taken by a decisive individual (i.e. median voter in voting distribution). Given voting 
rights distribution is naturally left-skewed, the median voter share increases as the 
share ownership of the largest shareholder increases when keeping the same 
distribution. We take the share of  the largest shareholder as a proxy for the share of 
the median in the voting distribution. Our hypothesis is that if substitution elasticity 
is low, the extraction rate is smaller if the largest shareholder holds a larger share. 
 
 
In the empirical part, we use a panel of 20 U.S. oil firms over the period 1993-2007 
to estimate the extraction equation as a function of lagged extraction rate, share 
ownership held by the largest shareholder, firm size and debt ratio. The empirical 
analysis is performed with different econometric techniques including System GMM 
and Within Group IV. Our results is consistent with the theoretical hypothesis that 
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the larger the share ownership owned by the largest shareholder, the lower the 
extraction rate of non-renewable resources.  
 
Overall, this chapter makes three contributions to the extant literature. First, this 
chapter links two strands of literature: production decision being endogenized 
through shareholder voting and optimal extraction model for non-renewable 
resources. To the best of our knowledge, no other study explores the effect of share 
ownership distribution on the extraction rate of natural resources.  
 
Second, this chapter is innovative in terms of the system GMM methodology we use 
in the context of share ownership concentration. Considering the lagged dependent 
variable and two control variables are likely to be jointly endogenous where they are 
simultaneously determined with the dependent variable or subject to two-way 
causality, system GMM is used to mitigate these problems. Moreover, system GMM 
estimator allows a small sample in the presence of an autoregressive component and 
has lower bias and higher efficiency than OLS, Fixed Effects and First-differenced 
GMM. 
 
Third, when measuring extraction rate, we use the ratio of the value of production 
over the firm value. This proxy may provide another novel and feasible alternative 
for extraction rate of firms since previous researchers encounter difficulty in 
collecting reserve data of non-renewable resources either at country or firm level (e.g. 
Young, 1992; Pickering, 2008). 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2, reviewing the related 
empirical studies in two strands: one is a test of the Hotelling rule, the other is about 
the relationship between shareholder ownership distribution and production 
decisions. Section 3.3 formulates the theoretical economics model. Section 3.4 
describes the data and methodology. Section 3.5 provides empirical results and 
discussions. The sensitivity analysis is given in section 3.6 and the chapter concludes 
in section 3.7. 
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3.2 Literature review - Empirical part 
3.2.1 Testing of the Hotelling rule  
Barnett and Morse (1963) collect time-series data on the price of a resource and 
explore whether the proportionate growth rate of the price is constant. The results 
indicate that resource prices including iron, copper, silver and timber fell over time, 
which is a disconcerting result for proponents of the standard theory. Subsequent 
researchers have shown a variety of results for different resources or different time 
periods. For example, Gaudet (2007) investigates U.S. price data for the period 
1870-2004 for copper, lead, zinc, coal and petroleum, 1880-2004 for tin, 1900-2004 
for aluminium and nickel and 1920-2004 for natural gas and plot the rate of change 
of price of each of those seven non-renewable minerals and three non-renewable 
fossil fuels. He finds high volatility in the rate of change of those prices. But more 
significantly this volatility appears centred at zero. In fact, in none of the ten cases is 
the mean rate of change of price significantly different from zero. It is very hard to 
detect any trend in the actual price levels of those resources. All in all, there is no 
clear picture of whether resource prices typically rise or fall over time.  
   
Many studies have pursued the net price approach since both net price and utility 
discount rate   are unobservable. The proxy is constructed for net price by 
subtracting marginal costs from the gross market price. Slade (1982) made one of the 
earliest studies of this type. She concluded that some resources have U-shaped 
quadratic price paths, having fallen in the past but latterly rising. Other studies of this 
type are Stollery (1983), who generally supported the Hotelling hypothesis, and 
Halvorsen and Smith (1991), who were unable to support it. In addition, other 
approaches have also been used to test the Hotelling rule and fuller details can be 
found in the survey paper by Berck (1995).  
    
Given above empirical study, the failure of Hotelling rule to fitting the facts is 
mainly attributed to two aspects. On one hand, Hotelling rule is constructed only 
apply to the idealized world with zero shocks. On the other hand, under the imperfect 
competition, there are various factors or shocks driving the price drift such as 
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political policy, taxation, economic crisis, demand elasticity and so on. As for the 
application of Hotelling rule, hence it is no longer relied in our study. Our particular 
focus is given to the extraction decisions of resource firms in the incomplete market 
when taking into account the preferences of the individual who have a share different 
from the population average.   
 
3.2.2 Share ownership distribution and firm performance 
As explained above, instead of testing the Hotelling rule, our study aims to examine 
the effect of share ownership distribution on the non-renewable resources optimal 
extraction through linking two strands of extant literature: the Hotelling model for 
non-renewable resources optimal extraction and the role of share ownership 
distribution in firm production/ pollution decisions. The theoretical literature is 
surveyed in chapter 2 and the empirical studies are summarized as follows. 
 
There is a huge amount of empirical literature investigating the effects of ownership 
structure on firm performance based on agency theory, which analyzes the 
relationship between principals/ owners and agents/managers. Most empirical studies 
have estimated the relationship between ownership concentration and performance in 
the form: 
 
   itititit
XariablesOwnershipV   1                          
 
Where X is a vector of control variables include nation and industry effects, which 
both influence ownership structure and performance (Pedersen and Thomsen, 1997, 
1999). The empirical evidence mainly focuses on two aspects: firstly, ownership 
concentration and performance; and secondly, insider ownership and performance. 
The latter study is beyond our research and is ignored here. These relevant empirical 
results are summarized below and tabled in Appendix B. 
 
Early studies, beginning with Berle and Means (1932), tend to find a positive 
association between ownership concentration and accounting profitability (Cubbin 
and Leech, 1983). Using ownership structure data for large Japanese corporations, 
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Morck et al. (2000) reach the same conclusion that Japanese firms’ average q ratios 
rise monotonically with both ownership by management and corporate block holders. 
The positive relation between firm value and corporate block holdings is consistent 
with the hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (1986) that large block holders are a way 
of overcoming the free-rider problems in shareholder monitoring associated with 
dispersed ownership. Gedojlovic and Shapiro (2002) have offered a positive 
relationship between ownership structure and financial performance of Japanese 
corporations with panel data.  
 
In contrast, working with a variety of measurements for owner concentration, 
including largest shareholder’s share ownership, top five, top ten and top twenty as 
well as Herfindahl index,  Leech and Leahy (1991) show ownership concentration 
for 470 U.K.-listed firms has negative coefficients in market value divided by 
ordinary share capital, trading profit margin and growth rate of net assets. Using U.K. 
financial services sector data comprised of 111 firms over 1992-1994, Mudambi and 
Nicosia (1998) find that the Herfindahl index measured as ownership concentration 
has a negative impact on actual rate of return at 5 percent significance level. Lehmann 
and Weigand (2000) examine the more network- or bank-oriented German system. 
In panel regressions for 361 German corporations over 1991-1996, they find that 
ownership concentration affects profitability significantly and negatively. 
 
In addition to results with linear relationship, some related studies (Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro, 1998; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Miguel et al., 2004) found a non-linear 
relationship concerning ownership effects. Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) 
empirically examine the ownership concentration-performance relationship using 
1030 medium to large firms with 11 industrial sectors (including oil) across Canada, 
France, Germany, the U.K. and U.S. from 1986 to 1991. Strong ownership effects are 
found in the U.S., weaker effects in Germany, traces of effects in the U.K., and no 
effects at all in Canada or France. For the U.S., direct non-linear ownership effects are 
found (the ownership coefficient is negative and significant; the squared ownership is 
positive and significant). In particular, in the U.S., concentrated ownership does not 
exert a positive marginal effect on profitability unless the firm is either highly 
concentrated, or highly diversified.  
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In contrast, using 435 of the largest European companies and controlling for industry, 
capital structure and nation effects, Thomsen and Pederson (2000) find evidence of a 
bell-shaped effect with a maximum at an ownership share of 83 percent. A positive 
effect of ownership concentration on shareholder value (market-to-book value of 
equity) and profitability (asset returns) is shown, but the effect levels off for high 
ownership shares. Moreover, Miguel et al. (2004) also support the quadratic 
relationship between firm value and ownership concentration using new evidence 
from Spain. They have offered results that firm value increases with ownership 
concentration at low levels, and decreases with ownership concentration at high 
levels. 
 
To sum up, a huge amount of literature comprises empirical studies concerning the 
relationship between firm performance and share ownership distribution. The 
difference between the present study and prior studies is in that we analyze the effect 
of share ownership distribution on extraction when firm decisions are taken through 
shareholder voting via the median voter. Next, an open-economy non-renewable 
resources model is formulated. 
 
3.3 The Economics Model 
3.3.1. Introduction 
We formulate a simple open-economy non-renewable resource model where 
individuals differ in share ownership of the resource firm. Final goods producers are 
price takers, while the resource firm realizes it can affect its price, depending on 
extraction. Shareholders will disagree on the extraction rate. The reason is that an 
individual with a share different from the population average wish to manipulate 
prices to alter wages versus profits. This is the same effect as in Yalcin and 
Renström (2003) and we take as our shareholder voting equilibrium the extraction 
rate that cannot lose against an alternative extraction rate in a binary election (i.e. 
the extraction rate preferred by the median in the voting distribution). Contrary to 
Stiglitz (1976) the resource extraction path will not coincide with the first-best, 
unless the decisive shareholder holds a share exactly equal to one over the 
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population size. The open-economy assumption simplifies the analysis (when r is 
exogenous). If we had used a closed-economy model, like Sinclair (1994), the 
resource firm would also have affected the return to savings, and shareholders 
would also have to take into account the redistribution between individuals of 
different savings, which complicates the analysis without altering the main 
incentives present when taking the resource-extraction decision. 
 
3.3.2. The model setup 
3.3.2.1 Final goods production 
 
There is a large number of competitive (i.e. price taking) firms using capital, labour, 
and a non-renewable resource, producing under the same technology. They can 
borrow and lend on the international capital market, at the interest rate r. Final goods 
price is normalised to unity, and the prices of labour and the resource are denoted w 
and p, respectively. Firms’ decisions can be represented as a representative firm, 
employing the aggregate quantities, solving: 
 
  )()()()()()())()()(())(,(),(max
)(),(),(),(
tXtptLtwtAtrtKtAtrtXLtKF=
tXtLtAtK
 (3.1) 
 
where K(t) is capital in production, A(t) is domestically supplied capital, L(t) is total 
labour (assumed to be constant), X(t) is the use of the non-renewable resource. For 
simplicity the production technology is weakly separable, and F is homogenous of 
degree one in K and ϕ, and ϕ is homogenous of degree one in L and X. We are 
agnostic to whether the non-renewable resource is essential in production (i.e. 
whether ϕ(L,0)=0). We can allow the case ϕ(L,0)>0 for L>0, i.e. there is enough 
substitutability between the resource and labour (e.g. energy produced by manual 
work). An example of such a technology is CES with substitution elasticity different 
from one. 
 
 
 
Denoting partial derivatives by subscripts, the first-order conditions give: 
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  )())(,(),( trtXLtKFK          (3.2) 
 
    )()(,))(,(),( twtXLtXLtKF L        (3.3) 
 
    )()(,))(,(),( tptXLtXLtKF X        (3.4) 
 
The homogeneity of degree one assumptions (i.e. constant returns to scale) implies 
zero profits in the final goods sector and, since r(t) is exogenous, FK and Fϕ are 
invariant with respect to K, L and X. In turn this implies that w and p are only 
functions of X (from decision making point of view). 
 
3.3.2.2 Resource extraction 
 
The non-renewable resource, S, is depleted according to 
 
)()( tXtS                (3.5) 
 
Given zero extraction costs (a simplifying assumption), the profits at each instant of 
time is: 
 
    ))(()()(,))(,(),()()( tXtXtXLtXLtKFtXtp= X     (3.6) 
where the second equality follows from (3.4), and the last equality denotes the fact 
that profits are only a function of X (from a decision making point of view). 
 
3.3.2.3 Individuals’ budgets 
 
Individuals differ in share ownership of the resource firm, ],[   , (assumed to 
be constant over time, for simplicity, and its density denoted f(θ)) and possibly in 
initial capital, a(0, θ). Consumption at date t of an individual with share θ is denoted 
c(t, θ). The law of motion for individual capital is: 
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),()(),()(),(  tctwtatr=ta         (3.7) 
 
3.3.2.4 Preferences 
 
The life-time utility of an individual with share θ is: 
 
 dttcue=U ρt


0
),()(             (3.8) 
 
where ρ is the discount rate. 
 
 
3.3.2.5 Consumption-savings equilibrium 
 
Maximising (3.8) subject to (3.7) gives the consumption-Euler equation: 
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Denote the density function of the distribution shares as f(θ), then equation (3.9), 
(3.7) together with 
 




0
)(),()( dftatA           (3.10) 
 
gives the equilibrium for any paths of r(t) and  X(t) (the latter being the decision of 
the shareholders in the resource firm). 
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3.3.2.6. Preferences over extraction rates 
 
For each shareholder we find the preferences over the extraction rates for the entire 
future (i.e. a time path of most preferred extraction rates). An individual then 
maximises (3.8), subject to (3.3)-(3.7).  
 
Then the current-value Hamiltonian to the problem is: 
    )(),(),())(())((),()(),(),( tXttctXtXwtatrtqtcu=H    (3.11) 
 
 
The first-order conditions are: 
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Equations (3.12) and (3.13) give the consumption Euler equation (3.9), as before. 
 
Next, notice that  
)/)1(/()/)1(/()( LXLLFLXLLXFXFw XXXLXL   
where the first equality follows from (3.3) and (3.4), and the last from homogeneity 
of degree one of ϕ. Then we obtain 
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Now (3.14) can be written as 
 
  ),(/1)1)(/1(),(  tLLtqF X        (3.18) 
 
Log differentiating (3.18) with respect to time gives (Appendix A) 
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where  
XX


 ~                  (3.20) 
 
Notice that ~  is the log change of the elasticity of ϕ(L,X) with respect to X. For a 
function with unitary substitution elasticity,   is constant and thus ~  is zero. For 
a CES function ~  is positive (negative) if the substitution elasticity is smaller 
(greater) than unity. 
 
Equation (3.19) gives the optimal rate of decline in extraction over time, the larger v 
is the larger is the decline, and expectedly the larger is the rate of extraction x/S. 
 
Proposition 1 
 
At each level of X, an individual shareholder with a share greater (smaller) than one 
over the population size prefers a smaller (greater) decline in extraction if ~ is 
positive.  The result is reversed for ~ negative. The individual prefers an 
extraction rate coinciding with the first best if either the she individual holds a share 
equal to one over the population size or if ϕ(L,K) is Cobb-Douglas (unitary 
substitution elasticity). 
 
If ϕ(L,K) is CES with a substitution elasticity lower than one, then a shareholder with 
larger share prefers lower extraction rate. 
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Following a path with a less rapid decline in X, implies that the level of extraction is 
smaller at each level of the resource, S. 
 
Our hypotheses are that if the substitution elasticity is smaller than unity, the 
extraction rate is smaller if the decisive shareholder holds a larger share, and that a 
higher rate of extraction in one period gives a lower decline in X in the next (follows 
from (3.19)). If the elasticity of substitution is high, the signs are reversed. 
 
Since share ownership gives voting rights, the distribution of voting rights is not the 
same as the distribution of share ownership. If we look for the preferences of the 
median voter, the median voter will not be the individual who owns the median share, 
but the individual who is in the middle of the vote distribution, i.e. someone with 
larger share. As we increase the share ownership of the largest individual, keeping 
the distribution the same, the median voter share also tend to increase. 
 
The shares sum to one 



 df )(1            (3.21) 
 
and the median in the voting distribution, θm , is given by 

m
df


 )(
2
1           (3.22) 
 
It is easily verified that for distribution like uniform f(θ)=n, or inverse f(θ)=n/θ 
(where n is a constant) an increase in the share of the largest shareholder,  , 
implies an increase in the decisive individual’s share, θm. 
 
 
To conclude, we have formulated a simple open economy model with resource 
extraction where individuals differ in share ownership of the resource firm. The 
resource extraction decision is assumed to be taken by the median in the voting 
distribution (as her policy proposal cannot be defeated by an alternative proposal in a 
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binary election). Given that shares carry voting rights, voting rights become naturally 
left skewed. We therefore expect to see the decisive individual owning a larger share 
when the larger shareholder owns a larger share. We can then take the share of the 
largest shareholder as a proxy for the share of the median in the voting distribution. 
 
Our hypotheses are that if there is low substitution elasticity, the extraction rate is 
smaller if the largest shareholder holds a larger share, and that a higher rate of 
extraction in one period gives a lower decline in X in the next. If the elasticity of 
substitution is high, the signs are reversed. 
 
We next test these hypotheses. 
 
 
3.4 Data and Methodology 
3.4.1 Sample selection 
To assess the effect of share ownership distribution on non-renewable resources 
extraction rate, we consider only the firms which are engaging in oil and gas 
exploration and production and are listed on Standard and Poor’s and the New York 
Stock Exchange. We start with a potential sample including 43 firms listed on 
Standard & Poor’s and 63 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange over 
1993-2007. As for these 106 firms, oil production and price data and share 
ownership data are collected manually from annual company reports which condition 
the size and time frame of the overall sample. Other financial data are collected from 
the on-line Datastream Facility.  
 
The choice of our panels is mainly determined by both the availability of reserves 
data and share ownership data. As for the availability of reserve data, it will be 
further explained in section 3.4.2.1. We remove the firms in which largest 
shareholders own less than 5% of the outstanding share
6
 and the firms in which they 
did not provide the production and price for oil or natural liquid gas.  
                                                 
6
 For U.S. firms, the ownership data is not available in annual reports when the largest shareholder holds less 
than 5% of shareholdings. 
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Moreover, estimated equations are first-differenced, and values of the regressors 
lagged twice or more are used as instruments when using Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM). For this reason, considering the lagged variables in our estimating 
equations, at least three years data for each firm are needed. Thus, only firms with a 
minimum of three observations are kept in the sample. We then drop firm-years that 
do not have complete records on the variables used in our regressions, namely 
average price of oil or natural liquid gas, annual production of oil or natural gas 
liquid, market capitalization, total debt and equity.  
 
After these adjustments, we are left with 255 observations on 21 firms. One firm, 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation, is excluded since its operation is controlled by 
OPEC. This cut-off is aimed at eliminating observations not reflecting the effect of 
shareholder voting. Finally, we obtain 241 observations for 20 firms including ten 
S&P firms and ten NYSE firms over 1993-2007, which is the sample used for the 
OLS and Within Groups estimates. As GMM is based on first-differences, only 218 
observations are used for the GMM estimates. Our sample has an unbalanced 
structure, with the number of years of observations on each firm varying between 
nine and 15. By allowing for both entry and exit, the usage of an unbalanced panel, 
to some extent, helps mitigate the potential selection and survivor bias (Carpenter 
and Guariglia, 2008). The data used for empirical estimation is reported in Appendix 
C. 
 
3.4.2 Variables and Measurements 
The key variables of interest consist of the extraction rate of oil firms and the share 
ownership of the largest shareholder. Three additional variables are used to control 
for effects on the extraction rate of firms which are not captured by the ownership 
variable. The descriptions of variables are summarized in Table 3.1. 
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3.4.2.1 Key variables 
 
Extraction rate 
 
Typical annual extraction rate for non-renewable resources is defined as the ratio of 
total production over total reserves for each year. This variable is called ER in our 
regressions. The selection of our panels is mainly determined by the availability of 
reserves data. Previous researchers encountered the same difficulty in collecting 
reserve data of non-renewable resources either at country or firm level (e.g. Young, 
1992; Pickering, 2008). There are two main issues attributed to the difficulty in 
selection. First, the real amounts of total reserves for most firms are not disclosed to 
the public. Second, firm-level comparability of reserves data is a difficult matter. All 
reserves estimates involve uncertainty depending on the amount of reliable geologic 
and engineering data available and the interpretation of them. Generally the reserves 
are reported on two principal categories: proven and unproven. Unproven reserves 
are further classified into the probable and the possible from which the definitions 
problem of reserves arises. For example, some firms provided proven reserves or 
unproven reserves. Some firms simply gave new discoveries over years instead of 
reserves data.  
 
To overcome the above problems, firm value is taken as a valid proxy for total 
reserves. It is considered as an equivalent measurement of the value of total reserves 
a firm owns, calculated by summation of the market values of a firm’s common 
stock and total debt. The market value of common stock is equal to the number of 
common shares outstanding multiplied by the price per share at the end of the year. 
The market value of the firm’s debt is calculated by the sum of the values of the 
short-term debt and the long-term debt. The measurement of extraction rate at firm 
level is formulated as:  
 
oil oil gas gasprice production price production
ExtractionRate
FirmValue
  

 
 
The denominator of extraction rate is equal to the sales of oil production which is 
equal to the product of annual average unit price and annual production of oil (i.e. 
crude oil and natural liquid gas combined). 
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Share ownership of the decisive individual 
 
As stated in the theoretical part, the share of the decisive individual increases in the 
share of the largest shareholder due to left-skewed voting rights distribution. We 
then take the share of the largest shareholder as a proxy for the share of the median 
in the voting distribution.  Moreover, the percentage of shares outstanding held by 
the largest shareholder (LSH) is the most employed in the literature and the most 
widely available and accurate measure to be a a proxy for share ownership 
distribution (see e.g. Leech and Leahy, 1991; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; 
Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000)
7
.  
 
3.4.2.2 Control variables  
 
Additional variables are included in the extraction rate regression models to control 
for other potential influences on the extraction rate of firms, namely debt, firm size 
and time dummy. 
 
The debt to equity ratio (DEBT) (also known as leverage ratio) is defined as the ratio 
of the book value of the firm’s total debt to the value of the firm’s equity. This ratio 
is included to control for a number of factors. Firstly, it controls for the likelihood 
that debt holders significantly affect production decisions and the operation of the 
firm as well as its management. Stiglitz (1985) suggests that lenders are more likely 
to control management actions effectively, particularly banks, relative to 
shareholders. Second, debt may be a solution to conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. As specified by Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986), 
decision-makers may use debt to signal that they are responsible to achieve the cash 
flow to meet the debt repayment. The managers may, therefore, reduce their 
                                                 
7 Prior studies indicate that alternative measures of ownership are highly correlated. For example, using 
ownership data across five countries, namely the U.S., the U.K., Germany, France and Canada, Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro (1998) have shown strong evidence that LSH highly correlated with the alternative Herfindahl index that 
is defined as the sum of the squares of the fractions of equity held by each individual shareholder. The correlation 
coefficient is 0.81 at 1% significance level. 
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discretion to consume excessive perquisites so that the firm’s equity is increased 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982). Moreover, several studies, 
including Whited (1992), argue that firms with higher leverage are more likely to 
face binding financial constraints. Haushalter (2000) find a positive relation between 
the extent to which a firm hedges and its financial leverage. More specifically, the 
fraction of production that oil and gas producers hedge against price risk is positively 
related to the ratio of total debt to total assets and is greater for companies having 
little financial flexibility which is measured by the relative amount of debt 
outstanding and cash holdings. 
 
The firm size variable used in our study is measured by the market value. We take 
the summation of market value of equity plus total liabilities and transform it into the 
logarithm to the base ten of the value. This measurement is advocated by Baumol 
(1959), who argues that the firm size is the amount of owned and borrowed money 
capital. In comparison with the sales and employment concept of firm size, market 
capitalization and total debt is a superior approximation to reflect the definition of 
Baumol (1959).  
  
 
Firm size potentially affects the extraction rate of firms through three different 
avenues. First, all else being equal, companies with lower market value are likely to 
have greater informational asymmetries with potential public investors (Haushalter, 
2000). Second, firm size affects both the willingness to enter agreements to control 
output and preferences for particular quota arrangements. Libbecap and Wiggins 
(1984) have shown that large firms tend to restrict the production of oil in the 
common pool, because the firm can achieve an optimum when price equals marginal 
extraction cost, which includes the direct cost of additional output and the increased 
cost of inframarginal production. Thereby, on the one hand, the firm decreases 
production to reduce the marginal extraction cost. On the other hand, considering the 
cross-unit cost effects from common pool production, as production shares decrease, 
firms internalize less of the cost increases from rival production. Third, according to 
Stiglitz (1976), the larger firm may have easier access to the capital market and be 
better able to pool risks. This suggests that the larger firm might have a lower 
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required rate of return on capital and implies a more conservationist policy for 
non-renewable resources. 
 
In addition, as Lehmann and Welgand (2000) suggested, macroeconomic shocks are 
common to all firms and can be subsumed by time dummy variables. Controlling 
over the time-specific effects is adequate since we are testing if the largest 
shareholder’s share ownership determines extraction rather than constructing a 
complete model.  
 
3.4.3 Descriptive statistics 
The statistics summary of our sample and all sample data used in estimation are 
provided in Table 3.2. Extraction rate ranges from 5.35% (for Goodrich Petroleum 
Corporation in 2005) to 62.99% (for Meridian Resources Corporation in 2007). The 
average extraction rate of our sample is 22.8%. The share ownership of the largest 
shareholder varies from 5.2% (for Apache Corporation, 2005) to 80.07% (EOG 
Resources Inc, 1993). The average level of the share ownership owned by the largest 
shareholder is 14.1%. Although all of these firms are in the same industry, there is 
substantial variation in the debt ratio: it ranges from 0 (for Berry Petroleum 
Company in 1994, 1995 and for Meridian Resources Corporation in 1996) to 5.8861 
(for Range Resources Corporation in 1998). The average firm value in our sample is 
2870 million U.S. dollars, ranging from $1.88e+07 to $3.12e+10. Moreover, 
correlation is conducted between paired variables. It is clearly seen that share 
ownership of the largest shareholder is negatively correlated with extraction rate of oil 
and gas. Two control variables appear significantly related to extraction rate.  
 
3.4.4 Estimation methods 
To test the hypothesis that the extraction rate is smaller if the largest shareholder 
holds a larger share, the estimation equation is: 
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    

     
        (3.23) 
 
where itER is the extraction rate of firm i  in year t  , , 1i tER  is the lagged extraction 
rate in order to capture the effect of past extraction. itLSH  is the percentage of 
shareholdings owned by the largest shareholder. itDEBT
 
is the ratio of debt to equity 
used to capture the effect of financial leverage. itLSHSQ  
represents the squared term 
for the largest shareholdings. itVlog
 
indicates the value of the firm in a logarithm 
measuring the firm size.  
 
In our model, we allow for unobservable firm-specific effects and suppose that the 
error term, it i itv f   , where if  is an unobserved time-invariant fixed effects,
 
it  
is idiosyncratic shocks. Clearly, OLS is inconsistent in this case, because , 1i tER  is 
correlated with if . Although first-differencing the equation eliminates the fixed 
effect, the component , 1i t  in it is correlated with , 1i tER  and possibly also with 
itDEBT and (log )itV via the two-way causality. 
 
Therefore, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator is likely to suffer from bias due 
to unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity as well as possible endogeneity of the 
regressors. Within groups estimator (also known as Fixed-effects estimator) only 
accounts for the former bias. A pooled Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator only 
accounts for the latter bias. There is heteroskedasticity, 2SLS is not asymptotically 
efficient. Although a Within Groups IV estimator accounts both for unobservable 
firm-specific heterogeneity and for the possible endogeneity of the regressors, 
typically it is less efficient than first-difference Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) that also controls for both 
biases. 
 
Arellano and Bond (1991) demonstrate that the first-difference GMM estimator 
corrects not only for the bias introduced by heterogeneity across panels, but also 
permits the lagged endogenous variable and a certain degree of endogeneity in the 
other regressors. This estimator takes first difference for each variable so as to 
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eliminate the firm specific effects and then uses two or more lagged variables as the 
instruments to eliminate the endogeneity problem. More specifically, we rewrite 
equation (1) as: 
 
, 1 , 1 , 2 1 2( )it i t i t i t it itER ER ER ER LSH LSHSQ        
 
           
3 , 1 . 2 4 , 1 . 2( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]i t i t i t i tD E B T D E B T L o g V L o g V         
            
, 1( )it i t     
Two critical assumptions must be satisfied for this GMM estimator to be consistent 
and efficient. First, the endogeneous regressors must be predetermined by at least 
one period: 
,[ ] 0i t s itE ER     
for 2s   
,[ ] 0i t s itE DEBT     
for 1s   
,[log ] 0i t s itE V      
for 1s   
Second, the error terms cannot be serially correlated:  
,[ ] 0it i t sE     for all 1s  . 
 
Meanwhile, Arellano-Bond test and Hansen J test are conducted. Arellano-Bond test 
sets the maximum lag distance to check for autocorrelation with the null hypothesis 
of no second-order serial correlation of the residuals. The GMM estimator is 
consistent if there is no second-order serial correlation in the residuals (i.e. the 
p-value is greater than 0.10). The Hansen J statistics is a test for overidentifying 
restriction with the null hypothesis of joint validity of the instruments. The J 
statistics are asymptotically distributed as chi-square distribution with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of instruments minus the number of parameters. When 
p-value of J statistics is greater than 0.05, the instruments are valid. 
   
The first-difference GMM suffers from finite-sample bias when instruments are 
weak (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Bond et al. (2003) give criteria to rectify the 
problem of weak instruments if the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable 
from first-difference GMM estimator are smaller than both Fixed-effects and OLS 
estimators. As for our estimations, we expect that the lagged dependent variable’s 
coefficients are greater than Fixed-effects estimates and less than the OLS estimates; 
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then there is no finite-sample bias due to weak instruments problem. In line with this 
test, it is shown in Table 3.3 that first-differenced GMM has a weak instruments 
problem. System GMM, therefore, is advocated. It consists of two equations: the 
original equation as well as the first-differenced one. Particularly in samples with 
small N in presence of an autoregressive component, Soto (2010) demonstrates that 
the system GMM estimator has lower bias and higher efficiency than all the other 
standard estimators through Monte Carlo simulations of the properties of OLS, Fixed 
Effects and First-differenced GMM and system GMM in country growth studies.  
 
 
3.5 Empirical Results and Discussions 
Columns 1, 2, 3 of Table 3.3 report the results of the baseline regression equation (1). 
As discussed in section 3.4.4, we test whether the GMM estimator suffers from finite 
sample bias by comparing the coefficients of lagged dependent variables from GMM 
to those of pooled OLS and within fixed effect estimator. The estimated coefficient 
of the lagged dependent variable from GMM is 0.085 and insignificant, which is less 
than the estimations of both OLS (0.671) and fixed effect (0.277), suggesting that the 
instruments in the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator are weak so that the estimator is 
biased in finite samples (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Hahn, Hausman and Kuersteiner, 
2004). To solve this problem, Blundell-Bond system GMM is used, which consists 
of two equations: the original equation as well as the first-differenced one.  
 
In columns 2, 3, and 4 we control for firm-specific fixed effects, identifying the 
estimates only off the variation in extraction rate within firms over time. In these 
regressions, the share ownership variables are jointly significant and all have the sign 
expected on the basis of our model. The within-group estimator in column 2 is 
inconsistent and underestimates the coefficient on 1tER  . 
 
Column 4 presents the consistent and efficient system GMM estimator proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998). The coefficient of the lagged extraction rate is strongly 
significant. The share ownership has negative and significant effect on extraction 
rate (at 5% significance level) and the squared term indicates positive and significant 
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correlation. We find evidence that the share ownership held by the largest 
shareholder impacts extraction rate negatively at increasing rate. There is a positive 
and significant relationship between debt ratio and extraction rate at 5% significance 
level. Firm size appears negatively correlated with extraction rate. The Hansen test 
cannot reject the over-identifying restrictions of the system estimator (p value is 1); 
the Arellano-Bond tests detect first-order autocorrelation in the error terms (p-value 
is 0), and the second-order autocorrelation (p-value is 10.1%) but do not find 
evidence for higher-order autocorrelation (p-value 59% for third-order). As we 
expected, the system estimator is correctly specified. Given system GMM’s superior 
ability to control for the finite sample bias and problem of endogeneity and greater 
efficiency compared with the instrumental variables (IV) estimator, our results are 
discussed in line with the system GMM estimation. 
 
In general, the results are consistent with our theoretical hypothesis that the more 
share ownership the largest shareholder has, the lower the extraction rate of 
non-renewable resources. Furthermore, using U.S. oil firms’ data, we find a 
non-linear relationship between share ownership of the largest shareholder and 
extraction rate suggesting that extraction rate decreases in the largest shareholder’s 
share ownership at an increasing change rate. Our results suggest that higher share 
ownership owned by the largest shareholder is likely to lead to smaller extraction 
rate. However, this is in contrast to Yalcin and Renstrom (2003) who demonstrate 
that with less share ownership by the decisive maker (i.e. the median voter), the firm 
tends to choose overproduction level than competitive economic equilibrium when 
production decisions are taken through shareholder voting via the median voter.   
 
Moreover, firm size is found to be negatively correlated with extraction rate; larger 
firms are likely to choose lower extraction rate
8
. This may be explained by Stiglitz 
                                                 
8 In our knowledge, firm value is the best available proxy for firm resource reserves in the extant literature. 
However, there is one controversial issue. All else being equal, bigger firms tend to have higher price-to-earnings 
ratio which is defined as market price per share divided by annual earnings per share. Accordingly, bigger firms 
are more likely to have greater market capitalization. Therefore, to some extent, extraction rate might be biased 
as result of firm size when we take firm value (i,e. the summation of market capitalization and total debt) as a 
proxy for resource reserves of the firm. Nevertheless, this is not a problem for this thesis since we are focusing on 
examining the relationship between share ownership and extraction rate rather than modelling extraction rate 
accurately. In addition, for future study, we can use average annual firm value to measure the firm size instead of 
at end-of-years.  
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(1976), who suggests that the larger firm may have easier access to the capital 
market and be better able to pool risks. This suggests that the larger firm might have 
a lower required rate of return on capital and implies a more conservative policy for 
non-renewable resources. In addition, debt appears to affect extraction rate positively. 
Firms with higher leverage are more likely to face binding financial constraints. The 
lenders are more likely to control management actions effectively, particularly banks, 
relevant to shareholders (Stiglitz, 1985).  
 
This empirical study allows the investigation of whether concentrated share 
ownership is harmful for extraction of non-renewable resources. Our results may 
provide some policy implications for social planners and regulators. Share ownership 
distribution requires attention. In line with our results, the firm with dispersed share 
ownership structure appears to extract more non-renewable resources while the more 
concentrated ownership tends to be conservative.    
 
3.6 Sensitivity analysis 
To check the robustness of our main results in column (4) of Table 3.3, we 
concentrate on examining whether these estimations are independent of changing 
definitions of variables, possible combinations of variables and alternative estimation 
methods. 
 
We tested the robustness of our results to alternative measurements of control 
variables. Firm size is replaced with total assets (FIRM SIZE2). Debt ratio is 
alternatively measured with the ratio of debt over total assets (DEBT2). In line with 
the efficiency and consistency, the system GMM estimator will be used in the 
estimation of the robustness test to follow. Our instrument set including 
FIRM-SIZE2 and DEBT2 is lagged twice. Column (1) of Table 3.4 presents the 
system GMM estimates of our alternative control variables. The largest share 
ownership is negatively and significantly related to extraction rate at 5% significance 
level. It is similar to our main results in Table 3.3 except the alternative firm size 
showing as insignificant. FIRM SIZE2 is excluded in column (2), the results have 
left our main results largely unchanged. While DEBT2 is excluded in column (3), in 
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spite of the same sign with our main results in Table 3.3, the J-test only has a 
marginal significance 0.081, suggesting that the omission of the DEBT2 causes 
mis-specification in the model. 
 
In addition to variable definitions, another concern with this paper is that estimation 
methods could affect results. We re-estimated our main model using Within Groups 
IV estimator which also corrects for both unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity and 
possible endogeneity of the regressors. Moreover, a number of researchers who 
participated in the debate on the factors of extraction of non-renewable resources did 
not include the lagged extraction (see Kellogg, 2011; Livernois and Uhler, 1987, etc). 
We therefore remove the lagged dependent variable from the set of regressors and 
from the instrument set. The results of this new specification are reported in column 
4(a), and 4 (b) in which time dummies are included as over half of these 
time-specific coefficients are significant. The results are again qualitatively similar 
to those reported in column (4) of Table 3.3. The coefficient of largest shareholder’s 
share ownership is significant and negative for both column 4(a) (at the 1% 
significance level) and 4(b) (at the 5% level). However, these two control variables 
possibly are affected by time effects. Debt ratio is only significant without the 
inclusion of time dummies. The signs of firm size factor appear inconsistent as well. 
Overall the results support our theory that the greater share ownership by the largest 
shareholder leads to lower extraction rate.  
 
3.7 Conclusions 
Our theoretical model is concentrated around understanding the effects of the largest 
shareholder on production decisions. We have formulated a simple open economy 
model with resource extraction where individuals differ in share ownership of the 
resource firm. The resource extraction decision is assumed to be taken by the median 
in the voting distribution (as her policy proposal cannot be defeated by an alternative 
proposal in a binary election). As voting rights distribution becomes naturally 
left-skewed, the decisive individual is expected to own a larger share when the larger 
shareholder owns a larger share. The share of the largest shareholder is taken as a 
proxy for the share of the median in the voting distribution. The hypothesis is that 
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the extraction rate is smaller if the largest shareholder holds a larger share if 
substitution elasticity is low. 
 
Our empirical study has examined whether there is a negative relationship between 
the share ownership owned by largest shareholder and the extraction rate of 
non-renewable resources. We use a panel of 20 U.S. oil firms over 1993-2007 to 
estimate extraction equation as a function of lagged extraction rate, share ownership 
held by the largest shareholder, and firm size and debt ratio. System GMM is used to 
ensure our small sample estimation in the presence of autocorrelation and 
endogeneity to be more efficient and less biased. Meanwhile sensitivity analysis is 
conducted to check the robustness of our empirical evidence. The results are found to 
be consistent with our theoretical hypothesis, suggesting that the largest 
shareholder’s share ownership does matter for extraction rate of U.S. oil firms. The 
larger share ownership owned by the decisive individual, the smaller is the extraction 
rate of the firm. This may provide a policy implication for government or regulator 
to control and allocate non-renewable resources by regulating the share ownership 
structure.   
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Table 3.1 Description of variables 
 
variables
ER
LSH
DEBT
FV
DUM
Control variables
the ratio of total debt to equity to represents financial leverage
Firm value in dollars to proxy for firm size
Time dummies in years
Description
Dependent 
Extraction rate of oil at the accounting year end, calculated by
the value of oil productions divided by firm value
Ownership distribution variable
Percentage of shares held by largest shareholder
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Summary statistics 
 
variable mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
 
Median 
ER 0.228 0.079 0.0535 0.6299 
 
0.2173 
LSH 0.141 0.109 0.052 0.8007 
 
0.1063 
DEBT 0.574 0.836 0 5.8861 
 
0.3122 
FV 2.87e+09 4.43e+09 1.88e+07 3.12e+10 
 
1.18e+09 
 
Correlation Matrix:                              
  
  Variable 
  
Variable      ER     LSH     DEBT      SIZE 
ER 1 
   
LSH -0.1371** 1 
  
DEBT 0.1146* 0.1195* 1 
 
FV -0.1153* -0.1078* -0.2150*** 1 
  
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics for the firms in sample. 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 The effect of share ownership distribution on oil 
extraction rate: OLS, Fixed effects and GMM estimators 
Dependent 
variable
OLS 
Estimator
Within 
Estimator
First-
difference
d GMM
System 
GMM
ER (1) (2) (3) (4)
L.ER 0.671*** 0.277*** 0.085 0.664***
(7.88) (4.04) (0.91) (7.04)
LSH -0.247** -0.225* -0.343* -0.272**  
(-1.96) (-1.77) (-1.93) (-2.11)   
LSHSQ 0. 339* 0. 323* 0. 511 0. 372*
(1.72) (1.88) (1.55) (1.83)
DEBT 0.010** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.011**  
(2.06) (2.95) (2.84) (2.58)
Log(V) -0.020*** -0.188*** -0.249*** -0.022* 
(-2.59) (-4.86) (-5.05) (-1.89)   
_cons 0.235*** 1.999*** 0.300** 
(3.18) (5.26) (2.57)
N                   241 241 218 241
R square 0.54 0.6
rho 0.81
AR2 0.37 0.101
J (p-value) 1.00 1.00
 
a.) t-statistics in parenthesis. b.) Time dummies are included in all specifications. c.) AR2 tests for 
second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. 
d.) The Hansen J statistics test of overidentifying restrictions under the null of instrument validity has 
a p-value of 1.00 in both columns. e.) *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 
1% level respectively. f.) The first differenced GMM and system GMM estimator use lagged values 
of ER dated t-2 as instruments and other right side variables dated t-3 as instruments. g.) The 
Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator in column (4) is one-step estimates and assumes the regressors 
are predetermined, not necessarily exogenous. 
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Table 3.4 Sensitivity analysis 
SYSTEM SYSTEM Within Within
GMM GMM Groups Groups
IV IV
ER (1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b)
L.ER 0.6408016*** 0.63224*** 0.634601***
(0.08938) (0.10544) (0.11152)
LSH -0.199580** -0.22779** -0.16862 -0.66209*** -0.30534**
(0.10404) (0.10037) (0.11118) (0.18984) (0.15411)
LSHSQ 0.27545* 0.32990* 0.23914 0.70** 0.382*
(0.17669) (0.18281) (0.21352) (0.281) (0.229)
FIRM SIZE2 0.006615 -0.00304
(0.00979) (0.01198)
DEBT2 0.053826*** 0.07356**
(0.03107) (0.04118)
FIRM SIZE1 0.0229 -0.12747***
(0.01664) (0.0293)
DEBT1 0.03791** 0.01702
(0.01554) (0.0116)
CONS 0.13067 0.06765** 0.10751 0.07151 1.48964***
(0.098003) (0.03028) (0.12644) (0.15805) (0.28201)
N 217 217 217 241 241
AR4 0.129 0.135 0.226
Sargan(p value) 0.284 0.334 0.056
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes No Yes
SYSTEM 
GMM
Dependent 
variable:
 
 
Notes: a.) The figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. b.) Arellano-Bond tests 
for autocorrelation under the null of no serial correlation. We find no serial correlation for 
fourth-order AR (4) in the first-differenced residuals, c.) The Hansen J statistics test of 
overidentifying restrictions under the null of instrument validity has a p-value of 1.00 for column 1-3. 
d.) Sargan test is also satisfied, although it is less meaningful because it requires that the error terms 
are independently and identically distributed (and error terms in this model are heteroskedastic). e.) *, 
**, *** denotes significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. f.) The system 
GMM estimator is one-step estimates and assumes the regressors are predetermined, not necessarily 
exogenous. We use lagged values of ER dated t-2 as instruments and other right side variables dated 
t-3 as instruments.  
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Appendix A 
 
The current value Hamiltonian of an individual’ s problem is the following: 
 
   ),()(),()()(),(  tctwtatrtqtcu=H     (i) 
 
The first order conditions of the problem imply: 
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Log differentiating (18) with respect to time gives 
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which in turn gives (19) and (20).
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Appendix B  
Summaries of Empirical Studies—the relationship between firm profitability and share ownership  
 
Authors Data Performance 
Ownership 
concentration Method Findings and Conclusions 
Morck et al. 
(2000) 
373 Japanese 
manufacturing firms 
(1986)  Tobin's Q 
Sum of 10 largest 
shareholders 
Cross-sectio
n The positive relation between firm value and corporate block holdings. 
Gedojlovic and  
Shapiro (2002) 
334 Japanese 
corporations 
(1986-1991) 
ROA (Return 
on Assets) 
Sum of 5 largest 
shareholders 
Fixed- and 
random- 
effect panel 
data 
methods   
The positive relationship between ownership structure and financial 
performance of Japanese corporations with panel data.  
Leech and 
Leahy (1991) 
470 UK-listed 
companies with 
wide range of 
industries (1983-85) 
VAL, TPM, 
RSHC ,TSG ,
NAG, HDS 
1, 5, 10, 20 largest 
shareholders and 
Herfindahl  Pooled OLS   
Concentration has negative coefficients in valuation ratio, profit margin and 
return on shareholders' capital, growth rate of sales and net assets. 
Mudambi and 
Nicosia (1998) 
111 UK firms in 
financial industries 
(1992-94) 
Actual Rate of 
Return Herfindahl 
OLS and 
WLS    Increased concentration is inversely related to the same performance. 
Lehmann and 
Weigand 
(2000) 
361 German firms 
(1991-96) 
ROA and ROE 
(Return on 
Equity) Largest shareholder 
Panel 
regression Ownership concentration affects profitability significantly negatively. 
Thomsen and 
Pederson 
(2000) 
435 largest 
European 
companies (1990) 
ROA and 
Market-to-boo
k value of 
equity Largest shareholder OLS 
Find evidence of a bell-shaped effect with a maximum at an ownership 
share of 83 percent. It is shown that a positive effect of ownership 
concentration on shareholder value (market-to-book value of equity) and 
profitability (asset returns), but the effect levels off for high ownership 
shares. 
Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) 
511 US firms 
(1976-80) ROA Largest shareholder  OLS 
No significant relationship between ownership concentration and 
profitability 
Demsetz & 
Villalonga 
(2001) 
223 US firms 
(1976-80) Tobin's Q 
Largest shareholder, 
Managerial 
ownership 
2-equation 
system, 
OLS, 2SLS 
OLS results suggest that ownership is significant in explaining performance, 
2SLS results 
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Appendix C  
Data of oil extraction rate and share ownership and financial characteristics for 
U.S. energy firms over 1993-2007 
Firm name year 
Extraction 
rate 
LSH 
(%) 
DEBT 
ratio 
FIRM 
SIZE 
APACHE CORPORATION      1993 0.25503 12.55 0.3236 9.28 
APACHE CORPORATION      1994 0.245423 8.05 0.4281 9.34 
APACHE CORPORATION      1995 0.194488 7.25 0.471 9.53 
APACHE CORPORATION      1996 0.189915 9.05 0.3913 9.64 
APACHE CORPORATION      1997 0.205623 10.63 0.4642 9.68 
APACHE CORPORATION      1998 0.197933 8.29 0.549 9.58 
APACHE CORPORATION      1999 0.187501 8.65 0.4479 9.79 
APACHE CORPORATION      2000 0.211529 7.35 0.2561 10.04 
APACHE CORPORATION      2001 0.310827 9.2 0.3282 9.96 
APACHE CORPORATION      2003 0.271236 10.1 0.1768 10.19 
APACHE CORPORATION      2004 0.277287 5.4 0.1563 10.28 
APACHE CORPORATION      2005 0.300561 5.2 0.0969 10.39 
EOG RESOURCES INC       1993 0.167424 80.07 0.0587 9.52 
EOG RESOURCES INC       1994 0.162052 80.01 0.064 9.5 
EOG RESOURCES INC       1995 0.115477 60.65 0.0754 9.62 
EOG RESOURCES INC       1996 0.154718 53.28 0.1155 9.65 
EOG RESOURCES INC       1997 0.196724 54.97 0.219 9.62 
EOG RESOURCES INC       1998 0.185421 53.52 0.431 9.58 
EOG RESOURCES INC       1999 0.258653 9.7 0.4734 9.49 
EOG RESOURCES INC       2000 0.205324 9.8 0.1345 9.86 
EOG RESOURCES INC       2001 0.286574 9.9 0.1896 9.73 
EOG RESOURCES INC       2002 0.192972 9 0.25 9.76 
EOG RESOURCES INC       2003 0.281157 9 0.2072 9.81 
EOG RESOURCES INC       2004 0.240003 10.15 0.127 9.98 
EOG RESOURCES INC       2005 0.192357 9.9 0.0555 10.27 
EOG RESOURCES INC       2006 0.223622 12.5 0.0482 10.2 
EOG RESOURCES INC       2007 0.173571 12 0.0539 10.37 
Forest Oil Corporation      1993 0.334026 6.48 1.7174 8.52 
Forest Oil Corporation      1994 0.423258 8.92 3.3604 8.44 
Forest Oil Corporation      1995 0.251944 34.9 1.4678 8.52 
Forest Oil Corporation      1996 0.180234 30.8 0.3263 8.85 
Forest Oil Corporation      1997 0.181811 39.5 0.4251 8.93 
Forest Oil Corporation      1998 0.196307 40.2 1.3322 8.95 
Forest Oil Corporation      1999 0.179399 36.7 0.5241 9.03 
Forest Oil Corporation      2000 0.260076 32.1 0.3499 9.38 
Forest Oil Corporation      2001 0.373972 33.3 0.4506 9.28 
Forest Oil Corporation      2002 0.22799 16.3 0.5901 9.32 
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Forest Oil Corporation      2003 0.259918 14.54 0.5851 9.4 
Forest Oil Corporation      2004 0.327005 12.94 0.4694 9.44 
Forest Oil Corporation      2005 0.283911 14.84 0.3097 9.57 
Forest Oil Corporation      2006 0.249355 12.55 0.5864 9.51 
Forest Oil Corporation      2007 0.172896 14.94 0.3937 9.8 
MURPHY OIL CORPORATION      1993 0.185668 14.92 0.0615 9.32 
MURPHY OIL CORPORATION      1994 0.215614 13.77 0.0945 9.32 
MURPHY OIL CORPORATION      1995 0.229164 8 0.11 9.31 
MURPHY OIL CORPORATION      1996 0.2039 9.3 0.0863 9.43 
MURPHY OIL CORPORATION      1997 0.221931 12.8 0.0881 9.42 
MURPHY OIL CORPORATION      1998 0.127435 13.8 0.1841 9.34 
MURPHY OIL CORPORATION      1999 0.188672 13.6 0.1523 9.47 
MURPHY OIL CORPORATION      2000 0.278435 13.4 0.2064 9.52 
MURPHY OIL CORPORATION      2001 0.205814 11.9 0.1494 9.64 
MURPHY OIL CORPORATION      2002 0.197208 6.6 0.2341 9.69 
MURPHY OIL CORPORATION      2003 0.130544 7.4 0.1929 9.85 
MURPHY OIL CORPORATION      2004 0.180873 6.9 0.0897 9.91 
MURPHY OIL CORPORATION      2005 0.183211 8.5 0.0612 10.03 
MURPHY OIL CORPORATION      2006 0.180412 14.5 0.0888 10.02 
MURPHY OIL CORPORATION      2007 0.128169 13.5 0.095 10.25 
NOBLE ENERGY, INC.      1993 0.086466 14.7 0.4151 9.27 
NOBLE ENERGY, INC.      1994 0.18688 13.6 0.3045 9.21 
NOBLE ENERGY, INC.      1995 0.174664 13.3 0.2514 9.27 
NOBLE ENERGY, INC.      1996 0.168794 15 0.3119 9.55 
NOBLE ENERGY, INC.      1997 0.28739 8.1 0.3216 9.42 
NOBLE ENERGY, INC.      1998 0.28359 8.1 0.531 9.33 
NOBLE ENERGY, INC.      1999 0.328979 8.3 0.3641 9.22 
NOBLE ENERGY, INC.      2000 0.203468 8.9 0.2037 9.49 
NOBLE ENERGY, INC.      2001 0.247154 10.6 0.4383 9.46 
NOBLE ENERGY, INC.      2002 0.194479 10.5 0.4731 9.5 
NOBLE ENERGY, INC.      2003 0.251175 9.4 0.3659 9.54 
NOBLE ENERGY, INC.      2004 0.267022 10.5 0.2419 9.66 
NOBLE ENERGY, INC.      2005 0.226871 14.2 0.2869 9.96 
NOBLE ENERGY, INC.      2006 0.279933 14.1 0.2131 10.01 
NOBLE ENERGY, INC.      2007 0.205183 9.7 0.137 10.19 
Pioneer Natural Resources      1997 0.109939 8.8 0.6653 9.69 
Pioneer Natural Resources      1998 0.233094 26.4 2.4787 9.48 
Pioneer Natural Resources 1999 0.245915 26.6 1.9468 9.42 
Pioneer Natural Resources 2000 0.268055 26.7 0.8148 9.55 
Pioneer Natural Resources 2001 0.235061 24.8 0.7879 9.55 
Pioneer Natural Resources 2002 0.148575 17.5 0.5636 9.67 
Pioneer Natural Resources 2003 0.260714 15.8 0.4084 9.73 
Pioneer Natural Resources 2004 0.276694 9.5 0.4693 9.87 
Pioneer Natural Resources 2005 0.17885 12.9 0.3122 9.94 
Pioneer Natural Resources 2006 0.224807 19 0.3105 9.8 
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Pioneer Natural Resources 2007 0.193107 20 0.4792 9.93 
SM ENERGY COMPANY      1994 0.125041 . 0.1001 8.4 
SM ENERGY COMPANY      1995 0.168997 . 0.2638 8.36 
SM ENERGY COMPANY 1996 0.117695 10.7 0.0585 8.68 
SM ENERGY COMPANY 1997 0.108614 10.2 0.2621 8.8 
SM ENERGY COMPANY 1998 0.178381 9.6 0.4847 8.81 
SM ENERGY COMPANY 1999 0.195035 7.9 0.1531 8.88 
SM ENERGY COMPANY 2000 0.294185 5.7 0.0835 9.11 
SM ENERGY COMPANY 2001 0.271292 7.7 0.4124 9.16 
SM ENERGY COMPANY 2002 0.288711 11.1 0.4912 9.12 
SM ENERGY COMPANY 2003 0.340827 7.5 0.3301 9.17 
SM ENERGY COMPANY 2004 0.322888 10.7 0.4007 9.23 
SM ENERGY COMPANY 2005 0.353578 12.2 0.4552 9.26 
SM ENERGY COMPANY 2006 0.387593 6.4 0.8188 9.25 
SM ENERGY COMPANY 2007 0.442751 8.9 0.3073 9.23 
STONE ENERGY CORPORATION    1994 0.163615 6.2 0.8588 8.08 
STONE ENERGY CORPORATION     1995 0.126068 10.3 0.1915 8.25 
STONE ENERGY CORPORATION 1996 0.092673 11.27 0.2536 8.75 
STONE ENERGY CORPORATION 1997 0.147087 10.8 0.3545 8.67 
STONE ENERGY CORPORATION 1998 0.209813 10.1 2.174 8.58 
STONE ENERGY CORPORATION 1999 0.227568 11.1 0.9983 8.68 
STONE ENERGY CORPORATION 2000 0.178513 8.9 0.1455 9.03 
STONE ENERGY CORPORATION 2001 0.237035 8.9 0.5092 8.88 
STONE ENERGY CORPORATION 2002 0.240582 8 1.2328 8.77 
STONE ENERGY CORPORATION 2003 0.262695 9.9 0.7347 8.9 
STONE ENERGY CORPORATION 2004 0.266077 12.7 0.4398 9.07 
STONE ENERGY CORPORATION 2005 0.255621 12.7 0.2677 9.22 
STONE ENERGY CORPORATION 2006 0.350986 11 0.2862 9.23 
STONE ENERGY CORPORATION 2007 0.362908 7.8 0.4418 9.28 
SWIFT ENERGY COMPANY      1996 0.217278 5.9 0.20005508 8.42 
SWIFT ENERGY COMPANY   1997 0.186214 5.9 0.05882414 8.61 
SWIFT ENERGY COMPANY 1998 0.31755 6 0.09538749 8.35 
SWIFT ENERGY COMPANY 1999 0.202099 . 0.03766075 8.55 
SWIFT ENERGY COMPANY 2000 0.193519 . 0.0231 8.99 
SWIFT ENERGY COMPANY 2001 0.312653 5.6 0.1088 8.81 
SWIFT ENERGY COMPANY 2002 0.228594 10.8 0.1624 8.91 
SWIFT ENERGY COMPANY 2003 0.398947 5.7 0.1375 8.96 
SWIFT ENERGY COMPANY 2004 0.311829 6 0.1151 9.12 
SWIFT ENERGY COMPANY 2005 0.334494 6.9 0.0478 9.34 
SWIFT ENERGY COMPANY 2006 0.297407 6.2 0.2164 9.39 
SWIFT ENERGY COMPANY 2007 0.30339 10.4 0.2354 9.48 
XTO ENERGY  1996 0.198135 13.1 0.7401 8.87 
XTO ENERGY 1997 0.154908 14.4 0.8218 9.08 
XTO ENERGY 1998 0.189483 13 2.7603 9.1 
XTO ENERGY 1999 0.227408 10.6 2.2368 9.16 
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XTO ENERGY 2000 0.199853 9.9 0.3573 9.47 
XTO ENERGY 2001 0.273959 6.6 0.3952 9.48 
XTO ENERGY 2002 0.187201 7.23 0.3565 9.63 
XTO ENERGY 2003 0.179273 10.38 0.2361 9.82 
XTO ENERGY 2004 0.171073 5.49 0.2217 10.05 
XTO ENERGY 2005 0.181048 6.29 0.1946 10.28 
XTO ENERGY 2006 0.216553 6.22 0.1996 10.32 
XTO ENERGY 2007 0.17342 5.33 0.2536 10.49 
Berry Petroleum Company 1994 0.188214 9.8 0 8.32 
Berry Petroleum Company 1995 0.204234 9.4 0 8.35 
Berry Petroleum Company 1996 0.152937 9 0.136 8.55 
Berry Petroleum Company 1997 0.161123 9 0.0834 8.62 
Berry Petroleum Company 1998 0.116768 9 0.0961 8.53 
Berry Petroleum Company 1999 0.172833 9 0.1562 8.59 
Berry Petroleum Company 2000 0.371542 9 0.0848 8.5 
Berry Petroleum Company 2001 0.272773 9 0.0733 8.56 
Berry Petroleum Company 2002 0.26385 9 0.0404 8.59 
Berry Petroleum Company 2003 0.300816 9 0.1132 8.69 
Berry Petroleum Company 2004 0.235141 8.8 0.0267 9.03 
Berry Petroleum Company 2005 0.294083 8.6 0.0687 9.13 
Berry Petroleum Company 2006 0.262175 8.6 0.311 9.23 
Berry Petroleum Company 2007 0.200666 8.5 0.2328 9.39 
Cabot oil and gas corporation 1993 0.192339 11.8 0.3899 8.78 
Cabot oil and gas corporation 1994 0.084412 10.2 0.4583 9.2 
Cabot oil and gas corporation 1995 0.196313 16.6 0.7473 8.77 
Cabot oil and gas corporation 1996 0.234979 16.6 0.6338 8.81 
Cabot oil and gas corporation 1997 0.256939 15.4 0.415 8.83 
Cabot oil and gas corporation 1998 0.208013 15.2 0.9274 8.85 
Cabot oil and gas corporation 1999 0.23362 11.2 0.7364 8.84 
Cabot oil and gas corporation 2000 0.186378 12.26 0.2955 9.07 
Cabot oil and gas corporation 2001 0.300862 8.44 0.5122 9.06 
Cabot oil and gas corporation 2002 0.251991 10.3 0.4628 9.06 
Cabot oil and gas corporation 2003 0.334105 12.5 0.2882 9.09 
Cabot oil and gas corporation 2004 0.259157 12.62 0.1882 9.23 
Cabot oil and gas corporation 2005 0.221184 13.6 0.1505 9.41 
Cabot oil and gas corporation 2006 0.208947 15 0.0823 9.5 
Cabot oil and gas corporation 2007 0.148678 15 0.0889 9.63 
Callon Petroleum Company 1995 0.399482 34.63 0.0017 7.76 
Callon Petroleum Company 1996 0.192523 34.72 0.2216 8.13 
Callon Petroleum Company 1997 0.224188 26.41 0.4711 8.27 
Callon Petroleum Company 1998 0.205214 29.3 0.823 8.24 
Callon Petroleum Company 1999 0.132014 16.33 0.553 8.45 
Callon Petroleum Company 2000 0.157808 14.57 0.6025 8.55 
Callon Petroleum Company 2001 0.206245 16.81 2.1692 8.46 
Callon Petroleum Company 2002 0.206749 14.19 5.3598 8.47 
72 
 
Callon Petroleum Company 2003 0.162843 14.08 2.1321 8.66 
Callon Petroleum Company 2004 0.26777 10.78 0.7574 8.65 
Callon Petroleum Company 2005 0.266238 8.38 0.5534 8.72 
Callon Petroleum Company 2006 0.339045 8.14 0.7239 8.73 
Callon Petroleum Company 2007 0.232079 9.27 1.1407 8.87 
Comstock resources Inc 1994 0.213583 14.21 0.9276 7.9 
Comstock resources Inc 1995 0.152336 13.46 0.9876 8.16 
Comstock resources Inc 1996 0.175104 5.27 0.2557 8.59 
Comstock resources Inc 1997 0.161303 6.3 0.8996 8.74 
Comstock resources Inc 1998 0.263215 12.7 3.7287 8.55 
Comstock resources Inc 1999 0.275633 16.3 3.4834 8.51 
Comstock resources Inc 2000 0.254748 13.1 0.5504 8.82 
Comstock resources Inc 2001 0.290109 13.3 1.8635 8.76 
Comstock resources Inc 2002 0.223604 13.2 1.3633 8.8 
Comstock resources Inc 2003 0.242832 8.3 0.4631 8.99 
Comstock resources Inc 2004 0.21997 7.9 0.5129 9.08 
Comstock resources Inc 2005 0.195196 7.1 0.1854 9.19 
Comstock resources Inc 2006 0.278628 7.8 0.3323 9.26 
Comstock resources Inc 2007 0.297942 8.1 0.4937 9.36 
GOODRICH PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION 1995 0.12528 19.6 0.2869 7.64 
GOODRICH PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION 1996 0.19829 23.3 0.3477 7.59 
GOODRICH PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION 1997 0.1801 21.8 0.4158 7.8 
GOODRICH PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION 1998 0.270123 21.1 4.2816 7.56 
GOODRICH PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION 1999 0.277288 29.4 2.9492 7.69 
GOODRICH PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION 2000 0.30714 20.3 0.3364 7.96 
GOODRICH PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION 2001 0.288308 17.8 0.3259 8 
GOODRICH PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION 2002 0.292546 32.8 0.4131 7.8 
GOODRICH PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION 2003 0.27582 24.2 0.2109 8.06 
GOODRICH PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION 2004 0.124358 24.6 0.0809 8.56 
GOODRICH PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION 2005 0.053542 22.3 0.0481 8.82 
GOODRICH PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION 2006 0.060522 19.9 0.1974 9.09 
GOODRICH PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION 2007 0.110357 18.3 0.2736 9 
MERIDIAN RESOURCES 
CORPORATION 1995 0.186593 8.82 0.0001 8.29 
MERIDIAN RESOURCES 
CORPORATION 1996 0.223026 13.67 0 8.39 
MERIDIAN RESOURCES 1997 0.134571 42.6 0.3353 8.63 
73 
 
CORPORATION 
MERIDIAN RESOURCES 
CORPORATION 1998 0.189907 42.5 1.6437 8.59 
MERIDIAN RESOURCES 
CORPORATION 1999 0.321451 41.9 1.8993 8.62 
MERIDIAN RESOURCES 
CORPORATION 2000 0.313135 14.8 0.5391 8.85 
MERIDIAN RESOURCES 
CORPORATION 2001 0.413368 14.2 1.2317 8.63 
MERIDIAN RESOURCES 
CORPORATION 2002 0.428328 14.1 4.5382 8.4 
MERIDIAN RESOURCES 
CORPORATION 2003 0.264183 6 0.416 8.72 
MERIDIAN RESOURCES 
CORPORATION 2004 0.364783 5.6 0.1586 8.74 
MERIDIAN RESOURCES 
CORPORATION 2005 0.443111 6.3 0.2087 8.64 
MERIDIAN RESOURCES 
CORPORATION 2006 0.535265 9.7 0.2823 8.55 
MERIDIAN RESOURCES 
CORPORATION 2007 0.629935 10.39 0.4805 8.38 
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 
COMPANY 1996 0.152902 18.3 0.0657 8.99 
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 
COMPANY 1997 0.206157 17.9 0.1546 8.99 
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 
COMPANY 1998 0.186558 12.9 0.2472 9.02 
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 
COMPANY 1999 0.227054 11.4 0.1117 9.09 
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 
COMPANY 2000 0.241771 12.6 0.0662 9.33 
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 
COMPANY 2001 0.37268 13.4 0.2737 9.3 
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 
COMPANY 2002 0.24219 9.3 0.3865 9.41 
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 
COMPANY 2003 0.322582 5.9 0.258 9.5 
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 
COMPANY 2004 0.288995 7.1 0.2692 9.67 
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 
COMPANY 2005 0.24226 10.6 0.1362 9.86 
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 
COMPANY 2006 0.234565 10.8 0.1974 9.85 
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 
COMPANY 2007 0.222709 10.7 0.1517 9.9 
Petroquest Energy 1998 0.172695 17.3 0.2455 7.27 
Petroquest Energy 1999 0.198183 13.7 0.1276 7.63 
Petroquest Energy 2000 0.155385 12.7 0.1141 8.16 
Petroquest Energy 2001 0.266537 14.6 0.1926 8.31 
Petroquest Energy 2002 0.257674 8.5 0.0506 8.27 
Petroquest Energy 2003 0.283873 8 0.1948 8.23 
Petroquest Energy 2004 0.325346 7.7 0.1737 8.42 
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Petroquest Energy 2005 0.21906 7.5 0.4041 8.74 
Petroquest Energy 2006 0.241031 7.7 0.3212 8.91 
Petroquest Energy 2007 0.304541 8.2 0.2149 8.92 
Range Reources corporation 1995 0.175841 8.9 0.6396 8.33 
Range Reources corporation 1996 0.184031 16.64 0.4624 8.57 
Range Reources corporation 1997 0.156658 16.64 1.4162 8.92 
Range Reources corporation 1998 0.159147 16.64 5.8861 8.93 
Range Reources corporation 1999 0.25115 51.79 3.7978 8.76 
Range Reources corporation 2000 0.21741 6.2 1.3547 8.9 
Range Reources corporation 2001 0.386225 7.6 1.2629 8.73 
Range Reources corporation 2002 0.298348 10.8 0.9537 8.76 
Range Reources corporation 2003 0.321921 12.4 0.6719 8.95 
Range Reources corporation 2004 0.18215 9.1 0.3734 9.36 
Range Reources corporation 2005 0.160699 14.3 0.1801 9.61 
Range Reources corporation 2006 0.14232 14.6 0.2749 9.69 
Range Reources corporation 2007 0.097265 15 0.1498 9.95 
Southwestern energy company 1993 0.134893 5.5 0.2747 8.77 
Southwestern energy company 1994 0.152734 . 0.3725 8.72 
Southwestern energy company 1995 0.120333 5.79 0.6694 8.72 
Southwestern energy company 1996 0.133313 5.79 0.7443 8.81 
Southwestern energy company 1997 0.161615 6.64 0.9369 8.79 
Southwestern energy company 1998 0.182973 7.3 1.5156 8.67 
Southwestern energy company 1999 0.160472 9.8 1.8391 8.67 
Southwestern energy company 2000 0.162113 7.5 1.5158 8.82 
Southwestern energy company 2001 0.249787 9.9 1.321 8.79 
Southwestern energy company 2002 0.191309 7.1 1.1526 8.81 
Southwestern energy company 2003 0.185934 5.7 0.3248 9.06 
Southwestern energy company 2004 0.146237 . 0.1761 9.34 
Southwestern energy company 2005 0.078128 6.87 0.0166 9.79 
Southwestern energy company 2006 0.078864 8.8 0.0233 9.78 
Southwestern energy company 2007 0.068588 6.68 0.1029 10.02 
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Chapter 4  
 
Share ownership distribution and 
Extraction rate of petroleum in oil 
fields 
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4.1 Introduction 
Both chapter 3 and chapter 4 aim to investigate the effect of share ownership 
distribution on the extraction rate of oil. In chapter 3, due to the unavailability of 
reserves at firm level, we take the firm value as a proxy. Nevertheless, fortunately 
the reserves for oil fields are available. Hence, this chapter differs from chapter 3 in 
that we shall show the relationship between share ownership distribution and the 
extraction rate of oil in oil fields, particularly when the real reserves data is given.  
   
Existing models provide possible meaning of petroleum production decisions (e.g. 
Mabro et al., 1986; Pesaran, 1990; Favero, 1992). Related theoretical literature is 
given in section 2.2.2. However, production decisions in practice are not always 
made simply according to the models of optimal production. On the one hand, as 
Nygreen et al. (1998) suggested, accompanying political effects might make the 
models more reliable and applicable. On the other hand, the aggregation of the 
output equation may undermine the efficiency of the parameter estimates (Pesaran, 
1990). Inspired by the former arguments, we consider both the role of the largest 
licensee for the oil field and the effect of the largest shareholder in the multinational 
company to which the largest licensee belongs when firm decisions are taken through 
shareholder voting. For the latter problem, we estimate the determinants of 
extraction through disaggregating the output equation by major oil fields.   
 
Rather than modeling petroleum production, we will explore the main determinants 
influencing the extraction rate in oil fields especially the effects of the largest 
licensee’s and the largest shareholder’s share ownership. Firstly, the economics 
model is developed to theorize the relationship between share ownership and 
extraction rate for oil fields. Then, we conduct empirical estimation with 216 annual 
observations on 44 oil fields in the U.K. Continental Shelf covering the periods 
1997-2001. Strong evidence is found that share ownership, regardless of the largest 
licensee and the largest shareholder of the multinational company, has significant 
and positive effect on the extraction rate of oil fields. The results suggest that the 
more share ownership the largest licensee (or the largest shareholder) holds, the 
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extraction rate of the oil field is higher, which is contrary to the results generated by 
firm-level data in chapter 3. 
 
This paper makes several contributions. First, we will address two important factors, 
i.e. the largest shareholder’s share ownership and the largest licensee’s share 
ownership, in extraction decisions and estimate their effects on extraction rate. 
Second, the effects of typical factors influencing non-renewable resources extraction 
rate, i.e. remaining reserves and pay thickness, are controlled and estimated with 
U.K. Continental Shelf data at disaggregated oil fields level
9
. Third, the 
heterogeneity across oil fields is captured by incorporating variables which account 
for both the geological features of each field and individual operator characteristics 
(i.e. the relationship-specific learning through accumulative working experience of 
the producer and the driller) in panel data models. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 concentrates on reviewing the 
related empirical studies concerning production models and other determinants of the 
extraction rate of oil fields. Section 4.3 describes data and summary statistics. 
Section 4.4 provides estimation methods and related diagnostics tests. Section 4.5 
presents empirical results and discussions. Sensitivity analysis is given in section 4.6 
and the chapter concludes in section 4.8. 
 
 
4.2 Literature Review - Empirical Part 
There are three parts of the literature related to our study. First, our empirical 
estimation is on the basis of the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) so that relevant 
production models of oil supply applied to UKCS by Pesaran (1990) and Favero 
(1992) are surveyed. Second, extraction cost is introduced as the factors included in 
cost function also determine the extraction rate of oil fields. Third, literature related 
to the producer-specific characteristics which affect the production of oil fields are 
introduced.  
                                                 
9 Most previous studies are based on aggregated oil fields, such as Pesaran (1990) and Favero (1992). The 
aggregation of the output equation may undermine the efficiency of the parameter estimates (Pesaran, 1990). 
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4.2.1 Oil Production Modeling for UK Continental Shelf 
4.2.1.1 The Pesaran (1990) model 
 
Building on the theoretical contribution of Pindyck (1978) and Uhler (1979) and 
Devarajan and Fisher (1982), Pesaran (1990) developed an econometric model for 
the analysis of the exploration and extraction policies of ‘price taking’ suppliers of 
oil. Given the specification of the extraction cost function, ),( 1tt RqC , he considers 
the cost function as below: 
 
  ttt
t
ttt qq
R
qRqC 

 


2
1
3
2101 )(
2
1
),(
                         (4.1) 
where t represents unobserved random shocks to marginal extraction cost，δ3 
concerning the effect of the pressure dynamics of petroleum reserves on marginal 
extraction costs is expected to have a positive sign. Favero (1992) suggested that the 
separation of overall cost function into its two components – operating costs and 
development costs – and including the rate of development in the decision variables 
of the firms will allow the model to capture explicitly the dependence of the 
production stage on the development stage. 
 
In addition, for parameters of the cost function, the following restrictions are 
expected to be satisfied:  
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These conditions ensure the convexity of the cost function and the expected marginal 
cost of extraction is positive. Associated (4.1) with the Euler equation (4.2),  
1 1
1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) ( )t t tt t t t t
t t t
C C C
E E p p E
q q R
      

  
   
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                       (4.2)
 
the output equation can be solved. The optimum or the desired rate of extraction: 
 
* 1
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1[ (1 ) / ] ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t t t t t t tq z z E p p z E q z E h      

                 
(4.3)
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where 2 2 3/ ( ) / ( ),t t t t tz R R R R        3 2/ ,    
      
2
1 1
1
( / ) ( / )
2
t t t t th q R q R    
According to Pesaran (1990), the relationship between the actual rate of extraction 
and the firm’s desired rate of extraction can be characterized by the simple partial 
adjustment model 1 1( ),0 1.t t t tq q q q         
Under this specification equation (3) yields: 
11 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 1
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
tt t t t t t t t t t t t
q q z z E p p z E q z E h     
         
      
 (4.4)
 
As possible models of oil price expectations, rational expectations hypothesis and the 
adaptive expectations hypothesis are considered. Under the former hypothesis, the 
price expectations term in (4.3) can be replaced by: 
1 1 1( ) ,t t t t t tpE p p p p         
Under the adaptive hypothesis,  
1
1 1
1
( ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) ( ),it t t t i t
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
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Therefore, using the above results (4.4), we get the output equation under the rational 
expectations hypothesis: 
11 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 1
(1 ) ( )
tt t t t t t t t t t
q q z z p p z q z h u     
      
       
          (4.5)
 
Under the adaptive hypothesis, we have  
11 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 1
(1 ) (1 ) ( )
tt t t t t t t t t
q q z z p z q z h v      
     
       
          (4.6)
 
 
Furthermore, Pesaran (1990) has applied it to the UKCS. Estimation equations (4.5) 
and (4.6) take explicit account of the intertemporal nature of exploration and 
production decisions. The non-linear version of Sargan’s (1958) generalized 
instrumental variable (NLIV) method is used. In addition, lagged values of , ,t t tq h p  
and Rt and their cross-productions are taken as instruments. 
 
Using quarterly data for the UKCS oil over the period 1978-1986,  the estimates of 
the structural parameters based on (4.5) have a priori expected signs and all are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. The estimate of the discount factor  , 
is within the admissible range and is well determined. The 3  confirms the existence 
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of an inverse relationship between extraction costs and the initially available reserves. 
But average marginal extraction costs over the sample take an implausibly high 
value of over $100 and the shadow price of oil in the ground is not always positive. 
Sensitivity analysis reveals that one important reason for the most implausible 
marginal extraction costs is obtained by setting the discount rate to infinity. 
 
However, the estimates based on equation (4.6), the supply function with adaptive 
formed price expectations, are very poorly determined. None of the parameters of the 
cost function are statistically significant. The value of 1.05 estimated for the discount 
factor is implausible.
 
In line with the above results, they dropped the statistically 
insignificant variable zt-1 but added seasonal dummies. A preferred output equation is 
adopted:
 
1 4 2 4 3 4 1 1
ˆ0.212( ) 5.622( ) 0.614( ) 0.712 5.552t t t t t t t t t t tq s s s s s s q z p             
(4.7) 
This equation passes the diagnostic tests and fits well, and its coefficients have the 
correct signs. It indicates that current production depends on lagged production and 
price positively.
 
 
4.2.1.2 The Favero (1992) model 
 
Producers are assumed to be risk neutral and decide on the rates of extraction 
1, tt qq ... and the rates of exploratory effort, 1
, tt xx , by maximizing the discounted 
future streams of profits. In order to obtain the desired extraction and exploration 
function, the intertemporal optimization problem is solved. 
The net profit function can be written as  
tttttttttt xwRqCqp 3121 ),(                                     (4.8) 
where  
 
)1)(1)(1( 4121 cttttt   ,
]1[ 222 tcttt   , 
]1[ 223 ttctttt upup    
(4.9) 
 
tq  
rate of extraction               tx  
rate of exploratory effort 
tR level of proven reserves          tw  unit cost of exploratory effort 
tp well-head price                 t1  royalty 
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t2 petroleum revenue tax           tup  
1+uplift on exploration costs 
t4 supplementary petroleum duty      ct corporation tax 
 
Then combined with proven reserves change    ttttt qedRR 1  and 
exploratory effort constraints ttt xXX  1  
where td denotes the addition to proven 
reserves during period t-1 to t from new discoveries and te the revisions/extensions 
to previously discovered reserves, represents the level of cumulative exploratory 
effort at time t. Lagrange technique is adopted to obtain the Euler equations. The 
optimal level of output function with taxation is derived as 
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We can see that the output depends on the ratios and let 
ttt 121   , ttt 2211   and ttt 3212   , suggesting that the tax system has an 
effect on output function unless the ratios are constant over time. 
 
Following Pesaran (1990), the relationship between the actual rate of extraction and 
the firm’s desired rate of extraction can be characterized by the simple partial 
adjustment model )( 1
*
1   tttt qqqq  , 10 
 
This specification equation, 
combines with (4.10) and yields: 
 
][)1( 1211121131101   tttttttttttt ppEzbzbEzbqq 
                  )()( 1311413113   tttttttt hEzbqEzb 
 
where  
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b
    
02 b
     
04  b
     
As possible models of oil price expectations, the rational expectations hypothesis and 
the adaptive expectations hypothesis are considered. Under the former hypothesis, 
the price expectations term in (4.10) can be replaced by: 
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tttttt ppE 1111 )(    
1112121 )(   tttttt ppE   
where 11 t satisfies the orthogonality property 0)|( 1111   tttE 
 
The second alternative for expectations formation is constituted by an adaptive 
expectation scheme for price combined with a rational expectations scheme for the 
tax parameters. We have  
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Where 10  v  
 
ttttE 2221  
 
Under this alternative, Favero (1992) consider the possibility of a backward looking 
behaviour by agents in the formation of price expectations. Finally, Favero (1992) 
has used the two following empirical alternatives for the supply equation with the 
above two price expectations formula. 
(i) Rational expectations model 
     
][)1( 12112113101   tttttttttt ppzbzbzbqq 
                  ttttttt hzbqzb 113141313 )()(               
(4.11)                                    
(ii) Mixed adaptive and rational expectations model 
     )](~)(~[)1( 2112113101 vpvpzbzbzbqq tttttttt   
                  ttttttt hzbqzb 213141313 )()(   
                                                                                                                 (4.12) 
 
Using the same dataset with Pesaran (1990), Favero (1992) concludes that the most 
satisfactory model of oil supply in UKCS supports the hypothesis with the discount 
factor of zero. More importantly the results do not modify the results estimated by 
Pesaran (1990) with the inclusion of taxation. The production of oil appears to be 
irrelevant to past oil supply decisions. That is the main reason why we do not 
consider the effect of taxation for our theoretical and econometrical models.  
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4.2.2 Extraction cost 
In this section, we use the literature on extraction cost function to determine which 
factors should be included in a typical production decision for oil fields. In the 
theoretical literature on non-renewable resource economics, a variety of assumptions 
about the structure of extraction cost function have been made in line with two main 
factors, namely the rate of extraction and the decline in quality accompanied by the 
depletion of the resource.  
 
Weitzman (1976) assumes that the unit costs of extracting a resource from a given 
stock depend not only on the current rate of extraction but also on cumulative 
extraction. Farzin (1984) and Gamponia and Mendelsohn (1985) assume that cost 
function is linearly homogeneous in the extraction rate and independent of quality 
changes that resource depletion causes. Eswaran et al. (1983) consider extraction 
cost as a non-linear function in terms of extraction rate and independent of quality 
changes. Pindyck (1978) assumes the cost function is non-linearly decreasing in the 
remaining reserves but linear in the extraction rate, and suggesting unit cost is 
independent of the extraction rate but rises with the depletion of the stock.  
 
In contrast, Levhari and Liviatan (1977) model extraction cost as a non-linear 
function of both cumulative extraction and the rate of extraction. Halvorsen and 
Smith (1984) and Heaps (1985) allow extraction cost to be non-linear in the stock of 
remaining reserves and rate of extraction. The cost function is assumed to be convex 
which varies positively with the rate of extraction and negatively with the level of 
remaining reserves in Pesaran (1990) and Favero (1992). 
 
There is the earliest formal model linking the complications of mining practice to the 
empirical estimates of Hotelling model by Farrow (1985). The theoretical conditions 
for efficient extraction from a known stock resource by a competitive mining firm 
are tested using proprietary data from a mining firm. Output price data and 
coefficient estimates from a trans-log cost system are used to compute the in situ 
value of the resource and the stock effect. Changes in the in situ value over time are 
then statistically compared with the expected price path. The results reject the 
hypothesis that the data are consistent with the theoretical model and the maintained 
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hypotheses. Variations of the basic model that incorporate a time-varying discount 
rate, an alternative expected price series, and a constraint on the rate of output are 
also tested and rejected. 
 
Following Farrow (1985), Young (1992) investigates cost specifications and their 
corresponding Euler equations and examines the behaviour of a panel of small 
Canadian copper-mining firms. Her examination takes place in two stages. In the 
first stage, the cost structures of the firms are considered. Starting with simple, but 
flexible specifications of the individual firm’s cost function, a series of Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) (Engle, 1982; Breusch and Pagan 1980) and Wald tests are 
undertaken. In this way, the suitability of altering the original cost specification can 
be gauged. Once a final specification has been chosen, the firms’ optimal output path 
is examined in the context of a Hotelling model of resource-owner behaviour. In this 
second stage, the chosen cost function is entered into the firms’ intertemporal 
profit-maximization problems. The first-order conditions (Euler equations) are then 
derived and estimated directly via the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) 
procedure (Hansen and Singleton, 1982). Nevertheless, even with the preliminary 
specification search and the use of GMM estimation, the behaviour of the panel of 
fourteen Canadian copper mining firms in the data set examined do not seem to be 
consistent with the basic Hotelling model used. 
 
Turning to the costs of oil fields, in order to capture the effect of declining quality in 
a way that does not rely on observing the physical characteristics of a deposit, 
Livernois and Uhler (1987) propose the specification of the extraction cost function 
for the Nth deposit discovered:     
              
 NtNRtNqC ),,('),,(   
 
It is hypothesized that costs for the Nth deposit, at time t, depend on the extraction 
rate, ),( tNq and  the fraction of reserves remaining 
  )(/),()(),( NStNXNStNR  , where )(NS is the initial deposit size and 
),( tNX is cumulative extraction, and a vector of exogenous physical characteristics, 
)(NG . As the cumulative number of discoveries rises, quality declines, so the 
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condition that 0NC is consistent with the notion that the best deposits are found 
first. They also assume the cost function has the properties that 
,0,0,0  Rqqq CCC and .0qRC Then a linear form of the cost function 
),'( , ittt NRqCC   is estimated and obtained strong results to support the proposed 
model.  
Livernois and Uhler (1987) use a cross-sectional random sample of 166 oil pools in 
Alberta that were producing in 1976 and that were discovered in various years 
between and including 1950 and 1973. They estimated a linear form of the cost 
function and obtained strong results in support of the proposed mode. They find that 
extraction rate and number of oil wells have a positive effect on extraction cost. 
Remaining reserves is correlated with extraction cost negatively. Moreover, using a 
sample of 80 oil reservoirs in the province of Alberta in 1973, Livernois (1987) 
analyses how geological characteristics affect extraction cost in oil pools. Marginal 
costs including the marginal user cost of reservoir pressure are independent of the 
rate of oil extraction. The geographical factors of production are found to have a 
significant impact on marginal costs. Moreover, Livernois (1987) finds that 
differences in the natural factors of production result in significantly different 
production possibilities among deposits under simultaneous exploitation.  
 
4.2.3 Oil production and other firm characteristics  
In chapter 3, we used some firm specific factors (i.e. firm size and debt ratio) as 
control variables in empirical estimation. However, these variables are not available 
for oil fields in this chapter. Therefore, we use fixed effects and random effects 
models to capture the unobservable specific characteristics for oil fields which 
potentially influence the extraction rate of oil. According to the literature, we 
consider the relationship-specific learning through accumulative working experience 
of the producer and the driller as firm characteristics influencing the oil extraction 
rate for each oil field. 
    
In macroeconomics, on-the-job learning and knowledge spillovers are widely 
considered as an important driving force for endogenous economic growth (Arrow, 
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1962; Stokey, 1988; Parente, 1994; Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996). When two firms 
accumulate experience working together, relationship-specific intellectual capital is 
created that cannot be appropriated to pairings with other firms (Kellogg, 2011).  
    
In oil cases, obtaining leases from the holders of that field’s mineral rights, the 
production company aims to extract oil reserves for processing and sale. Typically, 
producers have more geologic information than do drillers due to their knowledge 
from seismic imaging and previously drilled wells. The actual drilling of wells is 
conducted by drilling companies which own drilling rigs and drilling crews. 
Although producers do not necessarily physically drill their own wells, they do 
design wells and write drilling procedures. Kellogg (2011) argues that the 
relationship-specific learning through accumulative working experience of the 
producer and the driller plays a role in productivity improvements. 
 
According to Kellogg (2011), production function is  
 
log( ) log( ( ))fprt f p r fprt fprty h E X                            (4.13) 
where y denotes drilling efficiency, measured as the number of days required to drill 
each well for producers and rigs and producer-rig pairs. ( )h E denotes the learning 
process by which experience improves the efficiency of the rig crew and the 
decisions the firms make regarding how to drill the well. p denotes the producer and 
r is rig drilling the well, f is the field in which the well is drilled. We denote the 
fixed effects for fields and producers as well as rigs. fprtX denotes a vector of 
observable variables that may impact drilling productivity.  
    
Using a data set from the U.S. onshore oil and gas drilling industry with a sample of 
1354 fields and 704 producers and 1339 rigs over 1991-2005, Kellogg (2011) 
demonstrates that productivity of an oil production company and its drilling 
contractor increases in their joint experience.  He shows that a drilling rig that 
accumulates experience with one producer improves its productivity more than twice 
as quickly as a rig that frequently changes contracting partners. As a consequence, 
producers and rigs have a strong incentive to maintain their relationships, and the 
data demonstrate that producers are more likely to work with rigs with which they 
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have substantial prior experience than those with which they have worked relatively 
little. Moreover, the observed relationship-specific learning appears to be driven 
primarily by the accumulation of personal interactions between the firms’ personnel, 
rather than by just the accumulation of field or firm-specific technical knowledge. 
 
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
4.3.1 Data collection 
To examine the effect of share ownership distribution on the extraction rate of UK 
Continental Shelf oil fields, we gather data from various databases. Table 4.1 shows 
the data sources. From the historical statistics and Brown books provided by 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) of the UK government, we 
obtain the annual production and reserves for 121 offshore oil and gas fields over the 
period 1997-2001
10
. We restrict our focus to oil fields. Hence those fields producing 
gas are removed from our sample. Moreover, data on share ownership the largest 
licensee holds is collected from Brown books.   
 
From the Thomson One Banker database, we also draw data on share ownership 
owned by the largest shareholder of the multinational company to which the largest 
licensee belongs. Accounting for geological factors, the reserves of initial oil in place 
and thickness of the oil field are mainly collected from United Kingdom Oil and Gas 
fields Commemorative and Millennium: volume No.20 (Gluyas and Hichens, 2003) 
and supplemented by United Kingdom Oil and Gas fields: 25 years commemorative 
volume (Abbotts, 1991).  
 
For each field and variable, we go as far back as the data permit. We then dropped 
the oil fields that do not have complete records on three key variables used in our 
regressions, namely the extraction rate, share ownership of largest licensee and share 
ownership of the largest shareholders of the multinational companies. This left us 
                                                 
10
 On the one hand, year 2001 is the last year which is easily accessible; on the other hand, the oil price is calm 
and low before year 2003. 
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with a sample of 216 annual observations on 44 oil fields for 1997-2001. The sample 
has an unbalanced structure, with the number of years of observations on each firm 
varying between 3 and 5.  
 
4.3.2 Measurements of variables 
The dependent variable in our estimation is the annual extraction rate of oil fields, 
denoted as ER. It is measured by dividing annual production over recoverable 
reserves for each oil field. The recoverable reserve is defined as the oil that can be 
recovered from the oil reservoir, which is calculated by multiplying the amount of oil 
initially in place by the recovery factor.  
 
During a licensing round companies generally working together in consortia invest for 
the field on offer. According to the Department of Energy and Climate Change in the 
U.K., one of the consortium companies (generally the company with the largest 
interest in a field) takes responsibility for operating the field under the control of a 
joint operating committee of all the licensees. To examine the impact of share 
ownership (SH) to extraction, we use the share ownership that the largest licensee 
holds. Meanwhile, we also consider the role of the multinational company to which 
the largest licensee belongs (MSH). For instance, for one oil field named Andrew, its 
largest licensee is BP Exploration Operating Company Limited. In addition, to 
explore the effect of the largest licensee on extraction, we would identify if its parent 
firm, BP plc, affects the extraction decision of the oil field. The relating 
multinational companies list for each oil field is given in Appendix A.  
 
The variable of remaining reserves is treated as a controllable factor of production 
and denoted by RR. Following Livernois and Uhler (1987), it is calculated 
as ( ) /it i it iRR S Y S  , where iS  is the initial reserves in place and tY  
is 
cumulative extraction before year t . It accounts for the factors of initial deposit and 
age of the oil field. Pickering (2008) uses panel data and finds a positive and highly 
significant relationship between extraction rates and remaining reserves wherein 
differences in costs and pricing behaviour are all contained within the intercept term. 
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Therefore, we expect that the fraction of remaining reserves is positively correlated 
with extraction rate.  
 
Cost functions in which current and cumulative extraction (or equivalently for 
known initial stock, current extraction and remaining reserves) are the major 
arguments are also found in some other theoretical and empirical studies (Levhari 
and Leviatan, 1977; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Cairns, 1981; Epple ad Hansen, 1981; 
Stollery, 1984; Epple, 1985). In some applied papers other elements, such as input 
prices and geological characteristics, also appear in the cost function (Zimmerman, 
1977; Slade, 1984; Farrow, 1985; Young, 1992), but current and cumulative 
extraction rates remain as the main arguments of interest with regard to the 
determination of production profiles.  
 
The assumption of an inverse relationship between extraction costs and the size of 
the reserve base is of great significance in models of exploration such as in Pindyck 
(1978, 1980), Devarajan and Fisher (1982), and Lasserre (1985). In particular, as 
mentioned above, the cost structure of the Pindyck model is based upon the 
assumptions that extraction cost rises as reserves are depleted, and that discovery 
cost rises as the stock of undiscovered sites decreases as the sites remaining are 
lower in ‘quality’. 
 
Moreover, the differences in exogenous physical characteristics would determine the 
extraction rate for oil fields. According to Livernois (1987), the production is 
increasing in the thickness of the pay zone of the reservoir into which the well is 
drilled. This physical factor is measured with net pay thickness in feet, Z, which is 
defined as the thickness of rock that can deliver hydrocarbons to the well bore at a 
profitable rate. It is computed by oil column multiplied by net/gross thickness ratio. 
The effect of pay thickness on extraction rate is expected to be positive in our 
estimations.  
 
 
 
 
90 
 
4.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
The statistics summary of our sample is presented in Table 4.2. All sample data used 
in estimation are provided in Appendix B. Our sample consists of 44 oil fields over 
1997-2001. We have a total of 305 observations for the dependent variable, i.e. 
annual extraction rate for North Sea oil fields. The average rate of extraction is 6%, 
and the range goes from 0 to 56%. The largest licensee holds 58% of share 
ownership on average. There are five oil fields owned by the licensee with 100% of 
shareholdings, namely Andrew, Cyrus, Highlander, Miller and Tartan. 
 
The lowest maximum for shareholdings is 20%. The share ownership distribution is 
apparently concentrated, while the relating multinational company’s share ownership 
distribution is dispersed with the average share ownership 7% as well as a range 
from 0.0014 to 0.26. The statistics show that 70% of initial reserves are remaining in 
oil fields on average. The minimum level of remaining reserve is 29% and the 
maximum proportion of remaining reserve is 100%. Net pay thickness as the 
geological factor which impacts the oil reserve and production has skewed data. The 
average thickness of rock is 537 feet and the sample value ranges from 75 feet to 
2135 feet. Thereby it is transformed into a logarithm with base 10 to achieve the data 
normality. 
 
Moreover, Table 4.2 also shows the paired correlation for variables estimated in our 
regressions. The multinational company is correlated with extraction rate of oil field 
positively and significantly. The physical characteristics factors, remaining reserves 
and net pay thickness, are related to oil extraction strongly significantly (p<0.01). 
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4.4 Methodology  
4.4.1 Estimation methods 
Controlling for the potential effects of geological factors, the following equation is 
used to estimate the effect of share ownership distribution on extraction rate of oil 
fields,  
 
         itititititit
eZRRMSHSHER  lg43210           (4.13)
 
   itiit vue  , ,,...,1 Ni  Tt ,...,1  
 
where itER is the extraction rate of oil field i in year t . 0 is the intercept. itSH is 
the percentage of shareholdings owned by the largest shareholder in the field.
 
itMSH  is the percentage of shareholdings owned by the largest shareholder of the 
responsive multinational company for variable itSH . it
RR
 
is the ratio of remaining 
reserves over total initial oil in place. itZlg
 
indicates the logarithm of pay thickness 
for oil reservoir as measurement of field size,
 
ite is the error term for firm i at time 
t  and consist of the unobservable time-invariant field-specific effect iu and  an 
ordinary white noise term itv . As section 4.2.3 suggested, the specific factor iu is 
considered as the relationship-specific learning through accumulative working 
experience of the producer and the driller as firm characteristics influencing the oil 
extraction rate for each oil field.   
 
Estimation is performed using panel data techniques. On the one hand, it can address 
the panel structure of the collected data on extraction rate of oil fields. On the other 
hand, the panel data models can capture both the heterogeneity across oil fields and 
the heterogeneity across time periods.  
 
Our econometric analysis utilizes two specific standard panel data models: 
fixed-effects model and random-effects model (Hsiao, 1986). Each specific model 
stems from a more general model that captures differences across the various 
producers by incorporating an individual term for each oil field. If it is uncorrelated 
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with the other regressors in, then a random-effects model is appropriate. The 
one-way random-effects model captures differences across the various producers by 
including a random disturbance term that remains constant over time and captures 
the effects of unobservable factors specific to each oil field. The two-way random 
effects model captures differences over time periods by additionally including a 
random disturbance term that is generic to all producers but captures the effects of 
excluded factors specific to each time period. 
 
 
If the oil field-specific term is correlated with the other regressors, then a fixed 
effects model is appropriate. It removes any variable that does not vary within the 
groups. The one-way fixed effects model captures differences across oil fields by 
estimating a constant term for each oil field. The two-way fixed effects model 
captures differences over time periods by additionally estimating an individual 
constant term for each time period. 
 
4.4.2 Diagnostics and robust variance estimators  
This section will explore how well our data meet the assumptions of ordinary least 
squares regression and give the reasons why the results generated by panel data 
models are substantially robust. We will consider the following assumptions: 
homogeneity of variance, independence, model specification.  
 
Table 4.4 shows a summary of diagnostics tests for regressions. Breusch-Pagan test 
statistics with 52.88 strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the variance of the 
residuals is constant. It suggests that the residual has a heteroskedasticity problem. 
Moreover, as the degree of multicollinearity increases, the regression model 
estimates of the coefficients become unstable and the standard errors for the 
coefficients can get wildly inflated. To test the multicollinearity, variance inflation 
factor is measured. Generally, if a variable whose VIF values are greater than 10, the 
variable could be considered as a linear combination of other independent variables. 
In our regression model, the VIF equals 1.1 suggesting there is no multicollinearity 
problem. In addition, the specification error is found as Ramsey reset test with 
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statistics 4.04 at significance level below 1%, which indicates that the estimation has 
omitted variables. To end, we use Wooldridge test to check the autocorrelation in 
panel data. We reject the null hypothesis that there is no first-order autocorrelation in 
panel data. 
 
In order to ensure valid statistical inference when some of the underlying regression 
model’s assumptions are violated, we rely on panel models regressions. As stated in 
section 4.4.1, the fixed-effects model and random-effects model (Hsiao, 1986) are 
applied. Each specific model stems from a more general model that captures 
differences across the various producers by incorporating an individual term for each 
oil field. Thereby, to some extent, the specification error problem is mitigated. 
Finally, considereing the above problems such as panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation 
and panel-level heteroskedastic error term, we correct them by clustering at the panel 
level. It will produce consistent estimates of the standard errors. 
 
4.5 Estimation Results and Discussions 
In this section, we report and interpret estimation results with alternative estimators 
shown in Table 4.5. Due to the coefficients of time-specific factors showing 
insignificant in all estimations, only one-way fixed-effects estimator and one-way 
random-effects estimator are used. Model 1 shows that right-skewed share 
ownership distribution of licensees has a significant and positive effect on the oil 
extraction rate of oil fields. Moreover, the share ownership distribution of parent 
companies to which the largest licensee belongs also impacts the extraction rate 
positively at significance level of 1%. The greater the right-skewed share ownership 
distribution, the higher is the extraction rate for oil fields. Apart from the effect of 
share ownership distribution, oil extraction rate is determined by geological factors 
of individual fields proxied by remaining reserves and net pay thickness. The results 
show that the oil fields with more remaining reserves tend to extract more oil. 
Moreover, as we expected, higher extraction rate depends on smaller thickness of 
rock that can deliver hydrocarbons to the well bore. 
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Although the pooled OLS model generates solid results, it disregards the expected 
heterogeneity inherent in the panel data. To exploit the heterogeneity across 
individual oil fields, we turn to one-way panel data models. If appropriate, the 
one-way random effects model is preferred to the one-way fixed effects model as 
fixed effects model precludes estimation of one key time-invariant factor: net pay 
thickness of oil fields. Much of the subsequent analysis focuses on this factor when 
examining heterogeneity across oil fields. 
 
The one-way random effects model dominates the pooled OLS model according to 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test under the null hypothesis that 
variances of groups are zero. We find strong evidence of significant differences 
across oil fields as LM statistics equals 44.56 at significance level below 1%. 
Moreover, according to Hausman test for random effects, we could not reject the null 
hypothesis that the individual specific term is uncorrelated with the regressors as the 
test statistics equals 2.69 and P value is 0.442. Therefore, the random effects model 
domains the fixed effects model. 
 
Model 2 reports the estimation results from the one-way fixed effects model. There 
is a significant and positive relationship between extraction rate and the share 
ownership distribution of the parent company to which the largest licensee belongs. 
However, the share ownership of licensees and remaining reserves are found to be 
insignificant. Moreover, the appropriate F-test for joint significance of all the fixed 
effects – oil field-specific – confirms their importance at levels far below 1% 
(statistic equals 5.14). Thus, the one-way fixed-effects model dominates the 
comparable pooled OLS model. 
 
As mentioned above, the one-way random effects model not only dominates the 
one-way fixed effects model but also the pooled OLS model. Therefore, we focus 
more on the random-effects model. Model 3 reports the estimation results from the 
one-way random effects model. The results for factors involving share ownership 
distributions of oil fields and the parent company of the largest licensee, the 
proportion of remaining reserves and the net pay thickness of oil fields are very 
similar to the pooled OLS results in sign and statistical significance. Inclusion of 
these oil field-specific factors increases the coefficient of the share ownership 
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distribution controlled by parent company to which the largest licensee of oil field 
belongs, from 0.288 to 0.308. Moreover, the coefficient of remaining reserves also 
increases from 0.135 to 0.151. 
 
Overall, we find evidence that share ownership owned by the operator (i.e. the 
largest shareholder of the oil field is the operator) has a positive effect on oil 
extraction rate at 5% significant level. The largest shareholder from the operator’s 
multinational company shows a strong relationship with the extraction rate of the oil 
field at 0.1% significant level. In particular, when the multinational firm’s largest 
shareholder increases 1 per cent of ownership, extraction rate would increase by 
0.3%. In addition, geological factor, pay thickness and remaining reserves are found 
to be strongly correlated with extraction rate.  
 
As for chapter 3, our study is focusing on resource firm which delegate the decision 
of extraction rate of oil to the median voter directly. In contrast, chapter 4 examine 
the extraction decision for an oil field where there are many resource firms involved 
in production and operation. Moreover, these oil fields with several resource firms 
are engaging in exploration and production of petroleum on the same plateau, UKCS. 
There is no doubt the model of chapter 3 does not fit chapter 4. 
 
Our results may have some implications for policy makers or regulators. First, both 
the largest licensee and the largest shareholder of the multinational company to 
which the largest licensee belongs play an important role in extraction decisions for 
each oil field. Both have positive effects on the annual extraction rate. Second, 
annual extraction rate increases as share ownership distribution of the oil field and 
the largest licensee’s multinational company become more right-skewed.  
 
4.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
Using OLS as the reference point, the robustness across these models has been 
evaluated in model 1 of Table 4.5. The results generated by OLS are consistent with 
our main results estimated by one-way random-effects model. Nevertheless, since 
this positive relationship between share ownership distribution and extraction rate 
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challenges our previous econometric work in chapter 3, this section thoroughly tests 
the robustness of the results across sample selection and model specification as well 
as different estimation methods.  
 
Firstly, we test whether the results are driven by outliers by excluding various groups 
of oil fields from the sample. Two methods are used to detect outliers and influential 
points: the plots of leverage against residual squared in Figure 4.1 and the partial 
regression plots in Figure 4.2. We found that field no.41 was a point of major 
concern. Then, we performed random effects estimation with the outlier and without 
it separately in Table 4.3. Deleting field no.41 made little change in the coefficients. 
For instance, the most change is of coefficient for MSH and simply dropped from 
0.28 to 0.25. Therefore, oil field no.41 did not affect the regression. Thus, there is no 
influential point which has a large effect on regression results to remove. 
 
It is interesting to test for non-linearities by augmenting the regressions of Table 4.5 
with quadratic and cubic terms of the share ownership distribution. The relationship 
between inequality of share ownership distribution and extraction rate could depend 
on an oil field’s stage of development. We test for this by experimenting with 
different functional forms, such as including a squared and/or cubed term for 
inequality. We do not find any evidence for a significant quadratic or cubic 
relationship between changes in share ownership inequality and changes in 
extraction rate. 
 
As a further robustness check, we enquire whether the estimation method matters. 
Equation (1) is re-estimated using Feasible Generalized Least Squares estimator 
(FGLS) and OLS with Panel-Corrected standard errors (PCSE) which are specified 
in section 5.5. Both panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation and panel-level 
heteroskedastic errors are controlled. We estimate a set of regressions where the 
dependent variable (pollution emission) is regressed on the core variable (share 
ownership distribution) and all possible combinations of other control variables. The 
results are presented in Table 4.6. In comparison with PCSE estimations, results 
using FGLS appear overconfident. This problem is explored by Beck and Katz (1995) 
who attribute this overconfidence to time-series cross-section data where the error 
process has a large number of parameters as the FGLS assume the error process is 
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known but not estimated. This oversight causes estimates of the standard errors of 
the estimated coefficients to understate their true variability. 
 
Summing up, for most regressions, the coefficients of share ownership distribution 
variables indicate high significance with positive sign regardless of FGLS estimator 
and PCSE estimator. The results are again qualitatively similar to those reported in 
column (3) of Table 4.5.  
 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter examines the influence of share ownership distribution on extraction 
rate differences between oil fields. Results based on data from an unbalanced panel 
set of 44 UKCS oil fields covering the period 1997-2001 show that there is positive 
relationship between the share ownership of the largest licensee and the largest 
shareholder of the largest licensee’s multinational company and extraction rate. It 
suggests that an oil field with more right-skewed share ownership distribution tends 
to extract more oil after controlling geological characteristics such as remaining 
reserves and pay thickness. In particular, when the multinational firm’s largest 
shareholder increases 1 per cent of ownership, extraction rate increases by 0.3%. 
 
There is inconsistency between chapter 3 and chapter 4 regarding the role of share 
ownership distribution in extraction rate. However, these are as we expected. The 
main explanation attributed to the inconsistency is decision mechanism. Therefore, 
the most important issue for future research is that a theoretical model would be 
developed for chapter 4. We would capture a game between resource extracting 
firms (different firms on the same plateau). It will be strategic interaction between 
those firms and incentives to strategically delegate among shareholders.  
 
Moreover, some limitations must be taken into consideration. For instance, the 
identity of the largest licensee and the largest shareholder possibly affects extraction 
decisions. Hence to have a better picture of how extraction rate is determined by 
share ownership, it would be worthwhile further examining the link between the 
identities of these decisive shareholders and level of extraction rate.  
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Figure 4.1 Influential observations and outliers 
It is the leverage against residual squared plot. An observation with an extreme value 
on a independent variable is called a point with high leverage. Leverage is a measure 
of how far an independent variable deviates from its mean. An outlier is an 
observation with large residual. The upper left corner of the plot will be points that are 
high in leverage and the lower right corner will be points that are high in the absolute 
of residuals. The upper right portion will be those points that are both high in leverage 
and in the absolute of residuals. There is one point in this plot that stands out so much 
differently from any other point. The observation of field no.41 (Fergus oil field) is 
associated with the largest residual on the plot. 
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Figure 4.2 Problematic observations 
 
 
It is called a partial-regression plot and is very useful in identifying influential points. 
These plots show that field no.41 is potentially problematic. 
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Table 4.1 Definitions and sources of the variables 
Definition
the ratio of annual oil production over recoverable reserves of oil field
the percentage of share ownership the largest licensee holds
the percentage of share ownership controlled by the largest shareholder of
the multinational company in which the largest licensee is belonged to 
the ratio(initial deposit - cumulative production)/initial deposit
net pay thickness in feet
Sources
ER, SH DECC historical statistics and Brown book 
https://www.og.decc.gov.uk/pprs/pprsindex.htm 
https://www.og.decc.gov.uk/information/index.htm 
MSH Thomson ONE Banker
RR, Z United Kingdom Oil and Gas fields Commemorative and Millennium and
25years commemorative volume edited by Gluyas and Hichens (2003)
and United Kingdom Oil and Gas fields: 25 years commemorative volume
edited by Abbotts (1991).
Thickness of oil fields 
Variable name
Extraction Rate (ER)
share ownership distribution of 
licensees (SH)
share ownership distribution of the 
multinational company (MSH)
Remaining Reserves 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable       Mean    SD 
   
Minimum Maximum Median 
ER 0.061704 0.066767 0 0.556317 0.034822 
SH 0.575081 0.224240 0.2 1 0.5 
MSH 0.078709 0.071028 0.0014 0.2576 0.0527 
RR 0.697046 0.185114 0.290815 1 0.697502 
Z 537.7958 475.6533 75.9 2135.182 337.5 
 
Correlation Matrix: 
   
  
Variable 
  
Variable               ER              SH 
         
MSH          RR 
SH 0.0785 
   MSH 0.1261** -0.1865** 
  RR 0.3171*** 0.0162 -0.1337** 
 Z -0.3413*** -0.2528*** 0.0107 -0.0632 
 
 *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 4.3 Regression including/deleting outlier observations 
 
Field no.41—Fergus oil field has appeared as an outlier point in above graphs 
(appendix 4.1A, B). We use random effects estimator to test whether the results are 
driven by outliers by excluding oil field 41. The below results suggest that the 
outliers, field 41, did not affect the estimation. The relationship between share 
ownership distributions and extraction rate are positive and significant. Deleting 
field 41 made little change in the coefficients. The most change is of coefficient for 
RR and simply dropped from 0.151 to 0.128.  
 
Random-effects Random-effects
with outliers without outliers
SH 0.046048** 0.040287*
(0.023) (0.02208)
MSH 0.308415*** 0.296462***
(0.079) (0.08073)
RR 0.151005*** 0.128239***
(0.03376) (0.02894)
LGZ -0.06727*** -0.06158***
(0.01683) (0.01674)
_cons 0.088391 0.091083
(0.0595) (0.06365)
N 216 211
Adjusted R^2:
Overall 
0.326 0.373
 
Note: robust standard errors are in the parenthesis.  
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Table 4.4 Diagnostics tests summary 
 
 
Breusch-Pagan test statistics with 52.88 strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the 
variance of the residuals is constant. It suggests that the residual has heteroscedastics 
problem. Moreover, as the degree of multicollinearity increases, the regression 
model estimates of the coefficients become unstable and the standard errors for the 
coefficients can get wildly inflated. To test the multicollinearity, variance inflation 
factor is measured. Generally if a variable whose VIF values are greater than 10, it 
means that the variable could be considered as a linear combination of other 
independent variables. In our regression model, the VIF equals 1.1 suggesting there 
is no multicollinearity problem. In addition, the specification error is found as 
Ramsey reset test with statistics 4.04 at significance level below 1%, which indicates 
that the estimation has omitted variables. To end up, we use Wooldridge test to 
check the autocorrelation in panel data. We reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
first-order autocorrelation in panel data.  
Diagnostics
Breusch-Pagan test (p value )  chi2 (1) 52.88 (0.000 )
1.1
Ramsey reset test(p value )  F(3, 208) 4.04 (0.008 )
Wooldridge test for serial correlation(p value )  F(1, 43) 25.928 (0.000 )
variance inflation factor
 
 
Therefore, given above problems such as panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation and 
panel-level heteroskedastic in the idiosyncratic error term, we correct them by 
clustering at the panel level. It will produce consistent estimates of the standard 
errors (Baltagi, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002). 
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Table 4.5 Estimations of oil extraction rate: Fixed and Random 
effects models   
Dependent 
Variable 
 ER   
Pooled OLS 
Model 1 
Fixed Effects 
Model 2 
Random effects 
Model 3 
SH 0.047*** 0.008 0.046**   
 
(2.64) (0.36) (2.00) 
MSH 0.288*** 0.340** 0.308*** 
 
(4.96) (2.71) (3.90) 
RR 0.135*** 0.235 0.151*** 
 
(6.76) (1.43) (4.47) 
LGZ -0.068*** N/A -0.067*** 
 
(-5.53) 
 
(-4.00)    
_cons 0.102** -0.123 0.088 
 
(2.41) (-1.18) (1.49) 
rho 
 
0.538 0.348 
R-squared : overall 0.327 0.173 0.102 
            within 
 
0.109 0.492 
           between 
 
0.2267 0.326 
No. of  observations 216 216 216 
 
 
t values are shown in parentheses;* for p<0.10, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01; N/A indicates 
that a particular regressor is not applicable to the noted model; Time dummies are not included as 
time-specific coefficients are insignificant. In case of OLS only the values of R-squared is reported. 
rho is the fraction of variance due to ui. Panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation and panel-level 
heteroskedastic in the idiosyncratic error term are corrected by clustering at the panel-level.  
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Table 4.6 Sensitivity analysis: alternative estimator FGLS and PCSE 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
FGLS  
AR1 
FGLS 
AR1 
FGLS  
AR1 
FGLS 
AR1 
PCSE 
AR1 
PCSE 
AR1 
PCSE 
AR1 
PCSE 
AR1 
ER (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
        
 
SH 0.024393*** 0.039632*** 0.020502** 0.041799*** 0.03773 0.059652** 0.028873 0.056044** 
 
(0.00688) (0.01096) (0.00938) (0.01132) (0.02837) (0.02346) (0.02651) (0.02551) 
MSH 0.199431*** 0.085001*** 0.121079*** 0.151949*** 0.338382*** 0.214831*** 0.272279*** 0.150215** 
 
(0.02837) (0.02321) (0.02761) (0.00255) (0.08585) (0.08025) (0.0895) (0.07507) 
RR 0.099261*** 0.156953*** 
  
0.085605 0.113648***               
 
(0.01321) (0.01587) 
  
(0.05573) (0.04359)               
LGZ -0.07576*** 
 
-0.09235*** 
 
-0.10038*** 
 
-0.10614***  
 
(0.00813) 
 
(0.00714) 
 
(0.03276) 
 
(0.02084)  
_cons 0.16696*** -0.06826*** 0.29417*** 0.040656*** 0.231309** -0.04443 0.322227*** 0.051624*** 
 
(0.02756) (0.01193) (0.02193) (0.00674) (0.1244) (0.03569) (0.05873) (0.01755) 
R-squared 
    
0.4887 0.4237 0.4620 0.3602 
N 216 271 216 276 216 271 216 276 
  
Note: a) robust standard errors are in parenthesis. b) *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10% level, 
5% level, and 1% level respectively. c) Both panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation and panel-level 
heteroskedastic errors are corrected. 
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Appendix A 
Names of sampled oil fields and the multinational companies in which their 
largest licensee of oil fields are belonged to 
Name of Oil field year Multinational company 
ALBA 1997 chevron corp. 
 1998 chevron corp. 
 1999 chevron corp. 
 2000 chevron corp. 
 2001 chevron corp. 
ANDREW 1997 BG group 
 1998 BG group 
 1999 BP PLC 
 2000 BP PLC 
 2001 BP PLC 
ARBROATH 1997 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 1998 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 1999 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 2000 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 2001 Enterprise Oil inc. 
ARKWRIGHT 1997 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 1998 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 1999 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 2000 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 2001 Enterprise Oil inc. 
AUK 1997 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1998 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1999 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 2000 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 2001 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
BALMORAL 1997 ENI  S.P.A 
 1998 ENI  S.P.A 
 1999 ENI  S.P.A 
 2000 ENI  S.P.A 
 2001 ENI  S.P.A 
BANFF 1997 Conocophillips 
 1998 Conocophillips 
 1999 Conocophillips 
 2000 Conocophillips 
 2001 Conocophillips 
BEATRICE 1997 Talisman Energy inc. 
 1998 Talisman Energy inc. 
 1999 Talisman Energy inc. 
 2000 Talisman Energy inc. 
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 2001 Talisman Energy inc. 
BEINN 1997 Marathon Oil Corp. 
 1998 Marathon Oil Corp. 
 1999 Marathon Oil Corp. 
 2000 Marathon Oil Corp. 
 2001 Marathon Oil Corp. 
BERYL 1997 Exxon mobil Corp. 
 1998 Exxon mobil Corp. 
 1999 Exxon mobil Corp. 
 2000 Exxon mobil Corp. 
 2001 Exxon mobil Corp. 
BIRCH 1997 ENI  S.P.A 
 1998 ENI  S.P.A 
 1999 ENI  S.P.A 
 2000 CENTRICA PLC 
 2001 CENTRICA PLC 
BRENT 1997 Royal Dutch Petroleum co.--operator &Exxon 
Mobil corp. 
 1998 Royal Dutch Petroleum co.--operator &Exxon 
Mobil corp. 
 1999 Royal Dutch Petroleum co.--operator &Exxon 
Mobil corp. 
 2000 Royal Dutch Petroleum co.--operator &Exxon 
Mobil corp. 
 2001 Royal Dutch Petroleum co.--operator &Exxon 
Mobil corp. 
BRIMMOND 1997 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1998 BP PLC 
 1999 Exxon mobil Corp. 
 2000 Exxon mobil Corp. 
 2001 Exxon mobil Corp. 
BUCHAN 1997 Talisman Energy inc. 
 1998 Talisman Energy inc. 
 1999 Talisman Energy inc. 
 2000 Talisman Energy inc. 
 2001 Talisman Energy inc. 
CAPTAIN 1997 . 
 1998 . 
 1999 . 
 2000 . 
 2001 . 
CHANTER 1997 Total SA 
 1998 Total SA 
 1999 Total SA 
 2000 Talisman Energy inc. 
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 2001 Talisman Energy inc. 
CLAYMORE 1997 ENI  S.P.A & BP PLC 
 1998 ENI  S.P.A & BP PLC 
 1999 ENI  S.P.A & BP PLC 
 2000 ENI  S.P.A & BP PLC 
 2001 ENI  S.P.A & BP PLC 
CORMORANT 
NORTH 
1997 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1998 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1999 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 2000 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 2001 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
CURLEW 1997 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1998 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1999 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 2000 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 2001 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
CYRUS 1997 BP PLC 
 1998 BP PLC 
 1999 BP PLC 
 2000 BP PLC 
 2001 BP PLC 
DEVERON 1997 BP PLC 
 1998 BP PLC 
 1999 BP PLC 
 2000 BP PLC 
 2001 BP PLC 
DON 1997 BP PLC 
 1998 BP PLC 
 1999 BP PLC 
 2000 BP PLC 
 2001 BP PLC 
DOUGLAS 1997 BHP Billiton 
 1998 BHP Billiton 
 1999 BHP Billiton 
 2000 BHP Billiton 
 2001 BHP Billiton 
DUNBAR 1997 Total SA 
 1998 Total SA 
 1999 Total SA 
 2000 Total SA 
 2001 Total SA 
DUNLIN 1997 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1998 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1999 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
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 2000 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 2001 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
EIDER 1997 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1998 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1999 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 2000 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 2001 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
FERGUS 1997 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 1998 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 1999 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 2000 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 2001 Amerada Hess Ltd 
FIFE 1997 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 1998 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 1999 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 2000 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 2001 Amerada Hess Ltd 
FLORA 1998 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 1999 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 2000 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 2001 Amerada Hess Ltd 
FOINAVEN 1997 BP PLC 
 1998 BP PLC 
 1999 BP PLC 
 2000 BP PLC 
 2001 BP PLC 
FORTIES 1997 BP PLC 
 1998 BP PLC 
 1999 BP PLC 
 2000 BP PLC 
 2001 BP PLC 
FULMAR 1997 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1998 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1999 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 2000 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 2001 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
HAMISH 1997 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 1998 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 1999 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 2000 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 2001 Amerada Hess Ltd 
HARDING 1997 BP PLC 
 1998 BP PLC 
 1999 BP PLC 
 2000 BP PLC 
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 2001 BP PLC 
HEATHER {AND 
EXT} 
1997 DNO&BG&Texaco 
 1998 DNO&BG&Texaco 
 1999 DNO&BG&Texaco 
 2000 DNO&BG&Texaco 
 2001 DNO&BG&Texaco 
HIGHLANDER 1997 . 
 1998 . 
 1999 . 
 2000 Talisman Energy inc. 
 2001 Talisman Energy inc. 
HUTTON 
NORTH WEST 
1997 Royal Dutch Petroleum co.  
 1998 Royal Dutch Petroleum co.  
 1999 Royal Dutch Petroleum co.  
 2000 Kerr-McGee North Sea (U.K.) Ltd. 
 2001 Kerr-McGee North Sea (U.K.) Ltd. 
IVANHOE 1997 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 1998 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 1999 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 2000 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 2001 Amerada Hess Ltd 
KINGFISHER 1997 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1998 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1999 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 2000 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 2001 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
LENNOX 1997 BHP Billiton 
 1998 BHP Billiton 
 1999 BHP Billiton 
 2000 BHP Billiton 
 2001 BHP Billiton 
MACCULLOCH 1997 Conocophillips&ENI 
 1998 Conocophillips&ENI 
 1999 Conocophillips&ENI 
 2000 Conocophillips&ENI 
 2001 Conocophillips&ENI 
MAGNUS 1997 BP PLC 
 1998 BP PLC 
 1999 BP PLC 
 2000 BP PLC 
 2001 BP PLC 
MILLER 1997 BP PLC 
 1998 BP PLC 
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 1999 BP PLC 
 2000 BP PLC 
 2001 BP PLC 
MONTROSE 1997 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 1998 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 1999 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 2000 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 2001 Enterprise Oil inc. 
MURCHISON 1997 . 
 1998 . 
 1999 . 
 2000 . 
 2001 . 
NELSON 1997 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 1998 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 1999 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 2000 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 2001 Enterprise Oil inc. 
NINIAN 1997 . 
 1998 . 
 1999 . 
 2000 . 
 2001 . 
OSPREY 1997 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1998 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 1999 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 2000 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
 2001 Royal Dutch Petroleum co. &Exxon Mobil corp. 
PIERCE 1997 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 1998 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 1999 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 2000 Enterprise Oil inc. 
 2001 Enterprise Oil inc. 
PIPER 1997 Total SA 
 1998 Total SA 
 1999 Total SA 
 2000 Talisman Energy inc.. 
 2001 Talisman Energy inc.. 
ROB ROY 1997 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 1998 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 1999 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 2000 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 2001 Amerada Hess Ltd 
SCAPA 1997 Total SA 
 1998 Total SA 
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 1999 Total SA 
 2000 Talisman Energy inc.. 
 2001 Talisman Energy inc.. 
SCOTT 1997 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 1998 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 1999 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 2000 Amerada Hess Ltd 
 2001 Amerada Hess Ltd 
SEDGWICK 1997 Marathon Oil Corp. 
 1998 Marathon Oil Corp. 
 1999 Marathon Oil Corp. 
STATFJORD 1997 BP PLC & Conocophillips (the latter is operator) 
 1998 BP PLC & Conocophillips (the latter is operator) 
 1999 BP PLC & Conocophillips (the latter is operator) 
 2000 BP PLC & Conocophillips (the latter is operator) 
 2001 BP PLC & Conocophillips (the latter is operator) 
STIRLING 1997 ENI SPA 
 1998 ENI SPA 
 1999 ENI SPA 
 2000 ENI SPA 
 2001 ENI SPA 
STRATHSPEY 1997 . 
 1998 . 
 1999 . 
 2000 . 
 2001 . 
TARTAN 1997 . 
 1998 . 
 1999 . 
 2000 Talisman Energy inc. 
 2001 Talisman Energy inc. 
THELMA 1997 ENI SPA 
 1998 ENI SPA 
 1999 ENI SPA 
 2000 ENI SPA 
 2001 ENI SPA 
THISTLE 1997 BP PLC 
 1998 BP PLC 
 1999 BP PLC 
 2000 BP PLC 
 2001 BP PLC 
TIFFANY 1997 ENI SPA 
 1998 ENI SPA 
 1999 ENI SPA 
 2000 ENI SPA 
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 2001 ENI SPA 
TONI 1997 ENI SPA 
 1998 ENI SPA 
 1999 ENI SPA 
 2000 ENI SPA 
 2001 ENI SPA 
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Appendix B 
Data of oil extraction rate and share ownership and geological factors for 
UKCS oil fields over 1997-2001 
Field Name Year SH % MSH 
% 
R Q Q/R S X RR Z 
ALBA 1997 33.17 4.78 50.72 4849.
8 
0.0956
19 
400 14734.
79 
0.7310
9 
. 
 1998 21.17 2.92 50.72 4381.
38 
0.0863
84 
400 19116.
17 
0.6511
3 
. 
 1999 21.17 7.38 61.4 3993.
49 
0.0650
41 
400 23109.
66 
0.5782
49 
. 
 2000 21.17 2.81 61.4 4156.
16 
0.0676
9 
400 27265.
82 
0.5023
99 
. 
 2001 21.17 3.35 61.4 4319.
12 
0.0703
44 
400 31584.
94 
0.4235
75 
. 
ANDREW 1997 100 0.9 17.49 2797.
68 
0.1599
59 
292 3653.7
8 
0.9086
56 
184.3 
 1998 100 1.02 18.67 3243.
62 
0.1737
34 
292 6897.4 0.8275
65 
184.3 
 1999 100 5.27 18.67 3297.
62 
0.1766
27 
292 10195.
02 
0.7451
25 
184.3 
 2000 100 3 20 2540 0.127 292 12735.
02 
0.6816
25 
184.3 
 2001 62.75 3.03 20 1855.
6 
0.0927
8 
292 14590.
62 
0.6352
35 
184.3 
ARBROATH 1997 41.03 1.33 22 1109.
25 
0.0504
2 
334 11644.
72 
0.7454
9 
110 
 1998 41.03 1.51 22 1114.
87 
0.0506
76 
334 12759.
59 
0.7211
23 
110 
 1999 41.02 1.38 22.61 1100.
35 
0.0486
67 
334 13859.
94 
0.6970
73 
110 
 2000 41.02 5.18 22.57 931.2
2 
0.0412
59 
334 14791.
16 
0.6767
2 
110 
 2001 41.02 4.69 22.57 778.4
4 
0.0344
9 
334 15569.
6 
0.6597
06 
110 
ARKWRIGH
T 
1997 41.03 1.33 2.904 462.4
1 
0.1592
32 
73 527.1 0.9472
9 
117.78 
 1998 41.03 1.51 2.904 299.6
5 
0.1031
85 
73 826.75 0.9173
25 
117.78 
 1999 41.02 1.38 3.39 184.7
6 
0.0545
01 
73 1011.5
1 
0.8988
49 
117.78 
 2000 41.02 5.18 3.39 260.5
6 
0.0768
61 
73 1272.0
7 
0.8727
93 
117.78 
 2001 41.02 4.69 3.39 253.2
2 
0.0746
96 
73 1525.2
9 
0.8474
71 
117.78 
AUK 1997 50 0.54 20.4 646.5
4 
0.0316
93 
795 14924.
91 
0.8629
54 
382.5 
 1998 50 0.43 21.55 783.9
9 
0.0363
8 
795 15708.
9 
0.8557
55 
382.5 
 1999 50 7.18 21.55 621.2
7 
0.0288
29 
795 16330.
17 
0.8500
5 
382.5 
 2000 50 6.11 19.19 557.9 0.0290
72 
795 16888.
07 
0.8449
27 
382.5 
 2001 50 0.66 19.19 392.1 0.0204
33 
795 17280.
17 
0.8413
27 
382.5 
BALMORAL 1997 62 25.76 13.33 466.9
4 
0.0350
29 
151.11
11 
12852.
86 
0.3790
93 
126.15 
 1998 62 25.76 14 391.6
8 
0.0279
77 
151.11
11 
13244.
54 
0.3601
72 
126.15 
 1999 62 18.47 14 354.1
4 
0.0252
96 
151.11
11 
13598.
68 
0.3430
64 
126.15 
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 2000 75.29 18.47 15 275.2
9 
0.0183
53 
151.11
11 
13873.
97 
0.3297
65 
126.15 
 2001 75.29 18.47 15 291.5
3 
0.0194
35 
151.11
11 
14165.
5 
0.3156
81 
126.15 
BANFF 1997 34.5 5.54 10 278.2
3 
0.0278
23 
304 658.4 0.9841
9 
2135.1
82 
 1998 34.5 5.35 10 0 0 304 658.4 0.9841
9 
2135.1
82 
 1999 34.5 8.51 10.2 1101.
97 
0.1080
36 
304 1760.3
7 
0.9577
28 
2135.1
82 
 2000 34.5 13.59 6.7 711.4
4 
0.1061
85 
304 2471.8
1 
0.9406
44 
2135.1
82 
 2001 34.5 6.17 6.7 833.8
8 
0.1244
6 
304 3305.6
9 
0.9206
2 
2135.1
82 
BEATRICE 1997 65 4.86 22.26 151.3
7 
0.0068 486.66
67 
19578.
52 
0.7063
22 
. 
 1998 65 4.83 22.26 365.4 0.0164
15 
486.66
67 
19943.
92 
0.7008
41 
. 
 1999 75 4.44 20.83 194.0
5 
0.0093
16 
486.66
67 
20137.
97 
0.6979
3 
. 
 2000 75 3.87 20.83 137.3
2 
0.0065
92 
486.66
67 
20275.
29 
0.6958
71 
. 
 2001 75 4.31 20.83 96.83 0.0046
49 
486.66
67 
20372.
12 
0.6944
18 
. 
BEINN 1997 38 6.84 3 286.0
6 
0.0953
53 
. 1389.9
3 
. . 
 1998 38 6.88 3 213.8
6 
0.0712
87 
. 1603.7
9 
. . 
 1999 38 11.2 3 115.7
2 
0.0385
73 
. 1719.5
1 
. . 
 2000 38 7.79 3 29.68 0.0098
93 
. 1749.1
9 
. . 
 2001 38 5.04 3 47.25 0.0157
5 
. 1796.4
4 
. . 
BERYL 1997 45 2.8 101.6 3748.
27 
0.0368
92 
1488 91816.
18 
0.5495
58 
1665.1
5 
 1998 45 2.96 128.4
2 
2960.
71 
0.0230
55 
1488 94776.
89 
0.5350
33 
1665.1
5 
 1999 45 2.94 128.4
2 
2295.
54 
0.0178
75 
1488 97072.
43 
0.5237
71 
1665.1
5 
 2000 45 4.12 128.4
2 
1620.
52 
0.0126
19 
1488 98692.
95 
0.5158
21 
1665.1
5 
 2001 45 4.07 128.4
2 
1541.
33 
0.0120
02 
1488 100234
.3 
0.5082
59 
1665.1
5 
BIRCH 1997 46.79 25.76 4.035 767.9
7 
0.1903
27 
75 2079.1
9 
0.7976
26 
786.01 
 1998 46.79 25.76 4 499.7
8 
0.1249
45 
75 2578.9
7 
0.7489
8 
786.01 
 1999 46.79 18.47 4 225.9
2 
0.0564
8 
75 2804.8
9 
0.7269
91 
786.01 
 2000 46.79 11.09 3.02 94.03 0.0311
36 
75 2898.9
2 
0.7178
38 
786.01 
 2001 46.79 10.88 3.02 101.4
4 
0.0335
89 
75 3000.3
6 
0.7079
65 
786.01 
BRENT 1997 50 0.54 227.2 6263.
8 
0.0275
7 
3800 236741
.6 
0.5452
07 
. 
 1998 50 0.43 264.1 6053.
65 
0.0229
22 
3800 242795
.2 
0.5335
78 
. 
 1999 50 7.18 264.0
9 
4535.
99 
0.0171
76 
3800 247331
.2 
0.5248
64 
. 
 2000 50 6.11 263.1
6 
3537.
6 
0.0134
43 
3800 250868
.8 
0.5180
68 
. 
 2001 50 0.66 263.1
6 
2843.
41 
0.0108
05 
3800 253712
.2 
0.5126
05 
. 
BRIMMOND 1997 50 2.8 0.47 60.21 0.1281 14.8 78.27 0.9613 . 
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 1998 96.14 1.13 0.47 80.32 0.1708
94 
14.8 158.59 0.9217
77 
. 
 1999 50 2.94 0.47 48.31 0.1027
87 
14.8 206.9 0.8979
48 
. 
 2000 50 4.12 0.47 47.65 0.1013
83 
14.8 254.55 0.8744
45 
. 
 2001 50 4.07 0.47 31.15 0.0662
77 
14.8 285.7 0.8590
8 
. 
BUCHAN 1997 71.11 4.86 16.65 444.7
2 
0.0267
1 
490.90
91 
14522.
66 
0.7840
43 
1573.5
8 
 1998 68.17 4.83 16.65 401.9
6 
0.0241
42 
490.90
91 
14924.
62 
0.7780
65 
1573.5
8 
 1999 71.1 4.44 20.3 344.3
4 
0.0169
63 
490.90
91 
15268.
96 
0.7729
45 
1573.5
8 
 2000 71.1 3.87 20.3 350.5
7 
0.0172
69 
490.90
91 
15619.
53 
0.7677
32 
1573.5
8 
 2001 71.1 4.31 20.3 384.5
1 
0.0189
41 
490.90
91 
16004.
04 
0.7620
14 
1573.5
8 
CAPTAIN 1997 85 . 51.94 1461.
11 
0.0281
31 
1000 1461.1
1 
0.9893
34 
256.5 
 1998 85 . 45.22 2835.
97 
0.0627
15 
1000 4297.0
8 
0.9686
31 
256.5 
 1999 85 . 46.27 2524.
6 
0.0545
62 
1000 6821.6
8 
0.9502
02 
256.5 
 2000 85 . 41.4 2458.
44 
0.0593
83 
1000 9280.1
2 
0.9322
55 
256.5 
 2001 85 . 41.4 3106.
85 
0.0750
45 
1000 12386.
97 
0.9095
75 
256.5 
CHANTER 1997 24.33 17.06 0.56 48.5 0.0866
07 
17 502.84 0.7840
75 
. 
 1998 24.33 16.65 0.6 15.15 0.0252
5 
17 517.99 0.7775
69 
. 
 1999 24.33 11.66 0.74 6.75 0.0091
22 
17 524.74 0.7746
7 
. 
 2000 23.5 3.87 0.74 8.14 0.011 17 532.88 0.7711
75 
. 
 2001 23.5 4.31 0.74 6.07 0.0082
03 
17 538.95 0.7685
69 
. 
CLAYMORE 1997 20 25.76 78.7 2096.
27 
0.0266
36 
1452.9 63419.
49 
0.6813
53 
. 
 1998 20 25.76 81.2 1818.
28 
0.0223
93 
1452.9 65237.
77 
0.6722
17 
. 
 1999 20 18.47 86.16 1658.
02 
0.0192
44 
1452.9 66895.
79 
0.6638
87 
. 
 2000 20 18.47 86.16 1564.
09 
0.0181
53 
1452.9 68459.
88 
0.6560
28 
. 
 2001 20 18.47 86.16 1410.
75 
0.0163
74 
1452.9 69870.
63 
0.6489
4 
. 
CORMORA
NT NORTH 
1997 50 0.54 63.4 1477.
3 
0.0233
01 
1075 45061.
1 
0.6940
04 
798.75 
 1998 50 0.43 62.16 1638.
21 
0.0263
55 
1075 46699.
31 
0.6828
79 
798.75 
 1999 50 7.18 56.07 1540.
84 
0.0274
81 
1075 48240.
15 
0.6724
16 
798.75 
 2000 50 6.11 55.07 1513.
44 
0.0274
82 
1075 49753.
59 
0.6621
38 
798.75 
 2001 50 0.66 55.07 1468.
88 
0.0266
73 
1075 51222.
47 
0.6521
64 
798.75 
CURLEW 1997 50 0.54 11.4 86.17 0.0075
59 
132 86.17 0.9952
35 
149.64 
 1998 50 0.43 10.33 1437.
79 
0.1391
86 
132 1523.9
6 
0.9157
2 
149.64 
 1999 50 7.18 4.5 1508.
22 
0.3351
6 
132 3032.1
8 
0.8323
11 
149.64 
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 2000 50 6.11 4.68 817.0
3 
0.1745
79 
132 3849.2
1 
0.7871
27 
149.64 
 2001 50 0.66 4.68 386.0
4 
0.0824
87 
132 4235.2
5 
0.7657
78 
149.64 
CYRUS 1997 100 1.22 2.6 603.2
8 
0.2320
31 
82 1407.6
4 
0.8746
86 
75.9 
 1998 100 1.13 2.6 540.9
4 
0.2080
54 
82 1948.5
8 
0.8265
29 
75.9 
 1999 100 5.27 2.8 402.4
2 
0.1437
21 
82 2351 0.7907
04 
75.9 
 2000 100 2.96 2.8 252.9 0.0903
21 
82 2603.9 0.7681
89 
75.9 
 2001 100 3.03 2.8 180.6
4 
0.0645
14 
82 2784.5
4 
0.7521
08 
75.9 
DEVERON 1997 77.5 1.22 2.12 26.03 0.0122
78 
54 1918.5
9 
0.7406
35 
. 
 1998 81.72 1.13 2.12 51.61 0.0243
44 
54 1970.2 0.7336
58 
. 
 1999 81.72 5.27 2.16 40.26 0.0186
39 
54 2010.4
6 
0.7282
16 
. 
 2000 81.72 2.96 2.13 9.69 0.0045
49 
54 2020.1
5 
0.7269
06 
. 
 2001 81.72 3.03 2.13 10.91 0.0051
22 
54 2031.0
6 
0.7254
31 
. 
DON 1997 80.29 1.22 2.28 107.9 0.0473
25 
151 1742.6
9 
0.9157
51 
250 
 1998 77.5 1.13 2.33 99.73 0.0428
03 
151 1842.4
2 
0.9109
29 
250 
 1999 69.79 5.27 2.31 89.14 0.0385
89 
151 1931.5
6 
0.9066
2 
250 
 2000 69.79 2.96 1.29 69 0.0534
88 
151 2000.5
6 
0.9032
84 
250 
 2001 69.79 3.03 1.29 44.92 0.0348
22 
151 2045.4
8 
0.9011
13 
250 
DOUGLAS 1997 46.1 0.14 11.4 1604.
32 
0.1407
3 
202 2372.5
9 
0.9142
58 
337.5 
 1998 46.1 2.08 11.69 1324.
02 
0.1132
61 
202 3696.6
1 
0.8664
1 
337.5 
 1999 46.1 5.9 12.33 937.3
6 
0.0760
23 
202 4633.9
7 
0.8325
35 
337.5 
 2000 46.1 8.72 13.31 778.6
3 
0.0585 202 5412.6 0.8043
96 
337.5 
 2001 46.1 11.01 13.31 1117.
73 
0.0839
77 
202 6530.3
3 
0.7640
03 
337.5 
DUNBAR 1997 66.67 17.06 16.3 2491.
26 
0.1528
38 
821 6764.2
5 
0.9398
55 
551.6 
 1998 66.67 16.65 16.3 2100.
94 
0.1288
92 
821 8865.1
9 
0.9211
74 
551.6 
 1999 66.67 11.66 26.39 1885.
58 
0.0714
51 
821 10750.
77 
0.9044
09 
551.6 
 2000 66.67 3.85 25.66 1627.
2 
0.0634
14 
821 12377.
97 
0.8899
4 
551.6 
 2001 66.67 3.06 25.66 1440.
13 
0.0561
24 
821 13818.
1 
0.8771
35 
551.6 
DUNLIN 1997 50 0.54 53.5 807.0
8 
0.0150
86 
825 47651.
68 
0.5783
55 
705 
 1998 50 0.43 51.63 642.5
7 
0.0124
46 
825 48294.
25 
0.5726
69 
705 
 1999 50 7.18 51.29 627.1 0.0122
27 
825 48921.
35 
0.5671
2 
705 
 2000 50 6.11 50.56 525.2
2 
0.0103
88 
825 49446.
57 
0.5624
73 
705 
 2001 28.8 0.66 50.56 573.9
2 
0.0113
51 
825 50020.
49 
0.5573
94 
705 
EIDER 1997 50 0.54 15.2 653.9 0.0430 202.38 12376. 0.5535 . 
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 1998 50 0.43 15.16 616.4
4 
0.0406
62 
202.38
1 
12993.
17 
0.5313
29 
. 
 1999 50 7.18 14.84 600.6
7 
0.0404
76 
202.38
1 
13593.
84 
0.5096
62 
. 
 2000 50 6.11 14.5 355.7
2 
0.0245
32 
202.38
1 
13949.
56 
0.4968
31 
. 
 2001 50 0.66 14.5 241.9
4 
0.0166
86 
202.38
1 
14191.
5 
0.4881
04 
. 
FERGUS 1997 65 12.9 1.01 561.8
8 
0.5563
17 
16.3 810.96 0.6368
09 
126 
 1998 65 15.09 1.01 276.4
7 
0.2737
33 
16.3 1087.4
3 
0.5129
91 
126 
 1999 65 14.95 1.59 161.0
9 
0.1013
14 
16.3 1248.5
2 
0.4408
47 
126 
 2000 65 15.13 1.59 80.56 0.0506
67 
16.3 1329.0
8 
0.4047
68 
126 
 2001 65 14 1.59 56.74 0.0356
86 
16.3 1385.8
2 
0.3793
57 
126 
FIFE 1997 85 12.9 6.62 1077.
23 
0.1627
24 
132 3446.7
1 
0.8093
86 
212.22 
 1998 85 15.09 6.62 819.7
3 
0.1238
26 
132 4266.4
4 
0.7640
53 
212.22 
 1999 85 14.95 6.62 361.5
2 
0.0546
1 
132 4627.9
6 
0.7440
6 
212.22 
 2000 85 15.13 6.62 584.8
4 
0.0883
44 
132 5212.8 0.7117
16 
212.22 
 2001 85 14 6.62 449.2
4 
0.0678
61 
132 5662.0
4 
0.6868
72 
212.22 
FLORA 1998 85 15.09 1.73 151.8
6 
0.0877
8 
69 151.86 0.9839
34 
208.25 
 1999 85 14.95 1.73 505.5
3 
0.2922
14 
69 657.39 0.9304
5 
208.25 
 2000 85 15.13 1.73 495.4
2 
0.2863
7 
69 1152.8
1 
0.8780
36 
208.25 
 2001 85 14 1.73 278.2 0.1608
09 
69 1431.0
1 
0.8486
03 
208.25 
FOINAVEN 1997 80 1.22 31.2 252.2
1 
0.0080
84 
1097 252.21 0.9983
22 
259.87
5 
 1998 80 1.13 34.4 3690.
99 
0.1072
96 
1097 3943.2 0.9737
6 
259.87
5 
 1999 80 5.27 34.4 4261.
6 
0.1238
84 
1097 8204.8 0.9454
01 
259.87
5 
 2000 80 2.96 49.6 4588.
34 
0.0925
07 
1097 12793.
14 
0.9148
68 
259.87
5 
 2001 45 3.03 49.6 4419.
28 
0.0890
98 
1097 17212.
42 
0.8854
6 
259.87
5 
FORTIES 1997 98.15 1.22 336.4
6 
4109.
2 
0.0122
13 
4196 311708
.8 
0.4577
04 
399.1 
 1998 98.25 1.13 344.5
1 
3997.
95 
0.0116
05 
4196 315706
.7 
0.4507
49 
399.1 
 1999 98.94 5.27 345.2
9 
3227.
17 
0.0093
46 
4196 318933
.9 
0.4451
34 
399.1 
 2000 98.94 2.96 347.4
2 
2720.
3 
0.0078
3 
4196 321654
.2 
0.4404
01 
399.1 
 2001 98.94 3.03 347.4
2 
2827.
62 
0.0081
39 
4196 324481
.8 
0.4354
82 
399.1 
FULMAR 1997 45.25 0.54 74.7 547.3
6 
0.0073
27 
822 70840.
74 
0.3708
79 
874.2 
 1998 45.25 0.43 74.44 468.0
9 
0.0062
88 
822 71308.
83 
0.3667
22 
874.2 
 1999 45.25 7.18 78.94 373 0.0047
25 
822 71681.
83 
0.3634
1 
874.2 
 2000 45.25 6.11 73.42 227.8
3 
0.0031
03 
822 71909.
66 
0.3613
86 
874.2 
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 2001 45.25 0.66 73.42 172.4
5 
0.0023
49 
822 72082.
11 
0.3598
55 
874.2 
HAMISH 1997 43.33 12.9 0.5 16.67 0.0333
4 
7 420.2 0.5617
91 
212 
 1998 43.33 15.09 0.5 10.44 0.0208
8 
7 430.64 0.5509
04 
212 
 1999 43.33 14.95 0.5 8.32 0.0166
4 
7 438.96 0.5422
27 
212 
 2000 76.56 15.13 0.5 5.98 0.0119
6 
7 444.94 0.5359
91 
212 
 2001 76.56 14 0.5 3.2 0.0064 7 448.14 0.5326
54 
212 
HARDING 1997 70 1.22 25.33 3859.
55 
0.1523
71 
322 5789.9 0.8687
38 
412.14 
 1998 70 1.13 28.33 4655.
26 
0.1643
23 
322 10445.
16 
0.7632 412.14 
 1999 70 5.27 29.57 4281.
39 
0.1447
88 
322 14726.
55 
0.6661
37 
412.14 
 2000 70 2.96 30.03 4328.
24 
0.1441
31 
322 19054.
79 
0.5680
13 
412.14 
 2001 70 3.03 30.03 3177.
95 
0.1058
26 
322 22232.
74 
0.4959
66 
412.14 
HEATHER 
{AND EXT} 
1997 31.25 . 14.2 251.4
9 
0.0177
11 
464 14516.
42 
0.7716
17 
767.04 
 1998 31.25 22.5 14.2 225.1
1 
0.0158
53 
464 14741.
53 
0.7680
75 
767.04 
 1999 31.25 14.9 18.2 204.2
1 
0.0112
2 
464 14945.
74 
0.7648
62 
767.04 
 2000 31.25 13.08 18.2 190.7
5 
0.0104
81 
464 15136.
49 
0.7618
61 
767.04 
 2001 31.25 12.72 18.2 221.8
1 
0.0121
87 
464 15358.
3 
0.7583
72 
767.04 
HIGHLAND
ER 
1997 100 . 9.94 149.1
6 
0.0150
06 
149.42
86 
9137.6
2 
0.5536
02 
1264.3 
 1998 100 . 9.94 187.8
4 
0.0188
97 
149.42
86 
9325.4
6 
0.5444
25 
1264.3 
 1999 100 . 9.95 101.9
3 
0.0102
44 
149.42
86 
9427.3
9 
0.5394
46 
1264.3 
 2000 100 3.87 9.95 159.6
1 
0.0160
41 
149.42
86 
9587 0.5316
48 
1264.3 
 2001 100 4.31 9.95 165.5
4 
0.0166
37 
149.42
86 
9752.5
4 
0.5235
61 
1264.3 
HUTTON 
NORTH 
WEST 
1997 28.46 0.54 15.9 307.9
2 
0.0193
66 
1000 15854.
5 
0.8842
62 
1415.4 
 1998 28.46 0.43 15.9 262.2
2 
0.0164
92 
1000 16116.
72 
0.8823
48 
1415.4 
 1999 28.46 7.18 16.94 294.8 0.0174
03 
1000 16411.
52 
0.8801
96 
1415.4 
 2000 28.46 . 17.13 83.46 0.0048
72 
1000 16494.
98 
0.8795
87 
1415.4 
 2001 28.46 . 17.13 113.2 0.0066
08 
1000 16608.
18 
0.8787
6 
1415.4 
IVANHOE 1997 43.33 12.9 9.69 400.7
8 
0.0413
6 
100 7792.5
6 
0.4311
43 
913.83
6 
 1998 43.33 15.09 9.69 281.8
2 
0.0290
84 
100 8074.3
8 
0.4105
7 
913.83
6 
 1999 43.33 14.95 9.69 239.4
7 
0.0247
13 
100 8313.8
5 
0.3930
89 
913.83
6 
 2000 76.56 15.13 9.69 326.7
7 
0.0337
22 
100 8640.6
2 
0.3692
35 
913.83
6 
 2001 76.56 14 9.69 308.8
2 
0.0318
7 
100 8949.4
4 
0.3466
91 
913.83
6 
KINGFISHE
R 
1997 50 0.54 7.6 211.4
7 
0.0278
25 
104 211.47 0.9851
56 
174.3 
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 1998 50 0.43 7.6 1314.
71 
0.1729
88 
104 1526.1
8 
0.8928
74 
174.3 
 1999 50 7.18 5.48 988.0
9 
0.1803
08 
104 2514.2
7 
0.8235
18 
174.3 
 2000 50 6.11 4.332 803.6
3 
0.1855
1 
104 3317.9 0.7671
09 
174.3 
 2001 50 0.66 4.332 874.1
3 
0.2017
84 
104 4192.0
3 
0.7057
52 
174.3 
LENNOX 1997 46.1 0.14 8.8 454.1
8 
0.0516
11 
184 559.36 0.9778
08 
135.85 
 1998 46.1 2.08 8.8 893.7
2 
0.1015
59 
184 1453.0
8 
0.9423
51 
135.85 
 1999 46.1 5.9 9.82 857.4
9 
0.0873
21 
184 2310.5
7 
0.9083
31 
135.85 
 2000 46.1 8.72 10.11 1375.
99 
0.1361
02 
184 3686.5
6 
0.8537
4 
135.85 
 2001 46.1 11.01 10.11 1798.
06 
0.1778
5 
184 5484.6
2 
0.7824
04 
135.85 
MACCULLO
CH 
1997 40 5.54 8 583.3
9 
0.0729
24 
200 583.39 0.9787
06 
156 
 1998 40 5.35 8 2000.
65 
0.2500
81 
200 2584.0
4 
0.9056
83 
156 
 1999 40 8.51 7.7 1754.
75 
0.2278
9 
200 4338.7
9 
0.8416
34 
156 
 2000 40 13.59 7.7 1353.
58 
0.1757
9 
200 5692.3
7 
0.7922
28 
156 
 2001 40 6.17 7.7 1086.
51 
0.1411
05 
200 6778.8
8 
0.7525
71 
156 
MAGNUS 1997 85 1.22 106.2
7 
3090.
73 
0.0290
84 
1662.5 84793.
02 
0.6276
76 
912.76 
 1998 85 1.13 106.2
7 
3147.
72 
0.0296
2 
1662.5 87940.
74 
0.6138
54 
912.76 
 1999 85 5.27 106.2
7 
3045.
73 
0.0286
6 
1662.5 90986.
47 
0.6004
8 
912.76 
 2000 85 2.96 121.0
7 
2923.
74 
0.0241
49 
1662.5 93910.
21 
0.5876
42 
912.76 
 2001 85 3.03 121.0
7 
2213.
72 
0.0182
85 
1662.5 96123.
93 
0.5779
22 
912.76 
MILLER 1997 100 1.22 41.11 5195.
28 
0.1263
75 
586 33019.
82 
0.5886
61 
288.8 
 1998 100 1.13 43.33 3441.
15 
0.0794
17 
586 36460.
97 
0.5457
93 
288.8 
 1999 100 5.27 44.67 2732.
46 
0.0611
7 
586 39193.
43 
0.5117
54 
288.8 
 2000 100 2.96 46.67 2056.
72 
0.0440
69 
586 41250.
15 
0.4861
33 
288.8 
 2001 100 3.03 46.67 1382.
88 
0.0296
31 
586 42633.
03 
0.4689
06 
288.8 
MONTROSE 1997 41.03 1.33 11.35 61.5 0.0054
19 
236 11295.
66 
0.6506 105 
 1998 41.03 1.51 11.35 63.66 0.0056
09 
236 11359.
32 
0.6486
31 
105 
 1999 41.02 1.38 12.71 54.83 0.0043
14 
236 11414.
15 
0.6469
35 
105 
 2000 41.02 5.18 12.71 36.81 0.0028
96 
236 11450.
96 
0.6457
97 
105 
 2001 41.02 4.69 12.71 33.76 0.0026
56 
236 11484.
72 
0.6447
52 
105 
MURCHISO
N 
1997 88.33 . 41.06 806.1
4 
0.0196
33 
790.69
77 
35185.
6 
0.6751
54 
420 
 1998 88.33 . 41.06 791.5
7 
0.0192
78 
790.69
77 
35977.
17 
0.6678
46 
420 
 1999 88.33 . 41.06 743.5
2 
0.0181
08 
790.69
77 
36720.
69 
0.6609
82 
420 
 2000 88.33 . 41.73 495.0 0.0118 790.69 37215. 0.6564 420 
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7 64 77 76 11 
 2001 88.33 . 41.73 410.7
9 
0.0098
44 
790.69
77 
37626.
55 
0.6526
18 
420 
NELSON 1997 68.09 1.33 64.1 5602.
96 
0.0874
1 
790 24693.
22 
0.7718
22 
194.6 
 1998 68.09 1.51 64.1 4695.
35 
0.0732
5 
790 29388.
57 
0.7284
35 
194.6 
 1999 68.09 1.38 61.4 4514.
5 
0.0735
26 
790 33903.
07 
0.6867
18 
194.6 
 2000 68.09 5.18 61.4 4088.
96 
0.0665
95 
790 37992.
03 
0.6489
34 
194.6 
 2001 36.88 4.69 61.4 2913.
47 
0.0474
51 
790 40905.
5 
0.6220
12 
194.6 
NINIAN 1997 63.03 . 160 2366.
55 
0.0147
91 
2786.6
67 
142566
.7 
0.6265
3 
116.9 
 1998 63 . 158.4
2 
2197.
42 
0.0138
71 
2786.6
67 
144764
.2 
0.6207
73 
116.9 
 1999 63 . 158.6
3 
2053.
76 
0.0129
47 
2786.6
67 
146817
.9 
0.6153
93 
116.9 
 2000 63 . 158.8
9 
1722.
93 
0.0108
44 
2786.6
67 
148540
.8 
0.6108
8 
116.9 
 2001 44.9 . 158.8
9 
1763.
84 
0.0111
01 
2786.6
67 
150304
.7 
0.6062
59 
116.9 
OSPREY 1997 50 0.54 14 1204.
04 
0.0860
03 
157.89
47 
9146.9
2 
0.5771
07 
262.5 
 1998 50 0.43 14 764.2
7 
0.0545
91 
157.89
47 
9911.1
9 
0.5417
73 
262.5 
 1999 50 7.18 14.55 618.3
2 
0.0424
96 
157.89
47 
10529.
51 
0.5131
86 
262.5 
 2000 50 6.11 13.51 295.2
7 
0.0218
56 
157.89
47 
10824.
78 
0.4995
34 
262.5 
 2001 50 0.66 13.51 450.3
7 
0.0333
36 
157.89
47 
11275.
15 
0.4787
12 
262.5 
PIERCE 1999 40 1.38 14.39
2 
1415.
85 
0.0983
78 
387 1415.8
5 
0.9732
93 
. 
 2000 40 5.18 14.39
2 
2507.
96 
0.1742
61 
387 3923.8
1 
0.9259
85 
. 
 2001 42.79 4.69 14.39
2 
1792.
97 
0.1245
81 
387 5716.7
8 
0.8921
64 
. 
PIPER 1997 24.33 17.06 138 2416.
31 
0.0175
09 
1360 126568 0.3206
27 
968 
 1998 24.33 16.65 141.7 1951.
43 
0.0137
72 
1360 128519
.5 
0.3101
53 
968 
 1999 24.33 8.15 144.6
6 
1489.
62 
0.0102
97 
1360 130009
.1 
0.3021
57 
968 
 2000 23.5 3 144.6
6 
1155.
79 
0.0079
9 
1360 131164
.9 
0.2959
53 
968 
 2001 23.5 3.06 144.6
6 
957.3
1 
0.0066
18 
1360 132122
.2 
0.2908
15 
968 
ROB ROY 1997 43.33 12.9 14.54 570.2
1 
0.0392
17 
155 12729.
06 
0.4005
02 
734.56
8 
 1998 43.33 15.09 14.54 288.9
4 
0.0198
72 
155 13018 0.3868
94 
734.56
8 
 1999 43.33 14.95 14.54 271.6 0.0186
8 
155 13289.
6 
0.3741
03 
734.56
8 
 2000 76.56 15.13 14.54 179.5
9 
0.0123
51 
155 13469.
19 
0.3656
45 
734.56
8 
 2001 76.56 14 14.54 184.7
5 
0.0127
06 
155 13653.
94 
0.3569
43 
734.56
8 
SCAPA 1997 24.33 17.06 14.9 914.7
3 
0.0613
91 
206 12055.
11 
0.5728
04 
. 
 1998 24.33 16.65 15.65 769.9
4 
0.0491
97 
206 12825.
05 
0.5455
2 
. 
 1999 24.33 8.15 16.01 638.4
5 
0.0398
78 
206 13463.
5 
0.5228
95 
. 
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 2000 23.5 3.87 16.01 444.4
3 
0.0277
6 
206 13907.
93 
0.5071
46 
. 
 2001 23.5 4.31 12.4 370.0
7 
0.0298
44 
206 14278 0.4940
32 
. 
SCOTT 1997 43.33 12.9 63.4 5569.
3 
0.0878
44 
946 30982.
2 
0.7609
2 
1000 
 1998 43.33 15.09 63.4 4531.
35 
0.0714
72 
946 35513.
55 
0.7259
53 
1000 
 1999 43.33 14.95 59.41 4017.
46 
0.0676
23 
946 39531.
01 
0.6949
51 
1000 
 2000 43.33 15.13 59.21 2770.
85 
0.0467
97 
946 42301.
86 
0.6735
69 
1000 
 2001 43.33 14 59.21 2162.
21 
0.0365
18 
946 44464.
07 
0.6568
84 
1000 
SEDGWICK 1997 40 6.84 2.5 51.92 0.0207
68 
116 51.92 0.9967
33 
162.69 
 1998 40 6.88 2.6 496.6
2 
0.1910
08 
116 548.54 0.9654
8 
162.69 
 1999 38 8.58 8.95 514.0
7 
0.0574
38 
116 1062.6
1 
0.9331
29 
162.69 
STATFJORD 1997 33.33 5.54 545 3580.
53 
0.0065
7 
6348 67078.
62 
0.9228
62 
1131.9 
 1998 33.33 5.35 78.68 2345.
66 
0.0298
13 
6348 69424.
28 
0.9201
64 
1131.9 
 1999 33.33 8.51 78.68 1768.
08 
0.0224
72 
6348 71192.
36 
0.9181
31 
1131.9 
 2000 33.33 13.59 81 1187.
29 
0.0146
58 
6348 72379.
65 
0.9167
66 
1131.9 
 2001 33.33 6.17 81 797.1
9 
0.0098
42 
6348 73176.
84 
0.9158
49 
1131.9 
STIRLING 1997 62 25.76 0.317 37.21 0.1173
82 
44.8 202.23 0.9670
47 
. 
 1998 62 25.76 0.317 8.88 0.0280
13 
44.8 211.11 0.9656 . 
 1999 62 18.47 0.317 16.11 0.0508
2 
44.8 227.22 0.9629
75 
. 
 2000 75.29 18.47 0.4 16.65 0.0416
25 
44.8 243.87 0.9602
62 
. 
 2001 75.29 18.47 0.4 27.95 0.0698
75 
44.8 271.82 0.9557
08 
. 
STRATHSPE
Y 
1997 67 . 11.2 1330.
87 
0.1188
28 
101 2830.2
3 
0.7954
39 
220.8 
 1998 67 . 10.23 1006.
06 
0.0983
44 
101 3836.2
9 
0.7227
24 
220.8 
 1999 67 . 10.23 643.4
9 
0.0629
02 
101 4479.7
8 
0.6762
14 
220.8 
 2000 67 . 10.54 413.8
5 
0.0392
65 
101 4893.6
3 
0.6463
02 
220.8 
 2001 67 . 10.54 352.3
1 
0.0334
26 
101 5245.9
4 
0.6208
38 
220.8 
TARTAN 1997 100 . 13.8 333.4
3 
0.0241
62 
830.30
3 
12658.
7 
0.8887
05 
. 
 1998 100 . 14 331.8
6 
0.0237
04 
830.30
3 
12990.
56 
0.8857
87 
. 
 1999 100 . 14 272.0
2 
0.0194
3 
830.30
3 
13262.
58 
0.8833
96 
. 
 2000 100 3.87 14 239.9
2 
0.0171
37 
830.30
3 
13502.
5 
0.8812
86 
. 
 2001 100 4.31 14 176.9
1 
0.0126
36 
830.30
3 
13679.
41 
0.8797
31 
. 
THELMA 1997 47.48 25.76 5.79 1309.
19 
0.2261
12 
52 1474.3
6 
0.7930
23 
164.32 
 1998 47.48 25.76 5.79 1051.
49 
0.1816
04 
52 2525.8
5 
0.6454
1 
164.32 
 1999 47.48 18.47 5.79 905.3 0.1563 52 3431.1 0.5183 164.32 
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56 5 19 
 2000 47.48 18.47 5.8 772.8 0.1332
41 
52 4203.9
5 
0.4098
3 
164.32 
 2001 47.48 18.47 5.8 669.0
8 
0.1153
59 
52 4873.0
3 
0.3159
02 
164.32 
THISTLE 1997 81.72 1.22 54.42 429.6
7 
0.0078
95 
824 51174.
04 
0.5466
38 
493.2 
 1998 81.72 1.13 54.42 362.8
7 
0.0066
68 
824 51536.
91 
0.5434
23 
493.2 
 1999 81.72 5.27 54.37 305.1
5 
0.0056
12 
824 51842.
06 
0.5407
2 
493.2 
 2000 81.72 2.96 54.52 287.6
5 
0.0052
76 
824 52129.
71 
0.5381
71 
493.2 
 2001 81.72 3.03 54.52 191.1
8 
0.0035
07 
824 52320.
89 
0.5364
78 
493.2 
TIFFANY 1997 47.48 25.76 12.2 1204.
79 
0.0987
53 
156 6720.8 0.6855
01 
812 
 1998 47.48 25.76 12.2 762.1
4 
0.0624
7 
156 7482.9
4 
0.6498
37 
812 
 1999 47.48 18.47 10.3 425.0
4 
0.0412
66 
156 7907.9
8 
0.6299
47 
812 
 2000 47.48 18.47 8.1 275.2
9 
0.0339
86 
156 8183.2
7 
0.6170
65 
812 
 2001 47.48 18.47 8.1 189.5
7 
0.0234
04 
156 8372.8
4 
0.6081
94 
812 
TONI 1997 47.48 25.76 5.3 683.6 0.1289
81 
121 3690.1
6 
0.7773
71 
411.95 
 1998 47.48 25.76 6 794.1
7 
0.1323
62 
121 4484.3
3 
0.7294
58 
411.95 
 1999 47.48 18.47 6 655.0
1 
0.1091
68 
121 5139.3
4 
0.6899
41 
411.95 
 2000 47.48 18.47 6.4 467.4
4 
0.0730
38 
121 5606.7
8 
0.6617
4 
411.95 
 2001 47.48 18.47 6.4 383.3
8 
0.0599
03 
121 5990.1
6 
0.6386
1 
411.95 
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5.1 Introduction 
Pollution is an inevitable by-product of negative externality of the firm production 
process, particularly when using non-renewable resources such as petroleum refining, 
and metal mining. In terms of pollution decisions, most models assume that firms 
maximize profits. According to the justification for profit maximisation-Fisher 
Separation theorem (see Milne 1974, 1981), profit or net market value can be 
derived from the shareholders if there are no externalities, the firm is a price-taker 
and financial markets are complete.  
 
In the presence of incomplete market, however, Fisher Separation theorem breaks 
down in two ways. Firstly, no shareholders will wish to maximize profits. On the one 
hand, these pollutants enter positively into the profit function of the firm. For 
instance, less pollution control equipment means greater profits. On the other hand, 
pollution enters negatively into shareholders’ utility function. Therefore, 
shareholders will not only be concerned about the effect of firm’s decisions on their 
wealth but also care about the pollution effects on their utility. Secondly, the 
definition of profit maximization is dubious because of the price normalization 
problem (Gabszewicz and Vial, 1972). Different real outputs would be obtained 
under a different price system. Moreover, if the firm changes its production plan, 
shareholders’ old budget set will not be taken into account. Consequently, 
shareholders could not reach unanimity for firm objectives. 
 
As argued above, when a firm has market power, shareholders may not agree on the 
objectives the firm should undertake. To reconcile or aggregate shareholder interests, 
Hart and Moore (1996) and Yalçin and Renström (2003) propose shareholder voting 
as the solution and assume that production decisions are made by a majority of 
shareholders. In terms of the role of share ownership distribution in pollution 
decisions in particular, Roemer (1993) has analyzed an economy where individuals 
differ in share ownership of a firm. The individuals, depending on their share 
endowments, would prefer different levels of production (and thereby of the 
externality) by the firm. The firm’s decision is taken through a majority vote. The 
conclusion is that the more unequal the distribution of shares induces greater 
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externality. Similar conclusions to Roemer’s are reached by related studies such as 
Renström and Roszbach (1998) and Persson and Tabellini (1994).  
 
Different from Roemer (1993), we construct a duopoly model which can capture 
strategic interaction among firms. It adds an incentive of strategically delegating to a 
CEO with different preferences, in order to affect the equilibrium of the game 
between the firms. We demonstrate that in a Nash equilibrium, the larger the share of 
the decision maker of firm 1, the larger firm 1 production and pollution, and the 
smaller the production and pollution of firm 2. Furthermore, if the revenue elasticity 
is smaller than unity, then the pollution intensity is smaller as the share of the 
decision maker is larger.  
 
Moreover, to test our theoretical hypothesis, we use a firm level panel data set from 
the Toxicity Release Inventory of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
covering the period 1997-2005. Firms from three industries are included: metal 
mining, petroleum refining and related industry, and primary metal (SIC-codes 10, 
29, 33 respectively). More importantly, we improve the measurement of pollution 
emissions at firm level which accounts for weighted Human Toxicity Potential (HTP) 
pollution value and deflated value of firm sales. Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
fit panel data technique is applied.  
 
After controlling for the effects of observable firm characteristics on pollution 
emissions, we find that pollution decreases with right-skewed share ownership 
distribution, suggesting that the more share ownership is controlled by the largest 
shareholders, the less pollution level will be chosen. This is counter to Roemer’s 
argument that if the median shareholder owns a larger-than-per-capita share for the 
locality, the economic democratization will lower his/her share and the pollution will  
be reduced. 
 
The rest of paper is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents related empirical 
literature. In section 5.3, we formulate our theoretical model. We use the model to 
derive the role of share ownership distribution in pollution and spell out its empirical 
implications. In section 5.4 and section 5.5, we describe the data and methodology 
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respectively. Section 5.6 provides our empirical results and discussion. Sensitivity 
analysis is given in section 5.7 and section 5.8 concludes.  
 
5.2 Literature Review-Empirical Part 
 
The empirical equation developed in this paper mainly relies on three streams of 
empirical literature. First, given pollution might be endogenous, i.e. pollution could 
affect profitability, we consider the related literature in terms of the relationship 
between environmental performance and firm performance. Second, empirical 
studies concern the effect of ownership structure on environmental practices of firms 
with respect to powerful parties’ preferences, for example, managers, board 
members and block holders. Third, empirical evidence shows that firm 
characteristics may affect a firm’s pollution level like regulation stringency and 
financial factors. A summary of all the relevant empirical studies is given in Table 
5.1.  
  
5.2.1 Relationship between environmental performance and firm 
performance 
A growing body of empirical study focuses on addressing the relationship between 
environmental performance and financial performance. It is argued that a firm with a 
better environmental profile tends to improve the energy efficiency of the firm and 
control cost for production and in return might obtain high market profitability 
(Filbeck and Gorman, 2004). However, the results are not in consensus and even 
conflicting due to several factors like estimation methods (see e.g. Telle, 2006), 
small samples (see e.g. Cormier et al., 1993) and lack of objective environmental 
performance criteria (see e.g. Filbeck and Gorman, 2004). 
 
Using a panel data set consisting of 85 Norwegian plants from four industries 
including chemicals, basic metals, pulp and paper and other non-metallic minerals 
covering the period 1990-2001, Telle (2006) analyses the effect of environmental 
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performance on economic performance by performing pooled OLS and fixed effects 
model and random effects model separately. Therefore, two equations are separately 
estimated.  
 
For pooled OLS, the model is itititit udXbENPaECP  . For Panel data models, 
the equation is itiititit evdXbENPaECP  .The itECP is economic 
performance measured by return on sales (ROS) for plant Ni ,...,1  in 
period Tt ,...,1 .The itENP  denotes environmental performance (see calculation 
formula for variable NJFI in paper by (Telle, 2006)), itX  is a set of control 
variables including sub-industry’s difference (JFI) and number of employees and 
capital and risk class dummies as well as year dummies. itu  is an error term. 
However, in the panel data models, ite  is an error term. iv  is included controlling 
for unobservable plant characteristics such as plant location or time invariant 
elements of plant technology, management, or employee education.    
  
After controlling for above firm characteristics, a pooled regression shows that 
environmental performance affects economic performance positively. However, 
when the regression model accounts for unobservable plant heterogeneity by fixed 
effects model or random effects model, the effect is not statistically significant.  It 
is found that estimation methodology matters for results. In addition to omitted 
variable bias, Telle (2006) suggests that environmental performance might be 
endogenous for firm performance. Therefore it is concluded that “it pays to be 
green” by prior studies is a premature conclusion. 
 
Cormier and Magnan and Morard (1993) evaluate the relationship between corporate 
pollution indices and a firm’s market valuation.  The sample is from three major 
Canadian industries (i.e. pulp and paper; chemicals and oil refiners; steel, metals and 
mines) and includes 74 Canadian firms over 1986-1988. The pollution data is simply 
focused on wastewater discharge provided by the Environment Ministries of the 
provinces of Quebec and Ontario (Canada). The firm pollution index is measured as 
the ratio between the summation of actual pollution levels of plants by the firm and 
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the responding pollution standard sets. Applying an accounting identity framework, 
the following equation is estimated: 
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where MV and BV represent market value and book value. They find that a firm’s 
pollution performance has weak and negative impacts on market valuation. This 
weakly supports that corporations with a good environmental record should be 
valued at a premium by the stock market. 
 
In line with the well-established CAPM (Capital asset pricing model) frameworks by 
Sharpe (1964), Derwall et al. (2005) show that the influence of environmental 
screening on investment performance is the difference between the alpha on the 
high-ranked portfolio and the alpha on the low-ranked portfolio in the following 
equation.                                           
0 1 2 3 4 1 3( )it ft i i mt ft i t i t i t i t itR R R R SMB HML MOM IP                   
     
 
where  
 it
R = return on portfolio i  in month t  
 ft
R = one-month U.S. T-bill rate at t  
 mt
R =return on a value-weighted market proxy in month t  
           tS M B= return difference between a small-cap and a large-cap portfolio in month t   
       tH M L= return difference between a value (high-BV/MV) portfolio and a growth          
low-BV/MV) portfolio in month t  
       tM O M= return difference between a portfolio of past 12-month ‘winners’ and a       
portfolio of past 12- month ‘losers’ in month t  
 1 3tIP = represents three factors (principal components) capturing industry effects. 
 
Eco-efficiency is used to measure environmental performance for a firm, which is 
defined as the ratio of the value a company outputs over the waste the company 
generates during the production process. Using rating data from Innovest as a proxy 
for eco-efficiency, Derwall et al. (2005) estimate above equation and find evidence 
129 
 
that a stock portfolio with high ranked eco-efficiency value outperformed a lower 
eco-efficiency over the period 1995-2003 for U.S. companies after adjusting returns 
for market risk, investment style and industry effects. They confirmed that the 
benefits of corporate social or environmental responsible investing outweigh their 
costs. This is consistent with the argument by Porter and Van der Linde (1995) who 
point out that active policies to improve environmental performance can enhance a 
company’s input-output efficiency because of the more cost-efficient use of 
resources.  
 
Filbeck and Gorman (2004) use Student’s t test statistics to compare raw returns 
between 12 “less compliant (below-industry-average scores on the compliance 
index)” firms and 12 “more compliant (above-industry-average scores on the 
compliance index)” firms drawn from the IRRC/S&P 500 electric industry during 
the period 1996-1998. Return for each portfolio is calculated by using the geometric 
mean of the equally weighted monthly returns of each portfolio. The firm’s 
compliance index as a benchmark for environmental performance is the total cost of 
the penalties divided by domestic revenues. They find a negative relationship 
between financial performance and environmental performance. This result is 
consistent with King and Lenox (2002) who use panel data analysis of U.S. 
manufacturing firms. Moreover, they also regress the returns on the compliance 
index using the following equation:  
  
             0 1 2 3 4
1 2it it it it it itR B B CI B D B D B MVE e               
where itR  is the three-year holding period return for a company for 1997-1999; 
itCI is the level of the average compliance index for a company during 1996-1998; 
1itD is an indicator variable =1 if the firm is ranked with an above average regulatory 
climate for at least two of the three years within the period 1997-1999, and 0 
otherwise; 2itD is an indicator variable =1 if the firm is ranked with an above average 
regulatory climate for at least two of the three years within the period 1997-1999, 
and 0 otherwise; itMVE is the market value of equity for company i  during 1999 
where the market value of equity is calculated as the stock price at mid-year 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. However, the negative relationship 
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no longer holds after controlling for regulatory climate and company size. Filbeck 
and Gorman (2004) attribute their unexpected results to three main reasons. First, 
they restrict focus to the electric utility industry which is different from most other 
industries in regulation rules. Second, the primary measure of environmental 
performance might be problematic, which is computed by total cost of the penalties 
divided by the domestic revenues. It is a measure of how well a company is 
complying with existing statutes and regulations rather than how a company is 
attempting to control pollution beyond the compliance. Third, the relationship 
between environmental and financial performance has been incorporated into prices 
so that there is no benefit to induce new investors to control pollution. 
  
Konar and Cohen (2001) explore the relationship between environmental and 
financial performance for 321 manufacturing firms listed in the S&P500 in 1989. 
Tobin’s q is used to measure firm performance, which is defined as    
 
( )
( )
marketValue equity debt preferenceStock
q
replacementValue plant equipment inventory shortTermAssets
 

  
   
 
Two environmental performance measures are applied: TRI88, the aggregate pounds 
of toxic chemicals emitted per dollar revenue of the firm; and LAW89, the number 
of environmental lawsuits pending against the firm in 1989. Finally two regression 
equations are estimated: 
 
 
1q X                      ln( )q X      
 
In addition to environmental performance on the right side of the equation, control 
variables include market share of the firm, growth in revenues, age of assets, 
advertising intensity, research and development intensity, age of assets, and the 
import penetration.  They find evidence that there is a significantly negative effect 
of environmental performance on financial performance and confirm that a 10% 
reduction in emissions of toxicity results in a $34 million increase in market value   
for their samples.  
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5.2.2 Ownership structure and its impact on environmental 
practices 
 
Environmental outcomes are determined by a complex interplay of individual and 
group preferences and the institutional situations whose preferences are aggregated 
into social choices (Scruggs, 1998). A large volume of empirical studies has 
highlighted the internal struggle among corporate actors – blockholders, CEO, the 
top management team and board members who often pursue their own goals (see 
Kroll et al., 1993; Werner et al., 2005). 
 
Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) use primary data drawn from 209 publicly traded U.S. 
firms over the period 1994-1998 and investigate the determinants of likelihood that 
firms violate environmental laws in logit regressions. Both characteristics of firms’ 
governance structure and stakeholder pressures are taken into account. Inside share 
ownership is measured by the fraction of common stock owned by officers and 
directors. They find that environmental violation increases as the fraction of inside 
ownership becomes larger. In line with the argument that concentrated ownership 
entrenches managers, more inside ownership is more likely to lead to socially 
irresponsible behaviour. They also find evidence that the likelihood of a litigation 
decrease with the number of directorships held by outside directors suggesting that 
more reputable directors may act to reduce environmental litigation. This result is 
similar to Konar and Cohen (2000) who shows that there is a significant and negative 
relationship between the ownership controlled by managers and directors and 
pollution emissions. Besides, Harford (1997) suggests that due to investor portfolio 
diversification, publicly traded firms will pollute less.  
 
Firms will exhibit a range of responses to environmental concerns (Murrillo-Luna et 
al., 2008). Berrone et al. (2010) attribute this variation in responses to those who 
control the organisation and how much the controlling party values achieving social 
worthiness apart from economic gains. Therefore, using a sample of 194 U.S. firms 
required to report their emissions to EPA’s TRI programme, Berrone et al. (2010) 
examine the effect of family owners for public corporations on pollution control 
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between 1998 and 2002. They confirm that family-controlled public firms have a 
better environmental performance than their non-family counterparts, particularly at 
the local level. As for the non-family firms, stock ownership by the chief executive 
officer (CEO) has a negative environmental impact.  
 
5.2.3 Firm characteristics influencing pollution emissions levels  
 
Firm characteristics are considered as proxy for abilities and incentives to control 
pollution. Firm-level pollution varies depending on firm-specific factors (Konar and 
Cohen, 2000). King and Lenox (2002) find that the several firm-specific factors are 
correlated with emissions. Firm size, which is measured by a company’s assets, 
shows a positive correlation.  R&D intensity, calculated by the ratio of research and 
development expenses over total assets, is negatively correlated with total emissions. 
They also find that total emissions would be higher as financial leverage, i.e. debt 
ratio, increases. More importantly, King and Lenox create a measurement of 
regulation stringency at firm-level by weighting average of the state regulatory 
stringency of all the states in which a firm has facilities operating. However, contrary 
to their expectation, the estimation indicates positive correlation with emissions 
suggesting that more stringent regulation leads to more pollution. 
 
Nelson and Tietenberg and Donihue (1993) specify an emission function in terms of 
firm’s fuel mix, age of plants, other operating characteristics and the extent of 
regulation for electric utilities.  They conduct panel data analysis in fixed effects 
model based on the sample of 44 privately owned electric utilities in the U.S. over 
the period 1969-1983. The results show that the increased age of plants does not 
have a significant impact on emissions. This is consistent with the results of 
Dasgupta et al. (2000), who find no evidence that plants with newer equipment have 
better environmental performance. Negative effect of regulation is found but not 
significant. Moreover, combined with age function and regulation function, 
simulations indicate that emissions would have increased by 34.6% on average in the 
absence of regulation. In addition, emissions are found to be independent of output 
and capacity utilization. 
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Wu (2009) collects primary data of U.S. facilities through surveys and address 
argues that the market forces (or competitive pressure), regulatory pressures and 
personal values and beliefs of upper management toward environmental stewardship 
significantly influence a firm’s environmental decision. Especially, Wu finds that 
market forces and facility characteristics are the most influential factors impacting 
environmental violation, while personal environmental values and beliefs are the 
most significant factors affecting over-compliance. Contrary to Wu (2009), Dasgupta 
et al. (2000) use survey evidence from Mexico to show that the environmental 
management system is strongly independent of pollution control, even after 
controlling for simultaneity and other determinants of emissions intensity. Besides, 
small facilities are found to be more likely to violate environmental standards. This 
is consistent with previous findings that larger firms (measured either by total sales 
or number of employees) are more likely to reduce pollution voluntarily (Khanna et 
al., 2007; Arora and Cason, 1995; DeCanio and Watkins, 1998; Videras and Alberini, 
2000; Dasgupta et al., 2000; Konar and Cohen, 2000).   
 
In addition to financial factors effects, much empirical evidence is concentrated on 
exploring the effect of environmental regulation on pollution emissions for firms. 
Earnhart (2004) explores the effects of various regulatory factors containing 
inspections and penalties and permit conditions on wastewater discharges from large 
Kansas municipal wastewater treatment plants and finds that inspection- and 
enforcement-related deterrence strongly induces better pollution control. This 
evidence is supported by Eckert (2004), who examines the use of inspections and 
warnings to enforce environmental regulations and suggests that, even in the absence 
of frequent prosecutions, inspections deter future violations. Moreover, a number of 
empirical studies find that firms facing higher regulatory pressure are more likely to 
participate in voluntary environmental programmes (Konar and Cohen, 1997; 
Khanna and Anton, 2002; Rivera and De Leon, 2004; Potoski and Prakash, 2005; 
Rivera et al., 2006; Sam and Innes, 2008).   
 
Finally, previous studies also show that pollution information disclosure could result 
in pollution reduction. For example, Konar and Cohen (1997) examine U.S. firm 
behaviour in response to a significant stock market reaction after disclosure of toxic 
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chemical emissions levels. They identify all firms with significant negative abnormal 
returns upon the public announcement of their TRI emissions in 1989. They also find 
that the largest firms are most likely to reduce emissions subsequent to the new 
pollution information being made public (Konar and Cohen, 2000). Pargal and 
Wheeler (1996) also reach a similar conclusion. They argue that such informal 
regulations, i.e. information disclosure, define a shadow price or an implicit penalty 
for environmental pollution and it is an effective solution to reduce pollutions 
especially in regions where formal regulation is weak or absent. 
 
 
5.3 A Duopoly Model with Shareholder Voting 
We present a duopoly model which can capture strategic interaction among firms. It 
adds an incentive of strategically delegating to a CEO with different preferences, in 
order to affect the equilibrium of the game between the firms. 
 
5.3.1 Firms  
We assume that there are two non-price taking firms producing a homogenous good. 
The quantities produced by firms 1 and 2 are denoted y and y~  tilde, respectively. 
Pollution, x (and x~ ), is a by-product of production, but can be reduced/abated at a 
cost. We also assume that managing/monitoring production requires effort. Thus we 
make the cost function a function of both pollution and effort, c=c(y,x,s), where c is 
increasing in y, decreasing in x (i.e. production is less costly when more pollution is 
created) and decreasing in s (i.e. when more effort is exerted, production is less 
costly). For simplicity we assume the cost function to be quadratic in y and inverse in 
x and s. Denoting the revenue functions R and R
~
, respectively, we have the profit 
functions 
 
112)~,(  sxcyyyR=         (5.1) 
112 ~~~~),~(
~~  sxycyyR=         (5.2) 
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We denote the partial derivatives of R by subscripts (e.g. yyyRR  )~,(1 , etc). We 
shall assume that marginal revenue is positive, i.e. R1>0, that R11<0 (which turns out 
to be necessary and sufficient for the objective function to be concave), and that R21 
is non-positive (i.e. y and y~ are strategic substitutes). We shall also 
assume 0
~~
12121111  RRRR , (which holds for plausible demand functions). 
11
 
 
5.3.2 Share ownership  
Individuals differ in their share ownership, ],[   . For simplicity we assume that 
there is no cross ownership in the sense that if an individuals holds shares in firm one, 
the individual does not hold shares in firm 2 (this could be relaxed without altering 
the fundamental incentives present when choosing production plans and voting on 
representatives). Shares are distributed according to F(θ), which density function is 
denoted f(θ). To focus on the role of the distribution, we assume that no single 
individual owns half of the shares or more, i.e. 21 . Voting rights are 
proportional to share ownership in the sense that one share equals one vote (for 
simplicity we do not introduce preferential shares). 
 
In each firm, the production, pollution, and effort decisions are taken by a majority 
elected representative, CEO, chosen among and by the shareholders of the firm. We 
look for a Condorcet winning representative. 
 
                                                 
11
 It is convenient to use the notation of a revenue function throughout the analysis. What we have in 
mind is a situation where R = p(y+ y~ )y where p is the equilibrium price derived from a consumer’s 
demand function. Marginal revenue, R1, is positive if y∂p/∂y+p>0. Sufficient for this to hold is that the 
demand elasticity is greater than unity, or equal to unity if firm 2 is also operating ( y~ >0). This 
condition also implies that marginal revenue is falling more rapidly in own production than in the 
other firm’s production, i.e. -R11>-R12, in turn implying 0
~~
12121111  RRRR . 
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5.3.3 Firms’ decision making  
The representative chooses y,x,s taking sxy ~,~,~ as given, so as to maximise own 
utility. We assume for simplicity that utility is linear in profits and quadratic in 
pollution and effort (and that the pollution externality is local): 
22 )(),,,( sxsxyV             (5.3) 
  22 )~(~~
~
)~,~,~,
~
(
~
sxsxyV             (5.4) 
 The first order conditions with respect to x and s for the individual in firm 1 are 
(corresponding ones for firm 2 with ‘tilde’): 
02
)( 122 
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  xsxcy
x
V

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        (5.5) 
02
)( 2212 

  ssxcy
s
V


           (5.6) 
That the second-order conditions hold can be easily verified. Solving (5.5) and (5.6) 
for x and s gives: 
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                (5.8) 
Substituting back into (3), and using (1), gives: 
  ycyyRyyV 2
1
2
3
2)~,()~,,(          (5.9) 
Similarly for firm 2: 
  ycyyRyyV ~~~2),~(~~),~,~(~ 2
1
2
3
         (5.10) 
The Nash equilibrium is the solution to the first-order conditions to (5.9) and (5.10): 
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      (5.12) 
Notice that the second order conditions are fulfilled if and only if R11<0 and 0
~
11 R . 
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We shall now see how the Nash equilibrium quantities vary with share ownership 
and the cost parameter. Solving (5.11)-(5.12) for the partial derivatives we obtain 
(see Appendix A): 
0~~
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We see that the larger the share ownership of the decisive individual, the larger the 
firm’s output and the smaller the other firm’s output. The reason is that a larger share 
of profits makes the owner care more about profits, relative to pollution and effort, 
and will produce more everything else being equal. Firm 2 knows this, and cuts back 
on its own production. Thus, firm 1 is crowding out firm 2. This is because y and y~  
are strategic substitutes, and is a known result. 
Finally, using (5.7) and (5.11) we have: 
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where the latter equality follows from (5.11), and (5.13) and (5.14), respectively. 
Similarly, by differentiating (5.8), we obtain: 












12121111
111
~~
~
1
4 RRRR
R
y
Rss

          (5.19) 












12121111
111
~~
~
1
4 RRRR
R
y
Rs
c
s

          (5.20) 
Finally, we obtain the derivatives of the pollution intensity 
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We now state the properties of the Nash equilibrium production, pollution, and 
pollution intensity: 
 
Proposition 1 
In Nash equilibrium, the larger the share of the decision maker of firm 1, the larger 
firm 1 production and pollution, and the smaller the production and pollution of firm 
2. Furthermore, if the revenue elasticity is smaller than unity, i.e. if –R11y/R1 < 1, 
then the pollution intensity is smaller as the share of the decision maker is larger. 
Proof: The results follow from (5.13), (5.15) and (5.17), and by substituting the 
inequality –R11y/R1 < 1 into (5.21).         QED 
 
Thus, if the revenue elasticity is smaller than unity, firms where the decision maker 
has a larger share of profits will appear to have cleaner production, in the sense that 
its pollution intensity is smaller. 
 
5.3.4 Shareholder voting  
We now turn to the choice of the shareholders, who elect the representative (CEO) of 
the firm. The representative then acts as in the previous section. Each shareholder 
has the number of votes equal to her number of shares, and we seek to find the 
Condorcet winner, i.e. the representative who cannot lose against any alternative 
candidate in a binary election. This Condorcet winner will be the individual 
preferred by the median in the voting distribution (which will not coincide with the 
median shareholder, because voting rights are proportional to ownership). The space 
of alternatives is one dimensional (the candidates differ only in one dimension: their 
shares of the firm), and we need only to verify that preferences over candidate 
identity are single peaked. 
12
  Shareholders in firm 2 act in the same way. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 See Yalçin and Renström (2003) in the context of voting over representatives among shareholders. 
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5.3.4.1 Preferences over candidates 
 
We denote the production, pollution, and effort choices taken (in Nash equilibrium) 
by a hypothetical decision maker, with θ, as y(θ), x(θ), and s(θ), respectively. Also, 
the decision of firm 2 is affected by the identity of the decision maker in firm 1 (due 
to strategic interaction): )(~~ yy  . 13 
Indirect utility of a shareholder with ownership θi is: 
 2 1 1 2( , ) ( ( ), ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i iV R y y cy x s x                (5.23) 
The first-order variation with respect to θ is 
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The first term (the term involving R2) is the strategic commitment effect. R2 is 
negative (revenue is falling if firm 2 increases its production, as the price is falling), 
and 



 )(~y
is negative (as a decision maker with a larger share chooses larger 
production, y, for every level of y~ , implying that firm 2 finds it optimal to reduce its 
production, y~ ). Thus, the first term is positive, implying that any shareholder tends to 
prefer a decision maker with larger share. The second term is the increase in profits 
due to pollution (note that 0
)(




x
). This may or may not be outweighed by the 
negative effect of the pollution externality (the last term). The third term is the effect 
on profits by inducing more effort of the CEO (this effect is positive). Thus we can 
see already now that there is a tendency to delegate to a decision maker with a larger 
share, θ. 
Using (5.5) and (5.6), the first-order variation (5.24) may be rewritten as (see 
Appendix A): 
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We can now see that if θ=θi the pollution effect term will cancel, because the 
individual shareholder exactly agrees with the pollution decision of the CEO. If θi < 
                                                 
13
 Firm 2’s pollution is also affected, but irrelevant to shareholders of firm 1 because of our 
assumption of local externalities. 
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θ, the decision maker is over-polluting and the individual shareholder would tend to 
prefer a decision maker with lower θ. If θi > θ, the individual shareholder would tend 
to prefer a decision maker with higher θ, to accommodate under-pollution. 
 
Substituting for the partial derivatives of x and s, by using (5.17) and (5.19) we 
obtain: (see Appendix A): 
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Since (5.5) and (5.6) imply s=x/η we have 
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The term in parenthesis is always positive. For any θ < 2θi the first-order variation is 
positive, implying utility is increasing in θ. This implies that the optimal θ is at least 
twice the level of θi (i.e. θ ≥ 2θi ). Thus, any individual shareholder prefers a decision 
maker of at least twice the share of her own. Equation (5.27) either gives an interior 
solution, which is the global maximum (see Appendix A), or a corner solution . In 
both cases, preferences are single peaked. 
 
 
5.3.4.2 Shareholder-Voting Equilibrium 
 
We concluded in the previous section that a shareholder prefers a decision maker of 
at least twice the share of her own. This in turn implies that any individual with a 
share 2 i  or greater will be at a corner solution wishing to delegate to the 
largest shareholder. Thus, the largest shareholder gets the vote of at least the group 
of shareholders holding  /2 or more. If this group is in the majority, then the 
largest shareholder is the Condorcet winner. This, of course, depends on the 
distribution of shares. We shall derive a class of distributions sufficient for this to be 
the case. The class of distributions has the property that the density function does not 
decline too rapidly in theta (i.e. the distribution function is not too concave). 
Trivially, uniform distribution belongs to this class, as its distribution function is 
linear. 
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The distribution. First, the shares sum to one 
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The median in the voting distribution, θm , is given by 
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The decision maker with the maximum share ownership,  , is preferred by the 
median in the voting distribution if  m2 , i.e. if 
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where the last equality follows from (5.28) and (5.29) 
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Then (5.30) always holds if )(2)2( nn    for any n ., i.e. if )(n is a convex 
function in n.  
2
2
( ) ( )
( ) 0
n f n
f n n
n n
 
  
 
       (5.32) 
Thus, if 
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then the Condorcet winner is the representative with the largest share ownership. 
We now have 
 
Proposition 2 
For any distribution of shares satisfying 1
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(i.e. the distribution 
function, F, is not too concave), the representative majority elected under 
shareholder voting is the one with the largest share ownership. Then the larger the 
share owned by the largest shareholder, the larger is the firm’s production and 
142 
 
absolute pollution level, and if in addition–R11y/R1 < 1, this makes the pollution 
intensity x/y smaller. 
 
The result shows the possibility that firms where the larger shareholder holds a larger 
share will have lower pollution intensity (in a shareholder voting equilibrium), i.e. 
the firm appears to have cleaner production. We shall test this result in the remaining 
of the chapter. 
 
5.4 Data and Methodology  
5.4.1 Sample and Data collection 
Samples are drawn from publicly-traded U.S. firms that are required to report their 
toxic emissions in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) programme of the U.S. EPA. 
Only industrial facilities with ten or more full-time employees that release any listed 
toxic substance in excess of 25000 pounds and use at least 10000 pounds of any of 
the EPA’s listed chemicals via any of four different media (air, water, land, or 
underground injection) are required to report the type and amount of emissions to the 
EPA. The TRI database has been well used for research on measurement of 
environmental performance (e.g., King and Lenox, 2002; Klassen and Whybark, 
1999; Russo and Harrison, 2005; Berron et al, 2009, 2010). 
 
The pollution emissions data initially originates from the U.S. EPA’s TRI database at 
facility level. We weight on-site emission data of each chemical across air, water and 
land with responding Human Toxicity Potential value and then aggregate by the 
parent firm.  Share ownership distribution data are available from the Thomson One 
Banker database. Financial data used as control variables are from Compustat 
database. This database includes expenses on research and development (hereafter 
referred to as XRD), total assets and separate assets in business segments which are 
used to calculate the firm pollution intensity (hereafter referred to as FIPI), and 
gross/net assets value of plants and properties and equipments (the ratio hereafter 
referred to as AGEasset), and debt ratio. The employment data used for calculating 
regulatory stringency comes from the U.S. Census Bureau and the total emissions of 
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the state are from EPA’s TRI. Moreover, the measurements of all variables are 
elaborated in section 5.4.2 and section 5.4.3. Precise definitions and sources are 
presented in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 
 
Our study aims to investigate the role of share ownership distribution on the level of 
pollutants emissions in firms. Particular focus is given to firms in which 
non-renewable resources are used as inputs for production. Hence, our samples are 
selected from the following industries: Primary Metal (SIC-code33), Metal Mining 
(SIC-code10) and Petroleum Refining and related Industries (SIC-code 29).  
 
We initially identified 116 firms with data for the period 1997-2005. After 
subtracting companies with missing values for some of these variables, 
cross-referencing to the Compustat database for information on firm size, debt ratio 
and age of assets, and matching with both the TRI database for emission of firms and 
the Thomson One Banker database for information on share ownership, we were left 
with a 94-firm data set covering 1997-2005 and obtained 623 observations in total. 
To control for the potential influence of outliers, we truncated the sample by 
removing observations in firm no.24 named MAXXAM INC for all years and firm 
no.43 named TEXTRON INC in 2004 and 2005.   
 
Moreover, our data structure of full sample can be found in Table 5.5B. The panel is 
extremely unbalanced, with the number of observations ranging from a minimum of 
55 in year 2005 to a maximum of 89 in 1998. The usage of an unbalanced panel 
allows to both entry and exit, which partially mitigates potential selection and 
survivor bias. 
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5.4.2 Measurement of pollution emissions 
 
In early studies, annual pollution emissions are simply summed up as a measurement 
for pollution (e.g. Cohen et al., 1997; Dooley and Fryxell, 1999; Eskeland and 
Harrison, 1997; Feldman et al., 1997; Khanna and Anton, 2002; Konar and Cohen, 
2001; Rubin, 1999). However, it is hard to examine chemical exposure to harm for 
either the human or the ecosystem. Horvath et al. (1995) argue that simply summing 
annual pollution emissions of all TRI data is a poor proxy for its aggregate potential 
harm to human health or the environment. That is because the toxicity of TRI 
chemicals varies over more than six orders of magnitude. More importantly, 
weighted emissions approaches are more rigorous to weight toxic emissions in terms 
of relative harm, incorporating different toxicities in multi-media (i.e. air, water, 
land), and accounting for the chemicals’ transport as well as exposure routes. 
 
Various weighting methods are explored by researchers (see Table 5.2). According 
to Toffel and Marshall (2004) who compare and evaluates these methods, we choose 
the Human Toxicity Potential (HTP) scheme. There are four reasons for preferring 
HTP to other alternatives. First, although RQ has been applied by many studies (e.g. 
King & Lenox, 2000, 2002; Russo & Harrison, 2005), Toffel and Marshall (2004) 
find it problematic since being divided into five discrete values reduces its precision 
as a measure of relative harm. Moreover, it simply has one value per toxicity 
chemical but does not account for various release media. Consequently, it is hard to 
determine the relative harm of a particular chemical impact to the ecosystem or 
human health. Likewise, TRACI is abandoned as having the same drawbacks with 
RQ. Second, IRCHS is less appropriate as it seems designed for regulatory scrutiny 
and might be useful for prioritizing compliance management, rather than a weighting 
factor for gauging the relative impact to the environment. Third, EI99 and EDIP 
cover less than 10% of current TRI chemicals. Narrow coverage, to some extent, 
might make our estimation results biased. Finally, HTP factor is constructed by 
Hertwich et al. (2001) measuring toxicity in terms of benzene equivalence (for 
carcinogens) or toluence equivalence (for noncarcinogens). This method assigns 
each chemical a separate value for different media of release. It is more closely 
associated with actual risks to human health and environmental quality. Moreover, 
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HTP results are highly correlated with those obtained with more sophisticated 
weighting methods such as RESI (r =.73) and the “ecoindicator99” (r =.92) (Toffel 
&Marshall, 2004).  
 
In this paper, we improve on Berrone et al. (2010) by using the updated HTP factor 
of Hertwich et al. (2006) who introduce new calculations for emissions to air, water, 
agricultural and non-agricultural soil at two different soil depths. They also account 
for the oxidation products SO2 and NOx which are more dangerous than the primary 
pollutants. The formula for weighted pollution score for each facility is: 
                   MC
M C
MCtjt fEwp   
where MCtE is the emissions of chemical C to medium M (air, water, surface of 
agricultural soil, rootzone of agricultural soil) in year t by facility j; and MCf  is the 
weighting factor (HTP value) corresponding to chemical C emitted to medium M. 
Note that in accordance with prior research (King & Lenox, 2000, 2002, 2004) and 
Berrone (2009, 2010), we only consider chemicals both that were consistently 
reported on over the period of our data analysis and that were included in the HTP 
list (see Appendix B and Appendix C)
14
.  
 
First, we weighted each chemical with responding HTP factors with respect to 
different mediums and sum them up. Second, we aggregated the results across 
chemicals at facility level. Third, the total emissions of facilities were aggregated by 
parent company. Moreover, as the HTP method provides cancer and non-cancer 
values, we calculated two different variables respectively. Both variables were 
log-transformed to tone down the unduly influential effect of a few observations with 
extreme emissions values. Then we standardized and averaged two variables to 
obtain weighted pollution level in firms. In the end, we improve on Berrone’s (2010) 
measure not only by accounting for the effect of firm size (Hart and Ahuja, 1996) but 
also by incorporating price deflator. We finally create our dependent variable PE by 
                                                 
14
 Since TRI does not distinguish the emissions to land or underground between agricultural and non-agricultural 
soil, we calculate all emissions to land and underground as surface of agricultural soil and rootzone of 
agricultural soil respectively. 
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dividing the weighted emissions (WP) over deflated sales for firm i at time t which 
is formulated as 
( / ' )
it
it t
wp
sales price deflator
, namely pollution per unit of sales. 
 
5.4.3 Measurements of independent variables 
As 5.3.4.2 stated, the decisive maker majority elected under shareholder voting is the 
one with the largest share ownership. To test our hypothesis, our key variable 
therefore is the percentage of shares outstanding held by the largest shareholder 
(LSH).  
 
Following prior empirical study, our control variables include regulation stringency 
in firm-level, firm’s industry pollution intensity, and financial leverage, research and 
development expenses. Meanwhile, age of assets would be used for alternative 
measurement for R&D expenses. To assure the reliability of firm’s industry pollution 
intensity, industry dummies are used for alternative proxy. 
 
Following prior empirical study, our control variables include regulation stringency 
in firm-level, firm’s industry pollution intensity, and financial leverage, research and 
development expenses. Meanwhile, age of assets would be used for alternative 
measurement for R&D expenses. To assure the reliability of firm’s industry pollution 
intensity, industry dummies are used for alternative proxy. 
 
Environmental regulation is very common to use in the analysis of factors 
influencing pollution emissions (e.g. Meyer, 1995; King and Lenox, 2002, Berrone 
et al., 2010).  Environmental regulatory stringency (RS) varies across states and 
imposes stringent or lax penalties for pollution. Previous empirical studies suggest 
that penalties and scrutiny are strong deterring factors for environmental pollutions. 
For example, Karpoff et al. (2005) provide evidence that legal penalties rather than 
reputation loss are most important in deterring environmental violations.  
 
In terms of measurement for firm’s regulatory stringency, a previous proxy is 
obtained by calculating the inverse of the log of state toxic emissions divided by total 
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employees (Meyer, 1995). Nevertheless, given facilities of a firm are perhaps located 
in different states, King and Lenox (2002) improve on Meyer’s method and calculate 
the weighted average of the regulatory stringency for all the states where a firm has 
all facilities operating.   
 
However, the method used in King and Lenox (2002) is suitable for the firm in 
which all facilities are required to be investigated whereas our sample concentrates 
on the facilities only engaging in industries with SIC10 and SIC29 and SIC33. For 
example, in 1999, Alcoa Inc. had 72 facilities in the U.S. and reported their toxicity 
release data to EPA’s TRI programme. These facilities are located in different states 
and engaging many industries such as primary metal industry (SIC33), fabricated 
metal products industry (SIC34), transportation equipment industry (SIC37) and 
electric, gas and sanitary services (SIC49). Rather than investigating all industries 
firms are engaging in, our study only consider three industries, i.e. the metal mining 
industry (SIC10), the petroleum refining and related industry (SIC29), and the 
primary metal industry (SIC33). As for Alcoa Inc., only 36 facilities satisfy our data 
selection. 
 
Following Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) and Berrone et al. (2009, 2010), our proxy for 
regulation and scrutiny is expected to be more intense in the states where the 
company is headquartered and where it has major operations since decision-makers 
come into closer contact with the community. It is approximated as total on- and 
off-site toxic releases of the state to which firm’s headquarters belonged, divided by 
total employees, transformed into logarithm, and inverted. Total toxicity emissions 
for states are obtained from EPA’s TRI programme. The amount of total 
employment for each state comes from the U.S. Census Bureau. It is thus assumed 
that lower toxic emissions in the state in which a firm has headquarters is associated 
with higher level of regulatory stringency facing the firm, and a higher value for this 
variable. 
 
In addition to the environmental regulation factor, firm characteristics are also 
included, namely, debt ratio (DEBT for short) and age of assets (AGEasset for short) 
and R&D expenses (XRD for short). Debt ratio is measured as the ratio of debt over 
common/ordinary equity. AGEasset is approximated by the ratio between net and 
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gross assets of the firm’s plants and properties and equipment (PPE for short) 
(Konar and Cohen, 2000). Lower value means older age of PPE. Arguably, firms 
with older plant and equipment are likely to pollute more. However, the definition of 
AGEasset is ambiguous since continuous investment could offset the value of 
depreciation which reflects age of PPE. For this reason, we create an alternative 
measure for age of assets, R&D expenses by using price deflator to obtain a real 
value and transformed into logarithms. Higher value of R&D expenses is expected to 
lead to lower pollution emissions.  
 
Finally, the influence of firms’ industry pollution intensity and industry 
characteristics are considered. As for pollution intensity of firms, following Berrone 
et al. (2009), it accounts for the firm’s industry composition and its dirtiness and the 
proportion of each business sector where the firm operates. We collect data from the 
Compustat Business Segment database and identified each sector’s SIC code for 
firms. Categorized by two-digit SIC code, we then give a score to each segment 
regarding ‘dirtiness’ by ranking industries from the most to the least polluting sector 
according to the total amount of toxic emissions at industries level, which is 
established by EPA’s annual TRI (toxicity release inventory) national analysis. 
Furthermore, incorporating the economic importance of each sector which is 
measured by
j
T
A
A
, we weight the pollution ranking score by the fraction of responding 
sector’s assets over total assets of the firm. Then they are summed up at firm level. 
The measure is formulated as                    
                            
T
j
n
j
j
A
A
RF I P I 
1
 
Where jR  is the pollution rank position of segment j , jA is the total identifiable 
assets of segment j , TA is the total assets of the company, and n  is the total 
number of segments of the firm. Meanwhile, we create Industry Dummy variables 
as an alternative measure of firms’ industry pollution intensity, by setting 
IndustryD1=1, if the firm belongs to the metal mining industry, otherwise it equals 
0; IndustryD2=1 if the firm belongs to the petroleum refining and related industry, 
otherwise equals 0. To avoid the collinearity problem that the dummy variables trap 
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may cause, IndustryD3 is omitted. Our measure aims to identify the effect of 
industry upon pollution of firms, meanwhile, to examine the feasibility of FIPI.   
 
5.5 Estimation Methods  
Since our dataset has observations of multiple firms over different years, the use of 
time series cross-sectional data (also known as panel or longitudinal data) analysis 
techniques is appropriate to examine our hypotheses as to whether pollution 
emissions are statistically influenced by inequality of share ownership distribution. 
The equation of regression is as follows: 
 
1 2 3 4 5it it it it it it itPE LSH FIPI RS DEBT XRD u                      (5.34) 
 
where i  represents each firm and t  represents each time period (with 1,2t T  ); 
itPE is pollution emissions for firm i  
during period t ; independent variables 
include largest shareholder’s share ownership ( itLSH ), the firm industry pollution 
intensity ( itFIPI ),  regulatory stringency ( itRS ), debt ratio ( itDEBT ) and 
expenditure on research and development ( itXRD ). itu  
is the error term. 
 
Our estimation might suffer from potential self-selection bias. As stated above, the 
particular focus of observations is given to firms in certain industries in which 
non-renewable resources are the main input of productions. This sort of bias can be 
thought of as a form of omitted variable bias (Heckman, 1979). In addition, 
misspecification of models gives rise to heteroskedasticity. To mitigate these 
problems, Feasible Generalized Least Squares is appropriate whereby a within 
transformation is performed (i.e. each firm’s observations are expressed in deviations 
from their firm-specific means). Meanwhile, we performed FGLS regression 
analysis for panel data with White’s (1981) correction which solves some 
heteroscedasticity problems. 
    
For the purpose of comparison and control of the robustness of the outcomes of 
empirical analysis, one more regression is made using panel-corrected standard error 
(PCSE) estimator with exactly the same error structure as the FGLS-model: firm 
level heteroskedasticity. The main reason for doing this is that the FGLS standard 
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error estimates may be unacceptably optimistic. Beck and Katz (1995) attribute this 
overconfidence to time-series cross-section data where the error process has a large 
number of parameters since the FGLS assumes the error process is known but not 
estimated. This oversight causes estimates of the standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients to understate their true variability (Freedman and Peters, 1984), although 
there are no analytic results indicating whether this underestimate affects the 
performance of FGLS for panel data. Nevertheless, using Monte Carlo analysis, 
Beck and Katz (1995) show that PCSE estimates of sampling variability are very 
accurate, even in the presence of complicated panel error structures. They suggest 
that PCSE is superior to the more complicated GLS approach to the analysis of panel 
data. 
 
Besides, we also performed regressions using Fixed Effects model and Random 
Effects model but F tests fail to reject the hypothesis that all the coefficients in both 
models are different than zero, suggesting that they are problematic and not 
appropriate for our sample. 
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5.6 Empirical Results 
5.6.1 Descriptive statistics  
The preliminary statistics are reported in Table 5.5A. The average level of pollution 
emissions per unit of sales into logarithm is -4.82022, ranging from -20.2044 to 
13.66278. This wide range suggests that firms choose diverse pollution emissions 
levels although these firms possess similar industry characteristics such as 
non-renewable resources as principal input for production. The proportion of share 
ownership the largest shareholder holds ranges from 0.46% to 74.89%. The 
maximum value of a firm’s industry pollution intensity is 25.0112 and the minimum 
is 0. The average value of regulatory stringency is 0.33 with the range between 
0.04668 and 1.339952. The average debt to equity ratio is 0.90. These firms’ expense 
in R&D is 17.51 on average (in log with base 10). The value of age asset ranges 
from 0.15 to 1. 
 
Table 5.6 presents the Pearson correlation matrix between the variables estimated in 
the regression analyses. From Table 5.6, we may observe that share ownership 
distribution measured by the fraction of shares the largest shareholder holds is 
negatively associated with pollution emissions at with p < 0.10.  Moreover, it is 
clear to see that all control variables have a strong linear relationship with the 
dependent variable (i.e. pollution emissions). In addition, we confirm that the 
variable of R&D expenses is related to its alternative measure, age of assets, at 
significance level of 10%.  
 
5.6.2 Results  
Table 5.7 presents estimates of equation (1). Column (1) and (2) reports Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares estimates. Column (1) shows that the effect of the largest 
shareholder’s share ownership on pollution is highly significant. The estimated 
elasticity is -0.12, i.e. on average, across firms an increase in largest shareholder’s 
share ownership by 10% leads to a decrease in pollution by 1.2%. In column (2), we 
replace itXRD with itAGEasset  
to avoid misspecification due to a great number of 
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missing values in 
itXRD . The significance and coefficient of share ownership are 
unchanged suggesting that the main results are not biased due to missing values.  
 
In column (3) and (4), we present the estimates obtained by Ordinary Least Squares 
with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). It yields coherent results with the 
FGLS estimates. The share ownership variables are significant and all have the sign 
expected on the basis of our model. In particular, column (3) provides strong results 
with a higher coefficient and is significant at 1% level. The point estimate (-7.803) 
indicates that the elasticity of pollution with respect to share ownership evaluated at 
sample means is -0.194, suggesting that a 10% rise in share ownership is associated 
with a 1.94% decrease in pollution.  
 
Meanwhile, following previous environmental studies (Aragon-Correa, 1998; 
Berrone et al., 2009), Wald Chi2 tests are conducted to examine the explanatory 
value of our independent variables. Results of these tests indicated that the 
increments in variance explained among different control models were all significant. 
Wald Chi2 statistics are given in Table 5.7 confirming that the impact of share 
ownership distribution is statistically crucial to pollution emissions level in all cases 
other than due to random chance. Moreover, we also calculate the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) after each regression in pooled OLS to detect whether results were 
subject to multicollinearity.  Remarkably lower VIF values indicate that our 
estimations are free of any significant multicollinearity bias. 
 
Comparing column (1) through column (4), debt ratio has no relevance in explaining 
the pollution under the control of itAGEasset  and with an opposite sign to the 
regressions controlling for itXRD . In addition, itAGEasset is correlated with 
pollution at1% significance level. In contrast, it has weak influence on pollution but 
with expected sign when using PCSE. From all these estimations of Table 5.7, we 
confirm that the largest shareholder’s share ownership has a negative and highly 
significant effect on pollution emissions which is consistent with our hypothesis. 
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5.6.3 Discussions 
 
Our empirical evidence is broadly consistent with my theory hypothesis that share 
ownership controlled by the decisive shareholder (i.e. largest shareholder) positively 
affects pollution abatement. More importantly, this result implies that the firms with 
the more right-skewed ownership distribution are more likely to reduce pollution 
emissions when the pollution emissions decision is taken through shareholders. This 
result is counter to Roemer (1993), who shows the poorer the median voter is 
relative to the average, then economic democratization will make his/her share 
higher, thereby the more production and the more of the externality the firm 
produces.  
 
Moreover, in accord with our findings, pollution emissions, to some extent, are 
related to specific industry pollution intensity of firms. Contrary to previous research 
by Berrone et al. (2010), who find that industry pollution position intensity does not 
impact environmental performance, we find evidence that it has a positive and 
significant effect on pollution emissions. This may be due to the fact that our 
observations are based on industries with similar characteristics; for example, they 
all use non-renewable resources as inputs of production.  
 
We confirm the significantly negative relationship between regulatory stringency 
and pollution emissions which is consistent with Berrone et al. (2010). It suggests 
that stringent regulation would bring better environmental quality while lax 
regulation would lead to more pollution, which is also supported by previous studies 
(see e.g. Earnhart, 2004; King and Lenox, 2002).  
 
We also find evidence that pollution emissions would be lower as a firm expends 
more on R&D, suggesting that technology can help to reduce pollution. As Frosch 
and Gallopoulos (1989) argued, as firms’ further reductions in pollution become 
progressively more difficult, more significant changes in processes or even entirely 
new production technologies are needed. This result is also supported by Walley and 
Whitehead (1994), who suggest that as the firm moves closer to ‘zero pollution’, 
emission reductions will become more technology-  and capital- intensive. 
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In addition, we find no evidence that older plants or equipment tend to pollute more. 
Nelson and Tietenberg and Donihue (1993) reach a similar conclusion that increased 
age of plants does not have a significant impact on emissions. Dasgupta et al. (2000) 
also find no evidence that plants with newer equipment have better environmental 
performance. The unsatisfied result, to some extent, is attributed to ambiguous 
definition of AGEassets. As stated in section 5.4.3, age of assets is measured as the 
ratio of net asset value over gross asset value of PPE. Although it accounts for 
depreciation of assets over time, new investment or new assets are continuously 
involved. Therefore, this measure is not reliable to be an accurate proxy to reflect the 
age of PPE. 
 
Some of our results are difficult to explain. Surprisingly, in contrast to Berrone et al. 
(2010) and Konar and Cohen (2000), age of assets shows significant and positive 
sign. Since AGEasset is measured such that larger values indicate newer assets 
which tend to have newer PPE with more innovative technologies in pollution 
control or abatement, we expect it to be negatively correlated with pollution 
emissions levels. While our results show that newer plants are more likely to release 
toxicity, as elaborated above, measurement bias renders the estimates unreliable. 
Meanwhile, DEBT indicates significantly positive impact to pollution emissions 
after controlling for R&D expenses while insignificantly negative effect is shown in 
the regressions including age of assets. 
 
Our research results are also rich in policy implications. It is important for policy 
makers and regulators to understand how the largest shareholder affects pollution 
abatement decisions and how the concentrated share ownership structure in the US is 
associated with incentives for firms to reduce pollution emissions.  
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5.7 Sensitivity Analysis 
Since this negative relationship between share ownership distribution and pollution 
challenges Roemer’s theoretical work, and also since sample selection may influence 
the coefficient estimates, this section thoroughly tests the robustness of these results. 
It estimates a number of variations of the model estimated in Table 5.7, testing 
whether the negative relationship between share ownership and pollution persists 
across different variable definitions, and model specifications. 
 
First, we test the robustness of our results to different definitions of control variables. 
Industry dummy variables are taken as alternative measurement for firm industry 
pollution intensity. Column (1) and Column (2) in Table 5.8A1 separately report the 
re-estimations with FGLS controlling for XRD or AGEassets suggesting that 
alternative measurement of variables have left our main results largely unchanged. 
Surprisingly, using PCSE estimator, the largest shareholder’s ownership is not 
correlated with pollution when controlling for AGEasset. 
 
Furthermore, in accord with Barslund (2007), we check the robustness by including 
or excluding one or more controls in our preferred specification. We add time 
dummies based on a variables set of Table 5.7. The results are presented in column 
(3) and (4) of Table 5.8A1 and Table 5.8A2. Time dummies are jointly insignificant 
for both estimation methods. Once again, we confirm that the relationship between 
the largest shareholder’s ownership and pollution remains significant and negative. 
The sign and coefficients of control variables are qualitatively similar to our main 
results regardless of FGLS estimator and PCSE estimator. 
 
We also estimate a set of regressions where the dependent variable (pollution 
emission) is regressed on core variable (share ownership distribution) and all 
possible combinations of other control variables. The results are represented in Table 
5.8B1 and Table 5.8B2 respectively. For each regression, the coefficient of share 
ownership distribution indicates strongly significant and negative sign. The results of 
the robustness checks confirm our initial assessment. In particular the variable of 
share ownership remains significant and negative across different specifications. 
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5.8 Conclusions   
This study investigates the relationship between pollution emissions and the 
distribution of share ownership. Theoretically, we show that firms tend to delegate 
pollution decisions to the largest shareholder. The more share ownership the largest 
shareholder has, the more pollution would be cleaned up. We have presented panel 
data estimates of this relationship using data on 93 U.S. publicly traded firms 
covering the period 1997-2005 and concentrated on three industries, i.e. the metal 
mining industry, the petroleum refining industry and the primary metal industry. The 
technique of feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) for panel data is applied to 
correct the heteroskedasticity across firms and to account for firms’ heterogeneity. 
After controlling for the effects of firm-specific factors on firm-level pollution, our 
estimations reveal that share ownership distribution matters for the firm’s pollution 
emissions and the effect is statistically significant. Strong evidence is found that the 
more share ownership the largest shareholder holds, the less pollution the firm 
produces.  
 
This paper makes several contributions. First, it provides a theoretical model to 
analyze the negative relationship between right-skewed share ownership distribution 
and pollution emissions which contrasts with prior research by Roemer (1993). 
Second, robust empirical evidence is provided to confirm the role of share ownership 
distribution in pollution decisions when pollution decisions are taken through 
shareholder voting. Third, this research may have implications for U.S. economic 
reformers or regulators who are striving to improve corporate governance and 
environmental protection. 
  
Future research should attempt to identify the effect of firm performance on 
pollution emissions. Combined with the endogeneity problem of pollution, we would 
further examine the relationship between share ownership distribution and pollution 
emissions.  
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Table 5.1 Summary of relevant empirical studies 
Authors LHS RHS controls result sample method adjusted R^2 
Telle  Return on sales Pollution fim sub-industry pollution,  positive 85 plants 
panel data 
model 0.12 
(2006) 
  
capital, employees 
 
Norway (RE) 
 
     
Year1990-2001 
  
Cormier et al Market valuation Pollution 
Monetary working capital 
Inventories 
Fixed assets 
Debts 
Preferred stock 
Price/earnings ratio negative 74 firms OLS 0.2 
(1993) 
   
negative* 
(Canada) 
Year1986-1988 
reweighted 
least 
squares 0.45 
Derwall et al. Portfolio performance eco-efficiency 
Return difference between 
portofolios positive* 450 firms 
multifactor 
regression 0.87 
(2005) 
    
(U.S.) 
Year1995-2003 
  Filbeck and 
Gorman Return compliance  
Rank dummy in Regulatory  
Market value of equity negative* 24 firms t test . 
(2004) 
   
positive 
(U.S.) 
Year1996-1998 OLS 0.04 
Konar and 
Cohen  tobin's q-1 Pollution 
Replacement cost of tangible 
assets 
Advertising expenditures 
R&D growth in revenues 
Market share 
Growth revenues 
Age of assets negative*** 321 firms OLS 0.47 
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Capital 
expenditure/depreciation 
Import penetration 
 
(2001) ln(q) lawsuits 
  
(U.S.) 
Year1989 
 
0.46 
Kassinis and 
Vafeas environmental  board size envrionmenal preferences positive** 209 fims 
logit 
regression . 
(2002) lawsuit dummy board composition congresional voting record postive*** (U.S.) 
  
  
directorships regulatory stringency negative* 
   
  
insider ownership log (sales) positive* Year1994-1998 
  
   
return on assets 
    Berrone et al.  environmental  family firm dummy total sales, ROA,  positive* 194 firms OLS 0.27 
(2010) performance 
family CEO status 
dummy price-book ratio positive U.S. 
 
0.34 
   
board size 
 
Year1998-2002 
  
   
institutional ownerhsip  
   
   
regulatory stringency 
    
   
industry pollution intensity 
   
   
age 
    King and 
Lenox pollution firm size 
 
positive*** 614 firms Pearson . 
(2002) 
 
R&D intensity 
 
negative*** U.S. correlation 
 
  
debt ratio 
 
positive*** 
Year 
1987-1990 
  
  
regulatory 
stringency 
 
positive*** 
   
Nelson et al. pollution  age 
the perfentage of a firm's 
steam  unrelated 44 utilities 3SLS . 
(1993) 
 
capital utilization generating capacity located unrelated U.S. 
  
  
output  in a (SO2) nonattainment unrelated Year1991-1996 
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area 
  
regulation 
 
negative 
   
Wu violation  
competitive 
pressure 
 
negative** 1964 facilities multinomial probit 
(2009) on air emission investor pressure 
 
positive** U.S. 
  
  
regulatory pressure 
 
positive Year 2005 
  
  
costs risks and barriers negative 
   
  
CEO environemntal values positive 
   
  
publicly traded 
 
positive 
   
  
small facility 
 
positive 
   
 
overcompliance  
competitive 
pressure 
 
poitive 
   
 
on water pollution investor pressure 
 
negative 
   
  
regulatory pressure 
 
positive 
   
  
costs risks and barriers negative 
   
  
CEO environemntal values positive*** 
   
  
publicly traded 
 
positive 
   
  
small facility 
 
negative 
   
Earnhart 
biological oxygen 
demand  
KDHE/EPA lagged 
penalty seasons dummy positive*** 40 facilities 
panel data 
models 0.5 
(2004) wastewater pollution 
cumulative EPA 
inspections nonreporting of emissions negative U.S. 
(FE and 
RE) 
 
  
cumulative KDHE 
inspections population negative*** Year1990-1998 
  
  
Annual EPA 
enforcement sales taxes negative*** 
   
  
Annual KDHE 
enforcement monthly effluent limit negative 
   
  
predicted EPA 
inspection permit expiration positive*** 
   
  
predicted KDHE final limit type negative 
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inspection 
   
nonreporting of effluent limit 
   
   
IV--lagged EPA inspection 
   
   
IV--lagged KDHE inspection 
   Konar and 
Cohen  abnormal returns disclosure of TRI emissions    . negative*** 192 U.S. firms event study 
 
(1997) 
change in rank of 
emissions  rank of abnormal returns    . negative*** top 40 firms . 
 
     
Year1989 
  *significant at the 10% level  
      **significant at the 5% level 
      *** significant at the 1% level 
      
 
 
 
 Table 5.2 Abbreviations of typical weighting methods  
HTP Human Toxicity Potential 
IRCHS Indiana Relative Chemical Hazard Score for Environment 
RSEI Risk-screening Environmental Indicators  
EI99 EcoIndicator99 
EDIP Environmental Design of industrial products 
TRACI Tool for the reduction and assessment of chemical impacts 
RQ 
comprehensive environmental response, compensation, and liability act reportable 
quantity 
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Table 5.3 Description of variables 
 
Variables   Description of Variables     
PE pollution emissions in pounds per unit of sales;   
 
 
pollution emission (in pounds) is weighted by on-site emissions by HTP factor 
  
and aggregate the pollution of facilities by parent firms and deflated by sales 
(in US dollars)   
LSH Percentage of shares owned by largest shareholder   
FIPI Firm Industry pollution intensity,  all business sectors' industry rank   
  multiplied by the proportion of responding sector's assets   
RS Regulatory stringency approximated by the total emissions   
   of state the firms' headoffice belonged to divide by total employments of the state 
DEBT Debt ratio of debt over common equity     
XRD Log of Research & Development expenses divided by price deflator   
AGEasset age of assets measured as net assets over gross assets of plants properties and equipments 
Firm Size real value of total sales; obtained by using sales divided by price deflator 
IndustryD1, 
IndustryD2 
If the firm engaging in metal mining industry with SIC code = 10, the value 
equals 1, otherwise 0.  
 
 
If the firm engaging in petroleum refining industry with SIC code = 29, the 
value equals 1, otherwise 0.     
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Table 5.4 Data Sources 
Variables   sources       
PE 
 
Toxicity Release Inventory  program of U.S. EPA 
    www.epa.gov/tri/tridata/current_data/index.html  
LSH   Thomson One Banker   
LA5   Thomson One Banker   
LA20   Thomson One Banker   
LAH   Thomson One Banker   
FIPI 
 
Industry pollution ranking  from TRI 
    
Business segments financial information from 
COMPUSTAT 
RS 
 
Pollution data from TRI 
Employment from U.S. 
Census Bureau 
      www.census.gov/econ/susb/historical_data.html  
DEBT   COMPUSTAT     
XRD   COMPUSTAT     
AGEasset   COMPUSTAT     
Firm Size 
 
Total sales from COMPUSTAT 
     Price deflator from ERS(Economic Research Service) 
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Table 5.5A Summary Statistics  
Variable 
               
Observations/firms Mean      SD 
                         
Minimum Maximum Median 
PE(Log) 
752 
(n=102) -4.82022 5.315607 -20.2044 13.66278 -5.16517 
LSH 
733 
(n=101) 0.119453 0.095946 0.0046 0.7489 0.0979 
FIPI 618(n=98) 14.52486 6.342527 0 25.0112 14.41236 
RS 703(n=95) 0.328804 0.145352 0.046698 1.339952 0.2818295 
DEBT 751(n=102) 0.900006 3.221656 -32.4641 29.43789 0.4982781 
XRD(log) 394(n=55) 17.51116 2.210904 12.73189 22.82657 17.084 
AGEasset 744(n=102) 0.540755 0.15024 0.150579 1 0.5141255 
  
 
 
 
Table 5.5B Sample description 
year 
              
number of  
            
observations 
                  
Percent 
                      
Cumulative 
1997 77 12.46 
                          
12.46 
1998 89 14.40 
                           
26.86 
1999 75 12.14 
                           
39.00 
2000 73 11.81 50.81 
2001 65 10.52 
                           
61.33 
2002 66 10.68 72.01 
2003 61  9.87 81.88 
2004 57  9.22 91.10 
2005 55  8.90 
                    
100.00 
total 618 100.00   
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Table 5.6 Correlations Matrix                                                                                            
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7     
1 PE  1.00 
      2 LSH -0.06  1.00 
     3 FIPI   0.32*  0.08 1.00 
    4 RS -0.20* -0.03 -0.20* 1.00 
   5 DEBT -0.11*  0.02 -0.15* 0.02 1.00 
  6 XRD -0.24* -0.35* -0.47*   0.13*    0.1797* 1.00 
 7AGEasset   0.13*   0.14*   0.36* -0.16*    0.13* 0.08 1.00 
 
Note: a. Pearson correlations above 0.08 or below -0.08 are significant at the 10% 
level or better. b. * denotes P-value <0.01 
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Table 5.7 FGLS and PCSE regressions of pollution emissions on 
share ownership distribution 
   FGLS  FGLS  PCSE  PCSE 
 Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Main effects 
    
LSH -4.767** -4.806*** -7.803*** -4.226* 
 
(-2.26) (-4.00) (-2.96) (-1.89) 
Controls 
    FIPI 0.056** 0.155*** 0.178*** 0.246*** 
 
(2.14) (8.02) -4.01 -6.03 
RS -1.928*** -4.732*** -2.019** -5.228*** 
 
(-2.73) (-6.87) (-2.04) (-4.75) 
     DEBT 0.205*** -0.053 0.197** -0.083 
 
(2.79) (-1.12) -2.34 (-1.08) 
XRD -0.422*** 
 
-0.349*** 
 
 
(-5.98) 
 
(-3.41) 
 
AGEasset 
 
 2.273*** 
 
-0.00392 
  
(3.22) 
 
(0.00) 
_cons 1.42 -6.124*** -1.093 -6.238*** 
  (0.98) (-15.47) (-0.53) (-6.97) 
Observations 316 584  316 584 
Wald chi2 (5)         80.4*** 195.41*** 67.19*** 88.97*** 
 
Note: a) *p <0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; b) two-tailed tests for all tests and coefficients; c) t value are in 
parentheses. Model (1) and model (2) are estimated using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) 
estimator. Model (3) and model (4) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares with Panel-Corrected 
Standard Errors (PCSE).  
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Table 5.8A1 Sensitivity analysis using FGLS 
 
FGLS 
(1) 
FGLS 
(2) 
FGLS 
(3) 
FGLS  
(4)  
     LSH -4.528*** -2.694*** -5.844589*** -7.225891*** 
 
(-2.38) (-2.79) (-2.71) (-5.8) 
RS -2.803*** -3.790*** -1.955244*** -4.776612*** 
 
(-7.94) (-7.24) (-2.51) (-6.72) 
DEBT 0.242*** -0.094** .2031751*** -.0506997 
 
(3.7) (-2.16) (2.7) (-1.03) 
XRD -0.414*** 
 
-.3978383*** 
 
 
(-7.59) 
 
(-5.32) 
 FIPI 
  
.0648591** 
 
   
(2.33) 
 Industry Dummy 0.928** -0.273*** 
  
 
(2.45) (-1.21) 
  AGEassets 4.846*** 
 
3.264543*** 
  
(10.39) 
 
(4.88) 
Year Dummy 
 
Yes Yes 
_cons 2.284** -6.107*** 1.063451 -5.857931*** 
 
(2.3) (-23.71) (0.7) (-13.15) 
Observations 372 678 316 584 
Wald chi2 (5) 116.2***  231.83*** 74.74*** 311.76*** 
 
Note: a) Dependent variable: the ratio of pollution emissions over firm values. b) Estimates based on 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares. We also performed regression based on PCSE estimator showing 
similar outcome which is available in request. c) Significance level: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. d) t 
value are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.8A2 Sensitivity analysis using PCSE 
 
PCSE  PCSE PCSE PCSE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
LSH -7.40677*** -0.21587 -8.744623*** -5.596846** 
 
(-3.04) (-0.12) (-3.27) (-2.49) 
RS -2.94767*** -4.82989*** -2.265469** -5.558374*** 
 
(-3.14) (-5.21) (-2.28) (-5.09) 
DEBT 0.186049** -0.15583* .2019357** -.0917728 
 
(2.08) (-1.82) (2.41) (-1.19) 
XRD -0.4635*** 
 
-.3497638*** 
 
 
(-5.49) 
 
(-3.41) 
 FPI 
  
.1764789*** 0.236831*** 
   
(3.96) (5.84) 
Industry1 omitted 10.89722*** 
  
  
(7.55) 
  Industry2 -0.34831 omitted 
  
 
(-0.62) 
   Industry3 omitted 0.951522** 
  
  
(2.19) 
  AGEassets 4.127293*** 
 
0.7580011 
  
(3.5) 
 
(0.49) 
Year Dummy 
  
Yes. Yes. 
_cons 3.626328** -6.69569*** -.2670759 -6.49031*** 
 
(2.44) (-8.38) (-0.12) (-7.20) 
Observations 372 678 316 584 
R-squared 0.1098 0.2645 0.1840 0.1642 
Wald chi2 (5) 52.71*** 92.83*** 71.99*** 102.17*** 
 
 
Note: a) Dependent variable: the ratio of pollution emissions over firm values. b) Estimates based on 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares. We also performed regression based on PCSE estimator showing 
similar outcome which is available in request. c) Significance level: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. d) t 
value are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.8B1 Sensitivity analysis using FGLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)   
LSH -4.769*** -3.075*** -4.522** -3.904*** -2.802*** -5.171*** -3.755*** -3.309*** -4.544** -4.859*** 
 
(-5.46) (-3.11) (-2.34) (-3.23) (-3.10) (-2.79) (-3.13) (-3.66) (-2.11) (-3.91)    
RS 
 
-5.055*** -2.436*** -5.161*** -4.798*** -2.780*** -5.085*** -4.694*** -2.047*** -4.833*** 
  
(-9.57) (-5.82) (-7.55) (-9.42) (-8.95) (-7.52) (-9.21) (-2.90) (-6.93)    
DEBT 
 
-0.097** 
   
0.210*** -0.029 -0.110** 
 
                
  
(-2.49) 
   
(3.27) (-0.64) (-2.51) 
 
                
XRD 
 
-0.352*** 
  
-0.400*** 
  
-0.392***                 
   
(-6.56) 
  
(-7.53) 
  
(-5.60)                 
FIPI 
   
0.174*** 
  
0.169*** 
 
0.054** 0.163*** 
    
(10.57) 
  
(10.4) 
 
(2.09) (8.32) 
AGEasset 
   
4.284*** 
  
4.628*** 
 
2.026*** 
     
(11.9) 
  
(12) 
 
(2.89) 
_cons -4.300*** -2.803*** 1.382 -5.115*** -5.182*** 2.128** -5.063*** -5.249*** 1.141 -6.115*** 
 
(-38.65) (-14.51) (1.42) (-16.79) (-18.50) (2.18) (-17.30) (-19.52) (0.79) (-15.18)    
           
Observations  733 686 372 591 679 372 591 678 316 584 
Note: a) Dependent variable: the ratio of pollution emissions over firm values. 
 b) Estimates based on Feasible Generalized Least Squares. We also performed regression based on PCSE estimator showing similar  
outcome which is available in request.  
c) Significance level: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 d) t value are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.8B2 Sensitivity analysis using PCSE 
 
PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
LSH -3.47359** -2.44069 -6.46646** -4.15016** -3.13152* -7.26465*** -3.97812* -3.09705* -7.80339*** -4.22587* 
 
(-2.07) (-1.31) (-2.53) (-1.94) (-1.63) (-3.02) (-1.84) (-1.61) (-2.96) (-1.89) 
RS 
 
-6.89812*** -3.19346*** -5.44374*** -6.43602*** -2.94365*** -5.45056*** -6.25628*** -2.01858** -5.22847*** 
  
(-6.52) (-3.43) (-5.04) (-5.80) (-3.14) (-5.06) (-5.75) (-2.04) (-4.75) 
DEBT 
 
-0.15393 
   
0.191577** -0.08988 -0.17854** 0.196603** -0.08304 
  
(-1.90) 
   
(2.14) (-1.23) (-2.17) (2.34) (-1.08) 
XRD 
 
-0.41893*** 
  
-0.47039*** 
  
-0.34868***              
   
(-5.07) 
  
(-5.63) 
  
(-3.41)              
AGEasset 
   
3.52667*** 
  
4.078722*** 
 
-0.00392*** 
     
-2.84 
  
-3.19 
 
(-0.00) 
FIPI 
   
0.23881*** 
  
0.23067*** 
 
0.178189*** 0.245704 
    
(7.29) 
  
(7.01) 
 
(4.01) (6.03) 
_cons -4.32948*** -2.27849*** 2.96035** -6.12252*** -4.38946*** 3.672741** -5.9358*** -4.58026*** -1.09343 -6.2385*** 
 
(-14.04) (-4.42) (1.98) (-9.42) (-4.82) (2.47) (-8.92) (-5.04) (-0.53) (-6.97) 
Observations  733 686 372 591 679 372    591    678    316      584 
Note: a) Dependent variable: the ratio of pollution emissions over firm values. b) Estimates based on Feasible Generalized Least Squares. 
 We also performed regression based on PCSE estimator showing similar outcome which is available in request. 
 c) Significance level: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 d) t value are in parentheses. 
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First, (11) and (12) can be written as: 
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Next, solving for the partial derivatives, we obtain (13)-(16). 
The first-order variation of individual i’s indirect utility with respect to θ, equation (24) 
can be rewritten as follows: 
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where the last line is obtained by using (5) and (6). 
Equation (27) is 
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(suppose (27) is zero for *  , then (27) gives 
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Thus there exists an interior solution for any individual where 
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To see that (A10) is the global maximum, rewrite (A10) as 
BA
i
i

 2* 
               (A12) 
 and use (A12) to substitute for A in (A7) to obtain 
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which is positive (negative) when θ*>θ (θ*<θ), i.e. utility is increasing in θ for θ<θ* 
and declining in θ for θ>θ*. 
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Appendix B   
Non-cancer human toxicity potential in toluene equivalents for emissions to 
different compartments 
CAS#/Compound 
ID air water land underground 
630206 56 5 56 4.4 
71556 30 28 30 3.3 
79345 2.8 2.5 2.8 1.1 
79005 4.9 14 5.1 15 
75343 3.9 4 3.9 0.24 
75354 9.5 24 9.5 4.7 
75683 1 0.0086 0.97 4.5E-05 
57147 1900 170 160 20 
95943 8900 19000 8300 5600 
120821 9.6 78 10 19 
95636 11 330 11 44 
106934 1500 1300 1500 180 
95501 8.2 10 8.2 6.1 
107062 4.2 4.8 4.2 0.54 
540590 8.6 14 8.6 1.6 
78875 220 260 220 200 
528290 840 230 220 130 
106990 5.5 19 5.5 1.4 
541731 6 7.4 6 1.6 
542756 13 48 13 0.91 
108452 58 8.7 7.1 2 
106467 2.2 1.3 2.2 2.7 
100254 170 210 160 42 
123911 0.051 0.056 0.051 0.042 
106898 640 240 560 25 
109693 0.61 0.86 0.61 2 
63252 0.041 0.42 0.043 0.059 
80057 7.9 0.38 0.58 3.1 
58902 29 56 11 5.7 
57117314 2E+08 1E+09 1E+08 4.4E+08 
1746016 9E+11 4.9E+11 8.8E+11 6.3E+12 
93765 63 4.8 4.8 12 
95954 6.5 7 3.9 1.5 
88062 13 0.21 7.9 1.5 
88891 6100 710 970 2300 
118967 510 3 44 170 
94757 45 1.1 2.2 6.2 
120832 51 0.15 25 1.2 
 174 
105679 1.2 0.87 0.69 0.04 
51285 94 7.8 32 45 
121142 100 0.92 33 41 
576261 98 450 290 780 
606202 200 0.94 37 91 
126998 12 29 12 23 
95578 21 56 12 0.4 
75296 11 14 11 34 
109864 6.1 20 6.2 0.59 
88744 860 360 340 45 
79469 5.8 15 6.2 6.3 
88722 4.6 1.4 4.2 2.9 
90437 0.26 0.72 0.22 0.091 
99081 38 47 40 93 
101779 2.8 0.048 0.015 0.095 
534521 1700 56 500 94 
100027 21 6 21 3.4 
71751412 4000 31 0.33 110 
83329 0.45 2.6 0.5 1.9 
30560191 140 26 11 0.11 
75070 9.3 5.1 8.4 0.051 
67641 0.079 0.076 0.073 0.0013 
75058 30 15 27 0.53 
98862 2.5 0.63 1.5 0.076 
107028 4700 5800 4600 170 
79061 2000 25 3.9 4 
79107 62 0.22 9.6 0.42 
107131 38 19 36 1.7 
116063 620 750 660 300 
309002 720000 2600000 940000 2200000 
107186 4.3 1 2.1 0.046 
107051 88 45 88 6.8 
96184 43 54 43 24 
319846 59 110 25 11 
7429905 12000 9.3 8.3 3.1 
7664417 7.5 0.032 1.8 0.0015 
101053 1400 58 1.7 4.4 
62533 91 57 52 3.8 
120127 0.18 0.0081 0.72 3.1 
7440360 7400 1500 1500 1400 
12674112 3000 200000 96 71 
7440382 84000 20000 83000 130000 
1912249 17 0.015 3.3 19 
86500 260 6.4 9.8 61 
 175 
7440393 370 48 38 25 
114261 62 8.9 4.1 7.4 
17804352 6.6 0.41 0.35 2.5 
25057890 780 1500 1100 62 
71432 8.1 6.1 8.1 3.6 
108383 0.41 0.5 0.41 0.046 
95476 0.54 0.6 0.54 0.042 
106423 0.53 0.59 0.53 0.048 
108985 8200 19000 9200 70000 
92875 100 5.3 3.1 5 
65850 0.02 0.0024 0.0096 0.00076 
100447 21 1.9 20 3 
7440417 24000 540 950 1100 
319857 1500 2000 550 360 
82657043 97 260 23 270 
92524 0.98 3.4 0.88 0.15 
111444 2.7 4.3 2.9 2.9 
117817 33 9 0.3 4.8 
56359 2300 9500 830 870 
75274 280 210 270 69 
75252 200 210 200 65 
1689845 31 11 1.8 1.3 
71363 0.71 0.17 0.4 0.011 
85687 2.9 0.082 0.0031 0.076 
94826 76 6.9 0.41 0.84 
7440439 2E+06 140000 1900000 3.7E+07 
2425061 220 180 5 6 
133062 0.23 0.0036 0.14 0.078 
10605217 42 14 12 18 
1563662 180 52 160 8 
75150 1.4 2 1.4 0.82 
630080 0.27 0 0 0 
56235 2300 2300 2300 350 
75445 300000 82 230000 400 
110805 1.3 0.082 0.28 0.026 
75694 9.6 9.1 9.6 0.61 
75718 4.6 3.8 4.6 0.44 
57749 100000 240000 120000 160000 
470906 360 180 82 34 
76131 5.9 5.6 5.9 1 
79118 190 1.7 3.3 1.4 
108907 0.95 5.3 0.96 1.4 
124481 140 120 140 45 
75456 1.4 0.011 1.4 1.3 
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75003 0.071 0.073 0.07 0.00053 
67663 14 16 14 1.4 
1897456 15 0.59 1.4 1.7 
101213 3.5 1.1 0.41 0.37 
2921882 220 640 21 36 
7440473 2400 260 530 620 
156592 15 21 15 5.6 
10061015 14 51 14 0.36 
7440484 31000 65 95 85 
7440508 11000 6600 3600 1500 
56724 1900 970 43 70 
98828 0.41 0.38 0.41 0.036 
21725462 270 57 41 21 
110827 0.039 0.18 0.04 0.047 
108941 0.016 0.0081 0.014 0.00033 
60515 1600 570 420 210 
52315078 780 170 320 1400 
66215278 86 38 33 9.8 
50293 35000 66000 35000 43000 
62737 350 160 300 0.082 
52918635 50 1.2 0.031 8.5 
8065483 8100 780 510 540 
333415 1300 980 660 100 
74953 79 84 79 1.2 
1918009 19 4.3 2.4 1.4 
25321226 9.2 9.7 2.4 1.6 
120365 73 30 2.6 2 
115322 3100 6700 2200 68 
60571 130000 480000 150000 160000 
111422 310 1.7 1.2 0.52 
84662 0.39 0.31 0.22 0.05 
131113 0.023 0.0017 0.0041 0.0004 
124403 41 10 33 0.062 
121697 12 4.8 12 20 
84742 11 1.8 4.9 6.3 
88857 910 720 670 150 
117840 26000 160000 8200 1500000 
122394 14 14 2.8 0.96 
298044 13000 4300 250 400 
330541 380 120 110 280 
115297 15 23 15 28 
72208 14000 44000 18000 18000 
13194484 15000 14000 9500 840 
141786 0.092 0.024 0.086 0.0013 
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140885 1.6 0.71 1.5 0.033 
759944 2 2.3 1.9 0.51 
60297 0.23 0.37 0.23 0.0072 
97632 0.66 1.5 0.67 12 
100414 0.27 0.35 0.27 0.018 
107211 0.25 0.0042 0.02 0.00065 
75218 340 170 330 54 
96457 4600 400 290 130 
122145 480 120 18 38 
55389 3000 14000 2000 180 
900958 1100 590 52 370 
206440 22 7.9 17 39 
86737 3.2 17 2 3.2 
133073 5.4 0.024 0.094 0.51 
50000 16 0.29 4.2 0.11 
64186 0.064 0.0018 0.016 0.00013 
110009 45 41 45 1.3 
58899 2900 5400 2400 1000 
1071836 19 140 15 6.5 
76448 250 1800 520 2000 
1024573 8800 340000 11000 20000 
87683 4300 30000 4300 4100 
118741 21000 33000 21000 20000 
77474 130 120 94 130 
67721 5500 4900 5100 2900 
110543 0.81 7.1 0.81 7.7 
108101 1.4 0.35 1.3 0.027 
302012 390 140 140 0.46 
74908 1700 1600 1700 72 
7647010 24 0.12 0.1 1.9E-16 
7664393 7.1 0 0 0 
778364 0.031 9 0.031 2.2E-12 
123319 7.5 0.0015 0.014 0.11 
36734197 15 0.49 0.52 2 
78831 0.26 0.044 0.16 0.0018 
78591 0.032 0.16 0.067 0.016 
67630 0.018 0.0042 0.0087 0.00059 
143500 14000 150000 9000 9100 
7439921 580000 42000 540000 1.6E+07 
330552 290 210 91 76 
121755 24 7.2 0.3 2.7 
108316 22 4.1E-06 2E-07 3.9E-06 
7439965 3100 3.5 3.4 2.1 
108394 13 0.77 4.1 0.78 
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99650 4300 62000 970 9000 
7085190 420 14 8.8 5.6 
7439976 1E+07 1.3E+07 1.4E+07 1.4E+07 
67561 0.099 0.016 0.053 0.00041 
16752775 24 21 15 1.9 
94746 1100 62 18 7.4 
72435 71 1.6 4.6 65 
79209 0.081 0.02 0.075 0.00092 
96333 0.8 0.33 0.75 0.013 
74839 1600 900 1600 9.2 
74873 57 33 57 0.2 
78933 0.05 0.013 0.04 0.00047 
80626 0.53 0.93 0.53 0.045 
298000 2000 1900 1100 85 
1634044 0.081 0.17 0.082 0.029 
126987 460 690 540 6300 
75092 7 4.4 7 0.19 
22967926 190000 120000 190000 210000 
51218452 4.6 0.95 0.72 0.77 
21087649 8 9 8 2.4 
7786347 1100 51 4.2 9 
2385855 23000 260000 17000 18000 
7439987 12000 3600 14000 20000 
91203 18 22 18 31 
7440020 3200 26 24 18 
7697372 4.2 0 0 0 
98953 24 110 34 40 
10102440 4.3 0.014 0.0095 7E-17 
55630 3.2 0.33 0.072 0.093 
90040 180 23 84 64 
95487 15 0.49 3.1 0.25 
23135220 20 0.69 0.44 0.22 
301122 1000 170 31 0.22 
10028156 4.4 0 0 0 
56382 100 31 0.79 6 
11097691 2E+06 5900000 1800000 4100000 
106478 12 4.5 2.1 0.63 
106445 16 0.05 0.69 0.032 
608935 7700 12000 7600 6200 
82688 1300 1400 1000 950 
87865 32 0.13 7.6 21 
52645531 28 48 0.47 16 
108952 0.36 0.0027 0.075 0.0028 
7664382 31 0 0 0 
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14816183 78 61 64 6.4 
85449 5.9 4.3E-05 0.00084 0.077 
23103982 19 0.12 1.6 8.1 
106503 1.4 0.027 0.031 0.047 
23950585 11 9 4.4 2.3 
1918167 36 1.6 0.61 1.1 
115071 0.022 0.037 0.022 0.012 
75569 29 18 28 0.8 
13457186 140 40 5.9 17 
129000 11 0.24 14 42 
110861 74 8 47 0.9 
78488 24000 97000 19000 370 
78922 0.57 0.14 0.23 0.008 
7782492 8100 1600 1900 2900 
7440224 1600 460 1400 1800 
93721 6.6 2 3.5 2.3 
122349 100 11 12 26 
100425 0.085 0.34 0.086 0.2 
96093 30 5.4 6.5 0.72 
2025884 6 0.00064 0.00051 0.0073 
75650 2.2 2.2 1.9 0.62 
127184 57 43 57 39 
7440280 1E+07 2700000 1.4E+07 2.1E+07 
137268 50 1.3 3.9 3.4 
7440315 39 0.024 39 67 
57018049 22 19 6.9 4.6 
108883 1 0.88 1 0.096 
8001352 2300 2800 2300 4600 
156605 0.66 2.4 0.67 0.64 
10061026 11 50 11 0.35 
2303175 250 710 200 33 
24017478 670 300 180 120 
52686 170 6.6 3.9 3.7 
79016 0.64 10 0.68 9.2 
121448 11 1.1 4.9 0.043 
1582098 110 8.6 79 150 
639587 1300 580 83 480 
7440622 1200 710 970 1200 
108054 1.5 0.75 1.4 0.015 
593602 23 50 23 13 
75014 69 3800 72 370 
1330207 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.034 
7440666 190 14 18 22 
12122677 6.6 1.8 0.67 0.87 
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Appendix C   
Cancer human toxicity potential values for emissions to different compartments, 
in benzene-to-air equivalents 
CAS#/Compound ID air water land underground 
630206 3.2 0.28 3.1 0.25 
79345 9.1 6.4 8.9 2.7 
79005 2.2 2.4 2.2 1.4 
75343 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.014 
75354 0.69 3 0.69 0.4 
57147 7.2 0.54 0.53 0.064 
67562394 690000 3600000 550000 1800000 
120821 0.0045 0.18 0.0063 0.041 
106934 6.3 12 6.4 1.8 
107062 2.4 2.8 2.4 0.32 
78875 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.3 
106990 0.54 4.9 0.54 0.14 
541731 0.6 0.83 0.59 0.17 
542756 0.3 0.27 0.29 0.0058 
106467 1.4 0.72 1.4 1.4 
123911 0.086 0.093 0.086 0.069 
207089 1000 15000 1100 1300 
106898 1.1 0.45 0.94 0.05 
100005 3 2.9 3 1.6 
63252 0.0035 0.036 0.0037 0.0051 
57117314 8500000 40000000 3800000 17000000 
1746016 1.2E+09 7E+08 1.2E+09 9E+09 
51207319 1600000 7000000 670000 1600000 
88062 2.5 0.043 1.6 0.3 
118967 0.56 0.0032 0.048 0.18 
94757 0.61 0.015 0.03 0.084 
95807 62 1.5 5.4 22 
121142 4.5 0.041 1.5 1.8 
606202 10 0.046 1.8 4.5 
91598 3.6 3.4 2.1 0.27 
123739 3.3 1.8 3.1 0.015 
79469 22 57 24 24 
90437 0.00072 0.002 0.00062 0.00026 
91941 9.6 0.0027 2.9 21 
101779 22 0.44 0.14 0.88 
92671 560 13 3.3 13 
30560191 0.16 0.03 0.013 0.00013 
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75070 0.017 0.0068 0.015 0.000041 
60355 0.91 0.019 0.048 0.0037 
79061 130 1.6 0.26 0.26 
107131 3.9 1.6 3.7 0.15 
309002 2500 9200 3300 7900 
107051 0.038 0.02 0.038 0.0029 
96184 130 160 130 74 
319846 87 170 38 16 
62533 0.011 0.0068 0.0061 0.00044 
7440382 2600 640 2700 4300 
1912249 9.7 0.0086 1.9 11 
151564 340 810 460 15 
114261 0.066 0.0095 0.0043 0.0079 
17804352 0.1 0.0062 0.0053 0.038 
71432 1 0.76 1 0.44 
92875 11000 570 340 540 
56553 54 0.45 22 91 
50328 6400 9.4 200 30000 
205992 130 370 110 240 
91225 12 3 5.9 0.47 
98077 240 0.019 0.69 6.1 
100447 0.89 0.079 0.85 0.13 
7440417 22 6.1E-47 0.045 0.02 
319857 98 130 36 23 
82657043 3.9 11 0.95 11 
108601 0.085 0.29 0.095 0.17 
111444 16 26 18 18 
117817 0.13 0.035 0.0012 0.02 
75274 52 39 51 13 
75252 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.38 
1689845 4.6 1.6 0.27 0.19 
7440439 28 1.3E-49 0.81 0.81 
2425061 4.8 3.9 0.11 0.13 
133062 0.0051 0.000078 0.003 0.0017 
86748 0.018 0.2 0.00034 0.00022 
10605217 0.13 0.043 0.037 0.055 
56235 280 270 280 43 
120809 0.14 0.0025 0.0019 0.0026 
57749 250 640 310 420 
124481 19 17 18 6.2 
67663 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.1 
107302 12 0.0022 12 0.81 
1897456 0.049 0.002 0.0046 0.0058 
7440473 130 3.2E-46 0.5 0.26 
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218019 5.1 0.78 1.2 21 
10061015 0.74 0.63 0.74 0.0063 
21725462 32 6.9 4.9 2.6 
52315078 1.9 0.41 0.76 3.3 
66215278 0.11 0.05 0.042 0.013 
72548 350 2300 340 370 
72559 240 340 250 320 
50293 210 410 220 270 
62737 1 0.66 0.91 0.00026 
53703 300 1700 300 3800 
25321226 1.4 1.5 0.38 0.25 
115322 82 180 59 1.8 
60571 7500 27000 8600 9400 
64675 1.6 0.022 0.67 0.27 
77781 190 0.22 34 4.7 
330541 1.1 0.34 0.31 0.76 
13194484 3.1 2.9 1.9 0.17 
140885 0.078 0.034 0.074 0.0016 
75218 11 5.6 10 1.7 
96457 1.2 0.1 0.075 0.035 
133073 0.14 0.0006 0.0024 0.013 
50000 0.02 0.00035 0.0055 0.00014 
58899 55 120 50 22 
1071836 0.008 0.058 0.0065 0.0028 
76448 38 270 78 290 
1024573 45 1800 56 100 
70648269 5.2E+08 4.6E+08 510000000 520000000 
87683 50 74 49 47 
118741 2300 3400 2200 2100 
67721 270 230 250 140 
302012 22 2.5 5.2 0.009 
123319 1.2 0.00025 0.0023 0.018 
193395 280 5700 350 5100 
36734197 1.9 0.062 0.066 0.25 
78591 0.0011 0.0027 0.0014 0.00028 
143500 6200 84000 5000 5100 
7439921 28 2 26 780 
330552 7.5 5.4 2.4 2 
121755 0.05 0.016 0.00065 0.0059 
74873 0.67 0.4 0.67 0.0023 
60344 1.8 2.9 2 0.34 
74884 110 55 110 3.3 
1634044 0.000011 0.0029 0.000055 0.00057 
75092 0.2 0.14 0.2 0.006 
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51218452 0.46 0.094 0.071 0.076 
2385855 5900 68000 4300 4800 
122667 33 3.4 0.046 0.26 
7440020 2.8 9E-48 0.0011 0.00029 
55630 15 1.5 0.33 0.42 
86306 0.019 0.12 0.02 0.009 
90040 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.2 
95534 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.36 
106478 0.23 0.083 0.038 0.012 
82688 76 77 57 53 
87865 1.2 0.005 0.3 0.82 
52645531 1 1.7 0.017 0.6 
23950585 0.96 0.75 0.37 0.19 
75569 0.26 0.42 0.26 0.042 
106490 0.38 1.9 1.3 5.1 
78488 12 50 9.9 0.19 
94597 0.31 1.8 0.35 0.23 
122349 4.5 0.48 0.51 1.1 
96093 0.59 0.11 0.13 0.014 
127184 0.92 0.79 0.92 0.73 
62566 2.3 0.019 0.014 0.006 
8001352 50 60 50 100 
10061026 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.0058 
2303175 17 48 13 2.2 
79016 0.055 0.15 0.055 0.15 
1582098 0.46 0.036 0.33 0.61 
593602 0.36 0.8 0.36 0.2 
75014 1.9 4.6 1.9 0.88 
 
Notes:   
1. Source: Hertwich E.G. and S.F. Mateles and W.S. Pease and T.E. McKone (2006).   
An update of the human toxicity potential with special consideration of conventional 
air pollutions. Working papers no.1/2006. Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology (NTNU) Industrial Ecology Programme (IndEcol). 
2. CAS#/Compound ID = The chemical abstract service number of the chemical or 
chemical    compound category. 
3. We only consider chemicals (indicated by CAS number or compound ID) both that 
were consistently reported on over period of TRI program and that were included in 
the Hertwich et al. (2006)’s HTP list. 
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6.1 Summary of main findings 
As for the imperfect competition, profit maximization is no longer well-defined firm 
objective. The preferences of the owners are often inconsistent with the firm 
objectives when a firm realizes that it can affect its price. The reason is that an 
individual with a share different from the population average wish to manipulate 
prices to alter wages versus profits. This thesis formulates three theoretical models 
that capture the effects of share ownership distribution on production and pollution 
intensity when firm decisions are taken through shareholder voting. These models’ 
hypotheses are tested by the panel data. The theoretical propositions and empirical 
findings are summarized as follows. 
 
6.1.1 Share ownership distribution and non-renewable resources 
extraction rate 
In chapter 3, different from Stiglitz (1976), we formulate a simple open-economy 
model with resource extraction where individuals differ in share ownership of the 
resource firm. The extraction decision is assumed to be made by the median in the 
voting distribution as the median’s policy proposal cannot lose against an alternative 
proposal in a binary election. We take as our shareholder voting equilibrium the 
extraction rate (i.e. the extraction rate preferred by the median in the voting 
distribution). The shares owned by the largest shareholder are taken as a proxy for the 
share of the median in the voting distribution given voting rights becomes naturally 
left-skewed (as the distribution of voting rights is not the same as the distribution of 
share ownership).  
 
We demonstrate that at each level of resource use, an individual shareholder with a 
share greater (smaller) than one over the population size prefers a smaller (greater) 
decline in extraction if substitution elasticity is smaller than unity. The result is 
reversed for higher substitution elasticity. The individual prefers an extraction rate 
coinciding with the first best if either the individual holds a share equal to one over 
the population size or if production function is Cobb-Douglas (unitary substitution 
elasticity). Our hypothesis is that if there is low substitution elasticity, the extraction 
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rate is smaller if the largest shareholder holds a larger share, and that a higher rate of 
extraction in one period gives a lower decline in the use of non-renewable resources 
in the next.  
 
We then test the impact of the share ownership owned by the largest shareholder on 
the extraction rate based on 20 US oil firms which are listed on Standard &Poor’s and 
the New York Stock Exchange covering the periods 1993-2007. Moreover, we create 
a proxy for extraction rate in firm-level so that resolve the unavailability of firm’s 
reserves data which is a common difficulty for researcher in relevant literature. To 
mitigate the endogeneity of regressors and the heterogeneity across firms, 
first-difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator is used. 
According to the criteria of Bond et al. (2003), the first-difference GMM model 
suggests the instruments are weak. System GMM is used consisting of the original 
equation and the first-differenced one. In particular, system GMM estimator has lower 
bias and higher efficiency than all other estimator when the sample is smaller. 
 
Our empirical result indicates that the extraction rate of non-renewable resources is 
smaller when the largest shareholder holds larger share ownership after controlling the 
effects of the lagged extraction rate, debt ratio and firm size and macroeconomic 
shocks (i.e. time dummy). The result is consistent with our theoretical hypothesis. 
Moreover, a non-linear relationship between them is captured suggesting that 
extraction rate decreases in the largest shareholder’s share ownership at an 
increasingly change rate. In addition, we find that larger firms are more likely to 
choose lower extraction rate. Higher debt would lead to greater extraction rate.  
 
Finally, we use alternative measurements of control variables and alternative 
estimation method, i.e. within groups IV to test the robustness of the results. The signs 
and coefficients of the share ownership and debt ratio are qualitatively similar to our 
main results.  However, firm size indicates irrelevant to the extraction rate when the 
measurement is changed (i.e. firm value is replaced by total assets).  
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6.1.2 Share ownership distribution and extraction rate of petroleum 
in oil fields 
 
Different from Pesaran (1990) and Favero (1992) who develop the production 
modeling for oil fields of UKCS, we would improve on accompanying strategic 
interactions between resources extracting firms and incentives to strategically delegate 
among shareholders. Chapter 4 examines the impacts of the share ownership owned 
by the largest licensee and the largest shareholder of the responsive multinational firm 
on extraction rate of petroleum. 
 
The sample consists of 44 oil fields in UKCS over 1997-2001. Our econometric 
analysis is conducted with the aid of two specific standard panel data models: 
fixed-effects model and random-effects model. According to the Hausman test, the 
random-effects model dominates the fixed-effects model.  Meanwhile, we correct the 
panel-specific autocorrelation and panel-level heteroskedastic error problems by 
clustering at the panel level.  
 
The results show that the share ownership of the largest licensee and the largest 
shareholder of its multinational company are important determinants of the extraction 
rate of the oil field.  We find evidence that share ownership owned by the operator 
(i.e. the largest shareholder of the oil field is the operator) has a positive effect on oil 
extraction rate at 5% significant level. The largest shareholder from the operator’s 
multinational company shows a strong relationship with the extraction rate of the oil 
field at 0.1% significant level. In particular, when the multinational firm’s largest 
shareholder increases 1 per cent of ownership, extraction rate would increases by 
0.3%. Moreover, pay thickness has negative impact on the extraction rate, suggesting 
that the oil field extract less when pay thickness is greater. Remaining reserves are 
positively correlated with extraction rate. 
 
In the end, we conduct a robustness test through sample selection and model 
specification and alternative estimation methods. First, the result changes little by 
excluding the influential point (i.e. outlier). Second, we test for non-linearities by 
adding quadratic and cubic terms of the key variables (i.e. share ownership of the 
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largest licensee and the largest shareholder). We do not capture the effects of 
quadratic or cubic relationship between share ownership and extraction rate. Third, to 
compare the robustness of random-effects model, Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
estimator (FGLS) and OLS with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) are used. 
The results are again qualitatively similar to our main results. 
 
6.1.3 Share ownership distribution and pollution emissions 
In chapter 5, different from Roemer (1993), a duopoly model is constructed which can 
capture strategic interaction among firms. It adds an incentive of strategically 
delegating to a CEO with different preferences, in order to affect the equilibrium of 
the game between the firms.  
 
We demonstrate that individual shareholder with a share 
i prefers a decision maker 
of at least twice the share of her own. This in turn implies that any individual with a 
share 2 i  or greater, will be at a corner solution wishing to delegate to the 
largest shareholder. Thus, if the distribution of shares satisfying 1
)(
)(








f
f
 (i.e. 
the distribution function is not too concave), the largest shareholder gets the vote of at 
least the group of shareholders holding  /2 or more. The representative majority 
elected under shareholder voting is the one with the largest share ownership, and then 
the largest shareholder is the Condorcet winner.  
 
In a Nash equilibrium, the larger the share of the decision maker of firm 1, the larger 
firm 1 production and pollution, and the smaller the production and pollution of firm 2. 
Furthermore, if the revenue elasticity is smaller than unity, i.e. if –R11y/R1 < 1, then 
the pollution intensity is smaller as the share of the decision maker is larger. Therefore, 
the hypothesis is that firms where the larger shareholder holds a larger share will have 
lower pollution intensity in a shareholder voting equilibrium.  
 
In terms of our empirical study, we test above hypothesis based on 93 U.S. publicly 
traded firms covering the periods 1997-2005 for three industries: the metal mining 
industry, the petroleum refining industry and the primary metal industry. We improve 
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on the measurement of pollution intensity taking into account weighted pollution 
emissions and deflated sales of the firms. To compare the robustness of our results, 
we use two estimation methods Feasible General Least Squares (FGLS) and 
Panel-Corrected Standard Error (PCSE). The heteroscedasticity problems in panel 
level are corrected.  
 
The result indicates that there is a negative relationship between the pollution 
intensity and share ownership by the largest shareholder after controlling for the 
effects of regulatory stringency, firm industry pollution intensity and age of assets and 
expenditure in research and development. The result is consistent with the theoretical 
hypothesis. The estimate suggests that a 10% rise in share ownership is associated 
with a 1.94% decrease in pollution. Moreover, we find that industry pollution 
intensity has a positive impact on pollution intensity. Pollution intensity is larger 
when regulation of state is lax. We also find that pollution intensity is lower as a firm 
expends more on research and development. 
 
In the end, we test the robustness of our results using alternative measurements and 
different model specifications.  The coefficients and significance of variables are 
qualitatively similar to our main results. We confirm the evidence that the larger share 
ownership the decisive shareholder has, the lower the pollution intensity of the firm.  
 
 
To sum up, our research has demonstrated that share ownership distribution matters 
for resources extraction and pollution control theoretically and empirically. A 
government or a regulator can reform with respect to sustainability and environmental 
protection by regulating share ownership structure. For instance, governments need to 
take ownership structure into account when privatizing a non-renewable resource 
company. However, our theoretical hypothesis and empirical studies might not fit 
China or other emerging economics due to different legal ownership structure in 
which government or regulator play an important role rather than decisive 
shareholder. 
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6.2 Major contributions 
Our analysis differs from the other economic studies in the field in a number of 
respects and main points are summarized in the following table 6.2:  
 
 Application of median voter theory to resources firms’ decisions                
 
Different from the prior literature in optimal extraction path of non-renewable 
resource, we construct a resource model taking into account the preferences of the 
individual who have a share different from the population average. Since the 
extraction rate preferred by median voter cannot loose against an alternative proposal 
by other candidates in a binary election, we take shareholder voting equilibrium as the 
extraction rate. Voting distribution is naturally left-skewed which increases as the 
largest shareholding becomes larger. Hence, the largest shareholder is the proxy for 
median voter (i.e. decisive shareholder). Contrary to Stiglitz (1976), the extraction 
path will not coincide with the first-best, unless the decisive shareholder holds a share 
exactly equal to one over population size. 
 
 Duopoly model with shareholder voting for pollution decisions 
 
Different from the previous study in pollution decisions, we formulate a duopoly 
model with shareholder voting taking into account strategic interactions between two 
resource firms. We demonstrate that firms wish to delegate to the largest shareholder. 
Moreover, in Nash equilibrium, the larger share the decisive shareholder has, the 
lower pollution intensity is preferred. This conclusion is contrary to Roemer (1993) 
who analyze the role of share ownership distribution in pollutants level without 
considering strategic interactions for more than one firm. 
  
 Empirical techniques with panel data models  
 
Few empirical evidences investigate the role of share ownership distribution in 
extraction and pollution decisions. We collect sample in time-series cross-section 
structure. As for the resource extraction model in chapter 3, system GMM and 
first-differenced GMM are used to mitigate the heteroscedastics and endogeneity due 
to the lagged extraction rate and other regressors. In particular, system GMM ensures 
the robustness of our results while the sample size is small. As for the resource 
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extraction for oil fields in chapter 4, fixed effects model and random effects model are 
used to control the heterogeneity (i.e. unobservable specific factors across oil fields 
influencing the extraction rate) across oil fields. As for pollution decision model in 
chapter 5, FGLS and PCSE are conducted based on TRI data. This is different from 
the recent paper concerning firm pollution emissions by Berrone et al. (2010) who 
estimate their panel regressions applying average Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Our 
estimators can better capture the heterogeneity among firms and heteroscedastics 
across panels. 
 
 Novel proxy for extraction rate and pollution intensity 
 
To resolve the unavailability and comparability matters in terms of firms’ resource 
reserves which is a difficulty for many researchers in related literature, we take firm 
value as proxy. Therefore, annual extraction rate is measured by the ratio between the 
values of total production over firm value for each year. As for the measurement of 
pollution, we improve on pollution by using deflated firm sales and obtain absolute 
value in ratio. 
 
 
Table 6.1  Contributions 
Novelty Results  Chapters 
1. Applying median 
voter theory to 
non-renewable 
resources  
The extraction rate of non-renewable resources is lower when decisive 
shareholder with larger share ownership  3 
2.Constructing  a 
duopoly model with 
shareholder voting 
taking into account 
strategic interaction  
Firms wish to delegate to the largest shareholder voting. The larger share the 
largest shareholder has, the less is the pollution intensity. 5 
3. Empirical study 
using panel data 
models are 
implemented. 
Share ownership distribution has impact on extraction and pollution decisions 
of resource firms. Estimation methods include: GMM, FE, RE , FGLS , PCSE.  3,4,5 
4. Variable 
measurements 
oil oil gas gasprice production price production
ExtractionRate
FirmValue
  
  
3 
 
/ ( / )itPollutionIntensity wp sales PriceDefaltor  5 
 
 
 192 
6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Although enormous effort has been made to study the effect of share ownership 
distribution in resource firms’ extraction rate and pollution intensity, there are 
inevitably some limitations in this thesis.  
 
Firstly, we are aware that the empirical results appear to be a paradox between chapter 
3 and chapter 4. This inconsistency is mainly attributed to different decision models. 
In chapter 3, the extraction decision model is constructed for a resource firm while it 
does not fit the empirical study of chapter 4 for oil fields where there are many 
resource producers on the same place. Therefore, the most important issue for future 
research is that a theoretical model would be developed for chapter 4. We would 
capture a game between resource extracting firms (different firms on the same 
plateau). It will be strategic interaction between those firms and incentives to 
strategically delegate among shareholders.  
 
Secondly, we restrict our focus to those firms listed U.S. market in chapter 3. Future 
research questions could be using data from other markets, developing a differential 
game model of resource extraction. Moreover, as for chapter 4, sample size is small 
due to the data availability of UKCS oil fields. To further investigate the role of share 
ownership distribution in extraction of oil fields of North Sea, we would collect more 
data from oil fields in Norwegian Sea area
15
.  
 
Finally, on the empirical side, the most important extension is to endogenize pollution 
emissions and firm performance. Combined with the endogeneity problem of 
pollution, we would further examine the relationship between share ownership 
distribution and pollution emissions. Meanwhile, we want to check these larger 
shareholders’ identity aiming to study what critical incentives drive their decisions in 
extraction and pollution control.  
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 North Sea oil often refers to a larger geographic set including areas in UK and Norway. 
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